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“There is actually no problem in 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina that is not in Mostar.” 
 
(Alexander Stuhler. Advisor to the Mayor in 
 Mostar, interview  No.12, 20051) 
 
The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina celebrated its tenth anniversary in November 
2005. Even though the Dayton Peace Accords ended a terrible ethnic civil war in 1995, the 
socio-economic situation is still - ten years later - experiencing serious problems. A high 
rate of unemployment, the declining economy and sinking incomes are only a few 
elements of a complex and complicated, as well as stagnating socio-economic situation. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is undergoing two major transitions at the same time. On the one 
hand there is the transition from war to peace; the process of recovery consists not only of 
the material reconstruction, but also of the reconstruction of administrative institutions, the 
reduction of ethnic tension and the restructuring of a civil society. On the other hand there 
is the process of transition from socialism to a market economy, which was postponed by 
the war during the 1990s. Still, problems of privatisation and administrative reforms are 
unresolved. 
In order to summarise the socio-economic situation in 2005, some exemplary 
numbers draw a sobering picture. Officially, 42% of the population are unemployed; more 
than 40% of the population earn less than 250 €/month so that the already high risk of 
poverty is rising (UNDP 2005a, 15-28). Therefore, it is no surprise that more than 70% of 
the population between the ages of 18 and 35 years old would leave the country if they 
could, leading to a ‘Brain Drain’ and the lack of perspective of major parts of the society 
(ibid, 15-28). Even though the statistical data is related to the whole country, the situation 
at the local level is to some degree comparable.  
Mostar is and was often described as a microcosm for Yugoslavia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in many ways (Bose 2002, 98). Nowadays, it also reflects the different 
problems and challenges of a socio-economic development for the whole state. The city 
does not only face economic hardship, but is also burdened by an ethnic division between 
Bosnians and Croats2. Furthermore, the international organisations’ intervention in 
                                                 
1 All interviews are marked by numbers regarding their chronologic order. For an detailed overview see 
Appendix 2. 
2 The questions of names, terms, etc. is discussed in 1.4. 
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Mostar’s local governance is fundamentally steering political decisions. In addition, 
questions of civil society, ethnic tensions and nationalism are highly influential. Therefore, 
Mostar is “… a dramatic and illuminating example of the interplay of local and 
international forces shaping Bosnia’s post-war transition in a context of deep division and 
chronic systemic crisis” as Bose analyses (2002, 98). Therefore, the capital of the 
Herzegovina region with its specific conditions, such as the ethnic division and its 
economic problems, was suitable for me to conduct research in. The central research 
question is consequently: 
“What are the hindrances to local socio-economic development in Mostar?” 
Personal interest and several trips to the Balkan region were the driving forces and 
the primary reason to conduct research in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question itself is a 
result of deep experiences and personal contacts that came throughout my journeys 
between 2002 and 2005. As a result, the thesis reflects both strong personal interest and 
academic grounding. My research time in November 2005 gave me the opportunity to 
follow the research question through academic means and personal motivation. The thesis 
itself is therefore the result of experience, studies, and personal research. 
 
 
1.1 Research questions 
In order to answer the broader research question of the limiting factors for the socio-
economic situation in Mostar, a number of sub-questions is required. Regarding the various 
influencing factors, four sub-questions helped to answer the main research question. Even 
though the term socio-economic development is broadly discussed, here I refer to a classic 
definition that includes growth and progress in a economic and social way (Watts 2000, 
166-170). It is obvious that post-war socio-economic development includes more than just 
economic factors, as political and social factors play a very important role as well. 
Therefore, there is a need to approach the research question from different angles, both 
from the social and the political. The following sub-questions can be seen as tools for 
deconstructing the complex and complicated socio-economic structure of Mostar: 
1. Are hard economic factors responsible for the current stage of development in 
Mostar? 
2. How does the local political milieu contribute to its limited development? 
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3. To what extent are the international organisations fostering or hampering local 
development? 
4. What is the role of civil society in the socio-economic development of Mostar?  
Since the first question addresses economic aspects, such as reconstruction, international 
financial aid and the labour market, the ensuring questions, numbers 2 and 3, deal with the 
local government structure. Whereas the second one covers the internal, local political 
structures as factors for limited development, the third one asks to what extent the 
international community, their policies and intervention are responsible for the hampered 
local socio-economic development in Mostar. Since the first three questions cover 
economic and political aspects, the fourth sub-question focuses on the social aspects. The 
contribution to the civil society or its absence is discussed as well as elements of the 
quality of social capital. Even though a sheer endless chain of sub-questions would follow, 
I concentrate on these four as tools for answering the main research question of the 
limiting factors of socio-economic development. Consequently, I used qualitative 
interviews as a methodological means to gain deeper insight into the complex and 
overlapping structure of regional socio-economic development. When analysing the 
statistical data, it became obvious to me that qualitative research was needed in order to 
reveal the interconnections between the various reasons for hampered local development.  
 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis itself is comprised of two main parts: the approach towards the research 
question and the analysis of the interviews as the core of the research. In order to approach 
the research question, an historical background, as well as a conceptual grounding is 
needed. Since the historical chapter, Chapter 2, concentrates on the broader background of 
the political development towards the civil war in ethnic and economic terms from the mid 
1960s until the 1990s, the war itself and the international intervention as well as the 
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) as the basis of today’s state are discussed.  
The theoretical chapter, Chapter 3, focuses on different approaches used to explain 
the socio-economic development. It is, therefore, based on literature, on concepts lent by 
human geography and political science. Due to the fact that there is no coherent post-
conflict theory (Meier 2001) that describes socio-economic development on the local level 
including elements of the transition from socialism to a market economy, different 
theoretical concepts are provided. The economic transition from war to peace and the 
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transition from socialist to market economy contribute to the theoretical framework in the 
same way as the concepts of social capital and new institutionalist economies. 
Furthermore, a conceptualisation of the role of international organisations in the 
context of nation and peace-building contributes to the understanding of socio-economic 
development in a post-conflict society. Finally, the theoretical chapter includes an 
application of the different components to the case of Mostar. Due to the high degree of 
complexity, there is a certain need to apply the components to the research region directly 
in order to see the links. This section aims to fill the gap between the theoretical 
approaches on the one hand and the applied field work on the other side.  
The theoretical chapter is followed by a detailed description of the applied 
methodology, the fieldwork itself and a discussion of the methods used. Chapter 4 consists 
therefore of a general discussion on qualitative methodology and a description of the 
research time in the field itself. The general discussion addresses the advantages and 
disadvantages of qualitative methodology and structured interviews in particular, but also 
the epistemological grounding. Furthermore, Chapter 4 also outlines the period of field 
work, a description of the conduct of the interviews, as well as an overview of the 
interviewees’ positions and institutions.  
The core of the thesis is the analysis of the 23 interviews in relation to the research 
question. Regarding the analysis - Chapter 5 - there are four fields contributing to the 
hindrances to socio-economic development in Mostar:  
1. hard economic factors 
2. internal political factors 
3. external political factors 
4. social factors  
The analysis connects the interview statements with the theoretical components and 
approaches. Therefore, the concepts discussed in the theoretical chapter are interwoven in 
the analysis. Chapter 5 provides the answer to the research question; it shows the 
interconnectedness of the four fields and marks the importance of civil society in the 
process of socio-economic development. It also tries to weigh the different fields regarding 
their influence and importance.  
Furthermore, the thesis is illustrated with photos that give an impression of my own 
personal view of the situation in the city of Mostar. All pictures were taken by myself and 
can be interpreted as a subjective view.  
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1.3 Research region 
The research region - the city of Mostar - exhibits the various elements of a 
multiethnic post-conflict society. Mostar is located in the western part of the Federation of 
Bosnia –Herzegovina (FBiH) (Figure 1) and is the capital of the historic region of 
Herzegovina (Scotto 2002, 103; Lovrenovic 1999).  It is located along the river Neretva 































ure 1:  Bosnia and Herzegovina (Source: Mostar City Administration) Besides physical geographic factors, the socio-economic fabric is of greater interest. 
ographically, the estimated census in 2004 gave a number of 105,572 inhabitants 
eral Office of Statistics 2004). The number is also a result of the war between 1992 
1995 with its direct and indirect consequences on the size of the city. It is estimated 
 more than 4000 people died during the war (Obradović 1996)3.  The reasons for the 
ge in the demographic composition are also due to domestic and international refugee 
rations. However, it would require detailed research to examine the exact reasons for 
consistency of population (UNHCR 2005). Figure 2, shown below, demonstrates the 
’s current population mixture in comparison to the pre-war situation. 
                                           
 clear that these numbers can only be seen as estimates. Victims of the war are also the internally and 
nally deported people. They are estimated at 56,000 (Bjelakovic/ Strazzari 1999). 
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Figure 2: Demographic composition of Mostar. Source: (aggregated data, see footnote 4 and 5) 
Year Total Bosniaks/Muslims Croats Serbs Others Yugoslavs 
19914 126628 43856 43037 23846 3121 12768
  100% 34,63% 33,99% 18,83% 2,46% 10,08%
20045 105572 50078 50989 3648 857  
    47,43% 48,29% 3,45% 0,81%   
 
Thus, the figures indicate that the city is now almost equally divided between Croats and 
Bosniaks; politically speaking, a stalemate situation. Immediately after 1995 Serbs and 
‘Others’ as categories lost their importance; earlier numbers of Serbs declined through 
ethnic cleansing and expulsion during the war (Bose 2001, 105). Yugoslavs as a statistical 
category does not exist after the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation; ethno-national 
awareness and a sense of belonging arose during the war. The concept of Yugoslavism 
vanished with the ethnic civil conflict (see Chapter 2). 
Founded by the Ottoman Empire in 1566, the city of Mostar represents the Ottoman 
realm through its architecture in the same way that it shows the historic Croatian influence 
with the Franciscan monastery. Both ethnic groups, Croatian and Bosniak, do have strong 
historical roots in Mostar. So there is a sentimental, historical and ethnic interest in 
dominating the city, expressed through different ways, such as symbols of national 
belonging and architecture (Sells 2002, 309-312; Gromes, Moltmann and Schoch 2004, 
11). 
Before the war began in 1992, Mostar was well known for its cosmopolitan 
atmosphere, as a functioning multiethnic society, as a showpiece of Titoist ideology, of 
‘brotherhood and unity’, as well as for its industrial and cultural importance (Bose 2002, 
99). Due to the war and the horrors of ethnic cleansing, the ethnic balanced has changed 
fundamentally into a stalemate situation between Croats and Bosniaks: “the social fabric 
was turned upside down…”, (Bose 2002, 106). Therefore, the city was divided into two 
sectors – West Mostar was dominated by Croats and East Mostar by Bosniaks. During the 
war, the front line divided the formally multicultural city entirely.  
Besides the political situation, the regional economic structure was also partitioned 
into two territories; consequently, there was no shared economic space. Firms in the 
western part oriented towards Croatia, while firms of the Bosniak part traded exclusively 
with Bosniak partners. Even though a reform that created of a commonly administrated 
city took place in 2005, the lack of local development is expressed by the high rate of 
                                                 
4 Aggregated numbers from the official census 1991, in Ivancović and Melčić 1999). 
5 Aggregated numbers from the Office of Statistical Data, Federal Office of Statistics (2004). 
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unemployment, the increase of poverty and stagnation of economic activities (UNDP 
2005a). Therefore, Mostar can be seen as representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
many ways. The lack of an efficient social system as well as missing economic 
perspectives are only two among many aspects that indicate a stagnating local development 
(UNDP 2005b). Although the inauguration of the old bridge in July 2004 can be 
interpreted as a major sign of recovery, local development, democratic stability, and the 
tension between the ethnic groups and their representatives are still visible today. 
 
 
1.4 Terminology and epistemology 
When discussing socio-economic development in a post-conflict situation several 
terms and phrases that are commonly used can be understood in different ways. Thus, the 
terminology must be clear in order to avoid misunderstandings in such a sensitive 
environment. Why and how undefined and set terms could lead to certain connotations is 
described by Said (1994) in general and Todorova in particular for the Balkans (1999).  
However, I define the most prominent ethnic groups and the different administrative levels 
of state as follows: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a term refers to the state as the whole. It contains two 
entities, the Serb-dominated entity of the Serb Republic (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (FBiH). Even though the term federation could be understood as a 
federation between the RS and the FBiH, it only refers to the FBiH, which is dominated by 
Croats and Bosniaks. The definition is related to the Dayton Peace Accords, where the 
administrative bodies were formed and defined (DPA 2005).  
Furthermore, there is a need to define the prominent ethnic groups living in Bosnia. I 
assume that all of them are ‘Bosnians’, but their sense of ethnic belonging differs 
fundamentally. The prefix ‘Bosnian’ is assumed because the my analysis is connected to 
Bosnia. When, for example, the term ‘Croats’ is mentioned, then the Bosnian Croats are 
meant. Already in the introduction, when names and categories were mentioned there was 
a need for definitions. In general, when speaking of ethnic groups, I refer to Scotto’s 
definition (2004, 46). He defines Croats - in a Bosnian context - as the ethnic group that 
lives in Bosnia, that is mainly Roman Catholic and has Croatian cultural roots and 
traditions (see also Sundhausen 2005, 389-393). Furthermore, Serbs are seen as an ethnic 
group mostly of the Orthodox Christian faith. They also have their own linguistic roots and 
traditions, although they might not differ much from some traditions of the Croatians (see 
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Bartl 2005, 607). When speaking of Bosniaks, the term is more complicated and has 
undergone fundamental changes during the last half century. Scotto explains the 
development of the term in detail (2004, 46–48). When I speak of Bosniaks, I mean the 
Muslim population with a Bosnian identity (Džaja 2005, 123). Due to concepts of 
nationhood, the term Muslim is not appropriate, therefore the term Bosniak is used. I am 
aware that there are wide discussions on identity and ethnic markers but they are issues 
beyond the scope of the research question; for a deeper insight into the concepts of 
ethnicity, nationhood and their definition, see Smith (1986, 1991), Schöpflin (2003) or 
Gellner (1997). However, concerning the research question a detailed explanation on 
identity, ethnic belonging and nationhood is not necessary. 
Besides the definition of the terms, the clarification of my epistemological standpoint 
is an important issue for me. Due to the fact that “knowledge varies and depends on the 
context” (Baumann 2002, 79), my analysis of the limiting factors of the socio-economic 
development in Mostar belongs to a constructivist epistemological stance that is embedded 
in humanist geographical approaches. The discussion about a new understanding of 
cultural geography - the new cultural geography - covers the discussions about the 
epistemological grounding, the advantages and limitations of such a standpoint (see 
Werlen 2003; Massey 1999; Thrift 1999). Even though a constructivist stance neglects the 
existence of a single and universal truth and believes in a socially constructed environment 
of actors, certain phenomena are taken as facts for the decision makers (Krell 2000, 14). 
For the Bosnian case, I wish to clarify that there is no doubt that war crimes and 
genocide happened during the 1990s, and a moderate constructivist standpoint does not 
question the existence of violence (Todorova 1999, 198). Nonetheless, both the theoretical 
approach and my applied methodology are deeply embedded in the humanist concepts of 
geography, where results are always bound to the context, time and place (Robinson 1998, 
8). Therefore, the context could consist of the choice of actors, my own attitude towards 
the research topic as well as time and place. Thus, the results are influenced by 
subjectivity, perception and interpretation, but reflect the social reality of the interviewees 
(Audi 1998, 14). Although the results underline a subjective interpretation and personal 
perception, a critical and balanced way was ensured. Hence, social reality is taken as a 
reality that is constructed and relative, but all actors take such a constructed reality as if it 
would exist; they act and react on the assumption of their reality (Krell 2000, 242). These 
few remarks are rather standpoints that give the context in which the results of the thesis 
are based.  
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2 Political and Historical Background 
 
“Without the history of war you cannot 
 understand what happened in Mostar” 
 
 (Erich Rathfelder, interview No. 1, 2005)6
 
There is no understanding of the present without the past. This chapter is addressed to 
the political and historical backgrounds of Bosnia Herzegovina in the Yugoslavian and 
post-Yugoslavian context. The first section is an overview of the Yugoslavian form of 
socialism and the political radicalisation that lead to the civil war in which I focus mainly 
on economic as well as political aspects. The second section focuses on the war itself and 
provides a descriptive introduction rather than an explanation. For an explanation of the 
causes of the war from different perspectives see Woodward (1995), Silber and Little 
(1996), Donia and Fine (1994) or Magas (1993a).  The final section gives insight into the 
Dayton Peace Agreement and its consequences for the post-war recovery. In order to 
understand the present-day situation, an overview of the political contexts and the legacies 
of war and socialist times is necessary. The role of the international community is 
especially important. The shift from active intervention in the open and violent conflict to 
the role of consultant after ten years of recovery influences the current situation.  
 
 
2.1 Socialist Yugoslavia - ethnic balance and economic stability?  
Yugoslavian socialism differed to a great extent from the forms of socialism in 
Eastern Europe under the supervision of the USSR. Caused by its special demographic and 
historical background, Yugoslavia’s socialism had its individual “brand of socialism and 
its own microstructure” as Steinherr and Gros state (1996, 320). The fact that Yugoslavia 
freed itself from fascism by the end of the Second World War through the strong and 
identity-forming Partisan movement under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito led to the 
relative independence and low Soviet influence in the nation-building process of the 
country. Even though Tito was trained by USSR communists, the break with the Soviet 
form of socialism became evident in 1948 (Glenny 1999, 547).  The independent stance of 
Yugoslavia was mainly feasible through a new, supra-ethnic and supranational 
                                                 




Yugoslavian identity that derived from the Partisan movement and Tito’s understanding of 
the multiethnic Yugoslavian society. Tito was able to strengthen Yugoslavian identity, the 
so-called ‘Yugoslavism’ (Malcolm 1994, 198), through the fight against external enemies,  
which suppressed animosities between the ethnic groups - mainly Croats and Serbs 
(Glenny 1999, 574). This identity was strong especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “In 
Bosnia, 891,800 declared themselves Yugoslavs, far more than in any other republic” 
(Donia and Fine 1994, 178). 
 The suppression of competing national demands was, in retrospective, only possible 
through a political system that was tailored to Tito himself. The cult of personality was a 
phenomenon in which Yugoslavia did not differ from the USSR. Glenny states that   
“…the entire political structure in Yugoslavia was dependent on Tito’s belief in his own 
infallibility” (1999, 574).  It is said that Tito’s slogan was that the mass graves of the 
Second World War should be forgotten and ignored in order to form a common socialist 
identity (interview Mirsad Behram No.12, 2005; Donia and Fine 1994, 163). How fatal 
such politics of neglecting the past were, as shown by the nationalistic references of the 
fighting parties during the civil war between 1992 and 1995, when they used nationalist 
and historic symbols and stories in order to manipulate the people (Malcolm 1994, 217).  
After Tito’s death in 1980 these nationalist demands occurred in an even more extreme 
way, as the history of the recent conflict showed. There were tensions between nationalist 
groups within Yugoslavia, but Tito’s strict policy against national identities kept them 
under tight control (Glenny 1999, 625).  Once the central authority became weaker, at first 
through the new constitution of 1974 and then accelerated by the centrifugal forces of 
nationalism, the soil for an open conflict was prepared (ibid, 625). Besides ethnic tensions, 
economic decline and the discrepancies between the republics fostered the breakdown of 
Yugoslavia.  
After the Second World War, Yugoslavia - with its form of socialism - had open 
contacts between the West and the East, equally between North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) member states and the states of the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia’s 
openness to both the free markets and the command economies led to its fast economic 
growth after the Second World War. During the 1950s and 1960s it seemed that 
Yugoslavia would be the winner of the competition between the superpowers, especially in 
economic terms (Malcolm 1994, 2001). Its economic structure followed a middle way 
between a centrally-planned command economy and the liberal market economy of the 
Western states. “In the 1950s Yugoslavia was by far the best performer in the group of 
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socialist countries,” as Steinherr and Gros conclude (1996, 324). One element of 
liberalisation was, for example, that worker’s councils were making the decisions for their 
firms on a micro-scale. The principle of self-management, where the workers themselves 
had managed investments and production, innovation and trade, and the liberalisation of 
markets seemed to be successful concepts to realize the socialist society (Glenny 1999, 
575; Donia and Fine 1994, 173). However, by the end of the 1970s the weak points of the 
system became apparent. Yugoslavia faced the major problem of underemployment, which 
can also be seen as a special characteristic of the Yugoslavian form of socialism7. The 
massive supply of labour led to an exodus of workers especially to Germany in the 1970s. 
Great parts of these, so-called ‘guest- workers’ were mostly from the poorer republics of 
the south: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro (Glenny 1999, 589). By the 
end of the 1970s these guest workers were sent back to Yugoslavia, so that the local labour 
markets were overburdened through waves of additional labour. This process accelerated 
the economic decline. In addition to the weak economic situation that was characterised by 
the return of 800,000 workers, the beginnings of hyperinflation and increasing foreign 
debts were putting pressure on the Yugoslavian economy. The years 1970-1990 were 
characterised by increasing hyperinflation and rocketing foreign debts. The increase in 
foreign debts can be seen as an attempt to meet the increasing demand for consumer goods 
(Morewood and Aldcroft 1995, 163). A consequence of the increasing foreign debts was 
the expansive monetary policy which led to hyperinflation. “By 1975 the Yugoslav 
government was proclaiming that ‘inflation is enemy number one’ in our socialist society 
and the struggle against it is a major political problem” (Aldcroft and Morewood 1995, 
167). The discrepancies between the northern rich and growing republics: Slovenia, Serbia 
(without Kosovo) and Croatia and the poorer Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro increased. The central organs did not find proper macro-economic tools to 
stabilize the situation. “Regional variations were aggravated by the growing inability of the 
Yugoslav economy to absorb the available labour supply,” as Aldcroft and Morewood 
argue (1995, 172). Finally, the politics of the Yugoslav command economy were not able 
to solve the deteriorating economic situation by 1990 (Donia and Fine 1994, 165).  
However, the causes of the Yugoslavian collapse and its violent consequences are 
heterogeneous and the weighting of political, ethnic and economic elements differs. The 
description given here is an overview rather than a complete analysis of the complex 
economic processes. While the economic processes are only one side of the coin, the 
                                                 
7 In the Soviet-influenced countries unemployment or underemployment was seen as an element of market 
economies. Without free markets there is no market for labour and, therefore, no unemployment is possible. 
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following section focuses on the radicalising national movements and the slide towards the 
period of civil war from 1992-1995 that can be seen as the other side that led to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
 
 
2.1 The way to civil war in Yugoslavia 
 
 “The real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the 
 disintegration of governmental authority and 
 the breakdown of a political and civil order.” 
 
 (Susan Woodward 1995, 15) 
 
When asking about the reasons for the civil war in Bosnia within the process of the 
Yugoslavian collapse, several approaches are discussed (Woodward 1995; Bose 2002, 
Magas 1993a). However, it seems that ethnic nationalism played a decisive role.  After 
Tito’s death nationalism, especially that of the Croatian and Serbian peoples, was the 
accelerating force in the destruction of Yugoslavia. As described above, the national claims 
within the Yugoslav socialist state had never been unimportant. During the 1960s, for 
example, the Croat national movement was becoming stronger and cried out for better 
representation within the Yugoslavian state in terms of language and culture (Donia and 
Fine 1994, 182; Glenny 1999, 586). Also, the emergence of a Bosnian Muslim national 
identity during the 1960s was influential. During the first years of consolidation after the 
Second World War, there was no accepted Bosnian Muslim nation. This changed with the 
census of 1961 when, the Muslims had been ethnically accepted; but still without political 
power. Finally, in 1971, the Bosnian Muslims were fully accepted as a nation (Donia and 
Fine 1994, 184). Since then the Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have called 
themselves Bosniaks (Scotto 2004, 47). The term refers to a national identity that has been 
derived from a religious tradition. In the following the term Bosnikas always refers to the 
Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast, all peoples living in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are called Bosnians.  
In spite of this, Tito’s approach towards occasional acts of nationalism, no matter 
which one (Croat, Serb, Muslim), was repressive (Glenny 1999, 593). With all means 
available he restricted the appearance of nationalism under Yugoslav socialism, knowing 
that such forces would destroy the idea of ‘Yugoslavism’ (Donia and Fine 1994, 180). 
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After Tito’s death there was no authority that could adequately fill the gap and his 
followers were deeply rooted in their national identity. Along with the deteriorating 
economic situation and the political instability, various forms of nationalism came to the 
surface and led to the conflict in the 1990s. 
These expressions of nationalism had been streamlined through a manipulation of the 
masses; exclusiveness and chauvinist nationalist elements were used to gain the masses’ 
support, as Donia and Fine explain: “[i]n an environment of national rivalry aggravated by 
economic decline retaining popularity is a remarkable achievement for any leader” (1994, 
190).  Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman were the most prominent leaders of the 
post-socialist nationalist movements. In 1987 Slobodan Milošević came to power in the 
republic of Serbia and started to imploy Serbian nationalism, both within Serbia and at the 
Yugoslavian national level (ibid, 204). It was only possible to establish these strong 
nationalist claims in the context of greater republican independence and the weakening of 
the Yugoslavian socialist state (Magas 1993b). Milosevic’s goal was to transform 
Yugoslavia into greater a Serbia (Woodward 1995, 134). However, not only in Serbia did 
nationalist movements came to power, and in Croatia radical nationalist forces also 
controlled politics (Donia and Fine 1994, 206). As soon as territorial demands and 
nationalist movements in Serbia, Croatia and also in to a lesser extent Slovenia were 
successful, the “[…] Yugoslav Federation was dead” (Glenny 1999, 638). Then at last, the 
“National equality, embodied in the slogan: ‘brotherhood and unity’” and the idea of a 
Yugoslav identity was entirely destroyed (Donia and Fine 1994, 175). It is still an open 
question as to which aspect led to which cause, but Glenny (1999) and Woodward (1995) 
argue that the increase of radical nationalism is a consequence of the political breakdown 
and the economic decline of Yugoslavia and not vice versa.  A different approach is 
followed by Magas, who emphasises Serbian nationalism as the element that turned the 
economic troubles into a civil war (1993b, 251).  
The violent outcome of the processes described above depicts the situation in which 
Croatia and Slovenia voted for and declared independence in 1991. Then the question of 
national minorities and their rights, and the protection of the ‘motherlands’ became the 
starting point for the civil wars in Yugoslavia (Woodward 1995, 221). International 
acceptance of the republics’ independence took place soon after the referenda, so that the 
ground for civil war was prepared (Donia and Fine 1994, 218, Glenny 1999, 637). 
In Croatia the war started with the demands of ethnic Serbs in the region of Kraijna 
who saw their minority rights under threat, and the endless chain of territorial demands 
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based on majorities began to exacerbate the political instability (Malcolm 1995, 215). In 
April 1992 in Sarajevo a demonstration against war ended terribly when Serbian snipers 
killed peacefully-acting demonstrators. These snipers were part of Serbian Army’s 
campaign to keep Bosnia within the rump Yugoslavia (Glenny 1999, 638). This was the 
start of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was the result of the complex 
interconnection of religious, national, economic and political factors. 
Two phases of the war can be distinguished when examining the case of the city of  
Mostar: a) the war against the Yugoslav Army under Serbian control, in which Bosniaks 
fought together with Croatian troops and b) the ‘war within a war’ in which Croatian 
troops fought against Bosniak troops. The Bosniak-Croat coalition against the Serbian 
controlled Yugoslavian Army was the starting point of hostilities in 1992; however, the 
larger and more important phase for Mostar was the war between Muslims and Croatians 
from 1993-1995, when the city was divided and each side was ethnically cleansed (Bose 
2002, 96-98). Before the war, Mostar was well known for its Yugoslavian spirit that came 
from its ethnic heterogeneity. “Until 1992 Mostar was a charming microcosm of Bosnia 
and the former Yugoslavia - a captivating blend of south Slavic, Ottoman Turkish and 
Mediterranean cultural traditions with one of the most multinational population structures 
of any Bosnian or Yugoslav towns” (ibid, 98). During the war the ethnically mixed city 
was exclusively divided between the Bosniaks in the east and the Croatians in the west. 
Most of the Serbian population was expelled during the conflict (Scotto 2002, 105).When 
the symbol of Mostar, the old bridge, was destroyed in 1993 it became the symbol of the 
tragedy of the Balkan wars.  In many other aspects Mostar also became symbolic for the 
Balkan war because most of the conflicts that could be seen on the national level, could 
also be seen in the war around Mostar. The “division of the town into rival enclaves 
refracts the fate of Bosnia as a whole” (Bose 2002, 98). House-to-house fighting was also 
representative and, as Rathfelder states in an interview, “during the war it was really hell in 
East Mostar. There were only contacts through the cellars. You couldn’t go out. Everyone 
was killing [...]” (interview No.1, 20058). When the Croatian and Bosniak conflicting 
actors agreed on peace in 1994 through international pressure, 4000-5000 people had been 
killed and 56,000 had been expelled from the Mostar region (Scotto 2004, 105)9. The 
central zone around the front line, the Boulevard street, was entirely devastated. 
                                                 
8 German interviews are translated by me. For details of translation, see Chapter 4. 
9 The numbers of deaths differ in various sources. Due to population migrations in Mostar, it is a difficult to 
measure the casualties of the war. 
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 Photo 1: Destruction and reconstruction. Former front line, Boulevard, Mostar (© author) 
 
However, the applied tactics of ethnic cleansing and genocide, as well as the many 
kinds of war crimes that happened in Mostar could also be seen in the other parts of Bosnia 
(Human Rights Watch 2004). The massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 and the siege of 
Sarajevo from 1992-1995 are just two prominent crimes that stand for a terrible war 
between different ethnic groups steered by nationalistic leaders (Honing and Both 1997).  
Without going into further detail about the changing frontiers and borders, single 
events and political negotiations, the role of international intervention should be briefly 
described because it still has a major impact on the current political situation. The role of 
the international community, especially the European Union (EU) within the complex 
process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration is essential when describing the progress of the war 
and the development after it.  
The EU and the United States of America (USA) accepted the independence of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, based on the Wilsonian Principle 
of national self-determination (Donia and Fine 1994, 214). Germany’s early acceptance of 
the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen especially as an escalating factor in 
the war (Glenny 1999, 637; Donia and Fine 1994, 233). The acceptance of independence 
by the international community motivated Serbian regular and paramilitary troops to keep 
Bosnia under control because ‘Rump Yugoslavia’, or Greater Serbia, feared further loss of 
territory (Magas 1993a, 251). However, as soon as the political situation worsened, the 
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international community sent mediators who tried to negotiate a cease fire. In order to stop 
the ethnic cleansing and war crimes a United Nations Mission, by the name of the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), was formed to not only keep the negotiated cease 
fire in 1992, but also to fulfil a humanitarian mandate. Cyrus Vance, a US diplomat, 
announced that Serbs and Croats had agreed on peace. Peace was de jure on paper but de 
facto not existing; the UNPROFOR was not at all able to keep peace and to guarantee 
stability, because the war had just started (Donia and Fine 1994, 227). Finally, the Vance-
Owen peace plan failed because of a lack of support by the ethnic groups (Bose 2002, 
168). The UNPROFOR’s mandate was weak and had assumed that there would be at least 
a ceasefire, which was in fact not the case (Woodward 1995, 200). Due to an inappropriate 
UN mandate and a lack of co-ordination between UNPROFOR and NATO, the massacre 
in Srebrenica in 1995 was easily carried out by Serb paratroops. “[T]he peacekeepers on 
the ground, preliminarily trained for humanitarian missions, were ill-equipped to respond” 
as Pilch and Derdzinski argue (2004, 104). It was often the case that the peacekeepers 
themselves could be targeted by the conflicting parties; the massacres in Srebrenica and 
Goražde are only the most prominent and terrible cases of such attacks (Honing and Both 
1997). 
The role of international intervention embraced several elements. While the 
UNPROFOR troops were trying to keep the frequently agreed, but not recognised 
ceasefires between the conflicting actors, UN trade sanctions were placed on Serbia in 
1992. The most ambiguous, but also the most successful, form of intervention was the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) air strikes against Serbian artillery in Bosnia 
and against infrastructure in Serbia itself in 1995 (Crnobrnja 1996, 27). In sum, 
international intervention had two faces as Pilch and Derdzinski argue, “as UN 
intervention in the Bosnian conflict began as non-forcible humanitarian intervention, but 
shifted in 1995 to an enforcement action,” (2004, 112). All criticism aside, it should be 
appreciated that international intervention helped to limit the scope of the conflict (ibid, 
112). Under the pressure of NATO air strikes it was possible to force the three conflicting 
actors – Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks – to sign the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. It has 
to be stated that all the conflict’s actors - Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks - had not given up 
fighting and, therefore, they were fully accepted as actors also in the post-war period, 
which meant that the question of responsibility was not discussed and the reconciliation 
process was blocked from the beginning (ibid, 113). A closer look at international 
intervention during the years of conflict is important when speaking of the responsibility 
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that it took and the image that it has, in particular for the period of restructuring after the 
war. 
Finally, the General Framework Agreement of Peace as part of the Dayton Peace 
Accords (DPA) in 1995 ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which approximately 
250,000 people were killed and two million people had fled (Scotto 2004, 59). The DPA 
also ended open violence; therefore it was the basis for a structural peace (Galtung 1982) 
and, at the same time, it is a precondition for any further social, economic and political 
development. In the following I reveal some specifics of the DPA, in particular the 
influence of the international community tied to the constitution through the DPA. 
 
 
2.2 The Dayton Peace Accords - the basis of post-war recovery? 
The Dayton Peace Accords is not only the peace agreement between the conflict 
actors but also the formal acceptance of a Bosnian-Herzegovinan state (Bose 2002, 2). 
When the DPA were signed in 1995 by the three leaders of the former enemies including: 
Franjo Tudjman for the Croats, Slobodan Milošević  for the Serbs and Alija Izetbegović 
for the Bosniaks, it has to be recognised that the peace treaty was produced by external 
forces was a product of Western diplomats and politicians. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became a formal and accepted political unit under the Dayton Peace treaty and therefore it 
is a “state by international design and of international design” (ibid, 2002, 60). This means 
that it is a compromise between the former conflicting actors and it accepts the 
demographic and ethnic composition after three years of ethnic cleansing and expulsion 
(Almond 1999, 450). With signing the peace treaty the homogenous composition of ethnic 
groups that was a result of war crimes was internationally ratified. Although, a 
confirmation of the ethnic composition in 1995 caused major problems, such as the 
resettlement of returnees or the question of property rights, the DPA ended at least the 
ongoing ethnic cleansing and expulsion. However, the conflict situation for the 
international community did not leave many possibilities for solving the problem. The 
“[…]Yugoslav drama moved on a new stage, one of reconstruction and reconciliation 
rather than destruction and confrontation,” as Crnobrnja states (1996, 266). 
However, the DPA entail several elements for the regulation of public and private 
life. Furthermore, the General Framework of the DPA ensures all democratic elements. 
This includes strong protection for minorities that are guaranteed through the constitution 
(General Framework Agreement 1995, Article I-XI). On a political level, it structures the 
 17
artificially-formed state into two politically almost independent entities: the Republika 
Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). When forming the 
territories of the entities, the status of fighting in 1995 was taken as a base to draw the map 
(Bose 2002, 60). The proportion of Bosnia and Herzegovina divided between FBiH and RS 
was 51:49. While the RS is dominated by Serbs, the FBiH is a coalition between Croatians 
and Bosniaks who were able to agree on a separate peace before it came to the DPA in late 
1995 (ibid, 61). The executive power of the state is based mainly on the entity level; very 
few political fields such as foreign affairs or currency are regulated on the national level. 
Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state is rather weak; the entities, divided by ethnicity 
are rather strong. Therefore the international community is keeping the state together 
through external pressure (Ó Tuathail 2006). Moreover, joint institutions are the expression 
of the international community to form a joint state, therefore, the “state institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina function more like international conferences than organs of state,” 
as Haris Silajdzić, a member of the Muslim dominated SDA (Party for Democratic 
Action), states (in Bose 2002, 26).  In the joint institutions, a balance of ethnic groups is an 
essential priority. The president, for example, is changed every three months according 
ethnicity – in order to guarantee the ethnic balance.  
The DPA also ensure that all democratic structures of the new state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are under the international control of the Office of High Representative 
(OHR). Officially it is “the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this 
Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement” (DPA, 1995 Art I, Para 
2). It has, therefore, the power to steer the reforms towards democratic development 
without being itself democratically legitimised. The term ‘steering’ means that the High 
Representative is able to impose laws and to dismiss officials at every level of 
administration when they do not fulfil the democratic principles; they are backed by the 
mandate of the ‘Bonn Powers’, additional rights given by a conference in Bonn in 1997 
(PIC 1997). The ‘Bonn-Powers’ had been the answer to the lack of progress in 
democratisation. Many local authorities had not been able or willing to implement reforms. 
Therefore, the ‘Bonn-Powers’ are an enlarged political instrument to steer the process of 
democratisation. However, the role of the OHR was often criticised because it led to a lack 
of responsibility and a lack of initiatives by local politicians (Knaus and Martin 2003). The 
element of international control in the DPA is also important when speaking about the role 
of the international community in the later years of restructuring and recovery. When the 
‘Bonn-Powers’ were given to the OHR, its active involvement in national and local politics 
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was massive and influential. There was open criticism of the strong political involvement 
of the OHR regarding the phenomenon of ownership. Cox and Knaus argue that the 
increasing use of the Bonn-Powers after 1997 led to the passiveness of local authorities in 
the democratisation process (2003, 8). The intervention of the OHR at the local level was 
especially strong in Mostar. Even  after the DPA, the city was still ethnically divided and 
administrated by six municipalities, which were independent from each other and were 
ruled by the ethnic parties. Instead of guiding local authorities towards peaceful reforms on 
reunifying the city the OHR, after negotiations failed between the local political parties on 
the reunification of the city a new status of a reunited city administration was imposed by 
the OHR.  This shows that the role of international engagement in the peace process has 
changed and does not necessarily have a positive outcome (Knaus and Martin 2003). The 
undemocratic means that the OHR has - the executive, legislative, and juridical power in 
one hand, “[…] may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” (Madison in 
Knaus and Martin 2003, 73).  
Besides the influence of the international community, the local political scene in 
Mostar is dominated by the two parties representing different ethnic groups. The HDZ 
(Croatian Democratic Party) and the SDA (Socialist Democratic Action – representing the 
Bosniaks) had both been founded in 1990; they were both actively involved in conflict. 
Furthermore, they represent nationalist stances and are both integrated into the local 
business and media (Scotto 2004, 106). While the HDZ was heavily supported by the HDZ 
in Croatia and claimed the independence of Herceg-Bosna as an independent Croatian 
republic, the SDA had no direct support from other states. The radicalisation of these 
nationalist parties was also expressed through a strong connection to military forces (ibid, 
108). However, the programmes of the parties changed during the years of recovery. 
During and shortly after the conflict both represented radical and, to a certain extent, non-
democratic stances. Once the hard-liners had been dismissed by the OHR in 2000 the 
structures became increasingly more democratic (Bose 2002, 129). Especially the Croatian 
political representation of the HDZ had massive informal structures that had been 
supported by the Croatian government until 2003 when these structures were cut off by the 
OHR.  Until 2003 the political situation was entirely divided between the HDZ, which was 
ruling its municipalities and the SDA, which was controlling the eastern districts. In that 
sense the “[…] war has continued with other means” (Mirsad Behram interview No. 12, 
2005).  
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A precondition for the reunification of the city was the democratisation process 
within the ruling parties. There is a visible trend towards more democratic and liberal 
programmes due to the fact that younger elites took power and war-experienced politicians 
were discredited for not solving the current problems for the people (Jenichen 2004, 16). 
After the reunification of the city administration the will to co-operate has increased over 
the last few years and the internal structures of the parties have changed. However, there 
are still fields of politics that are far from being successful. In particular the cultural and 
education issues are problematic to agree upon (Bose 2002, 136).  
 
This chapter tried to focus on the political and economic backgrounds that led to the 
current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, in Mostar. The roots of the 
conflict derive mostly from the socialist state, economic decline and increasing nationalist 
politics that resulted in the civil war. Besides the description of the socialist past, I outlined 
the civil war itself with an emphasis on the role of international intervention. Moreover, the 
DPA and their consequences are discussed as well as the political scene in Mostar itself.  
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 3 Concepts of Local Development and Peace-Building in Mostar 
 
 “As far as starting points for economic transitions go, 
it is difficult to imagine a more difficult position 
than the one in which Bosnia found itself in late 
1995.”  
 
(Timothy Donais 2002) 
 
In order to approach the research question, “What are the hindrances to socio-
economic development in Mostar?” on a theoretical level, I have to deconstruct the 
complex and multi-layered post-war reconstruction process of local development in 
Mostar. Therefore, I focus on two main processes: local economic development in 
transitions and post-war reconstruction. The complexity of the situation in Mostar is made 
more potent by the post-conflict layer so that a comprehensive approach, in which different 
components are discussed, seems necessary in order to explain the ongoing processes 
adequately.  In contrast, a neo-classic and substantive, rather than static, approach to local 
development would reduce the understanding of the situation (Bathelt and Glückler 2005, 
1546; Stiglitz and Hoff 2001, 396). The latter, post-conflict aspect deals mainly with 
political, ethnic, national and conflict oriented approaches of nation and peace-building, 
whereas the former covers three different parallel aspects of local development, such as the 
transitions from war to peace, from socialist to market economy and an insight is given 
into the geographic concepts of social capital and institutional approaches. This chapter 
provides several components that play a part in the different processes of development in 
Mostar, and therefore it cannot be seen as an exhaustive, explanatory one. The lack of 
coherent approaches that would combine these different aspects, as Meier and Stiglitz 
(2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and others (Deininger 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Harztell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001) remark, have required the provision of several 
influencing components. 
When approaching the puzzle of development in post-conflict situations, as in 
Mostar, a structural theoretical approach is required. Many authors focus on nationalism 
and ethnic tensions that are in a sense addressing the roots and causes of the Yugoslavian 
catastrophe (1992-1995), rather than focusing on the post-conflict developments. However, 
one cannot ignore the components of ethnic, religious and national tensions in the context 
of peace-building (e.g. Campbell 1998; Mojzes 1999; Chandler 2000; Bougarel 2003). In 
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my theoretical approach priority is given to a structural, economic and institutional 
approach to building peace, rather than to individual perspectives of nationalism, identity 
and ethnic conflict (Flint 2005, 15), but linkages to nationalist and ethnic conflicts are 
touched upon. Even though the different components are provided separately, there is a 
high degree of interconnectedness between all components. 
 Therefore, a combination of economic and local transition approaches and the 
components of post-conflict developments will be discussed in this chapter. In the final 
section of this chapter introductory aspects of the concrete situation of local development 
in Mostar, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be provided in order to illustrate the 
applied theoretical aspects.  
 
 
3.1.1 Theoretical issues of development – overlapping processes of transition 
The following focuses on two aspects of transition and, additionally, on concepts of 
institutional and social capital that function within these transitions. Theories of transition 
from war to peace belong to the field of political science and international relations 
(Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 2001; Caplan 2004), whereas the shift from a socialist 
economy to a market economy is discussed in both macro-economics and economic 
geography (Gros and Steinherr 1996; de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 1996; Smith and Pickles 
1998; Smith and Swain 1998). Furthermore, the debate on the functions of institutions is 
widely discussed in economic geography (Putnam 1993; Amin and Thrift 1994; Bathelt 
and Glückler 2003, 2005). 
 
 
3.1.2 From war to peace - an economic perspective 
There are three main aspects in situations of civil war-torn societies, such as Bosnia, 
that need to be described and which make these situations difficult to analyse.  Since the 
war was fought on the country’s territory the industrial and transport infrastructure has 
been devastated, the administration of the state is likely to have deteriorated and civil 
society has also been affected by the war situation (Collier 1999, 168).  In this section I 
focus on the economic consequences, rather than on the effects on civil society, so as 
Collier states, “civil war is a sufficiently devastating phenomenon that is likely to have 
large effects on both the level and the composition of economic activity” (ibid, 168).  
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When examining conflict and post-conflict economic situations four main aspects are 
discussed in the literature (Deininger 2003; Collier 1999).   First, there is the destruction of 
private and public physical capital, such as roads, bridges and factories.  Then, the social 
disorder and the destruction of social capital, such as trust and stability, which is also 
connected to the third aspect, which is insecurity that leads to a lack of investment and a 
rise of transaction costs.  Finally, there are the government expenditures that are spent on 
political stabilisation instead of being invested in the knowledge-building sectors such as 
education and research (Deininger 2003, 583). 
A decline in production of the non-military sector, caused by the destruction of 
physical capital, is probably the major reason for a post-conflict deteriorated economy. 
Aside from the destruction of the production capacities, the flight of capital is another 
catalyst for a decrease in the economy on every scale from national to local levels (Collier 
1999, 173; Collier, Hoeffler and Pattilio 2001). During conflict years the costs for transport 
and transactions are extraordinarily high; this is caused by the lack of infrastructure and 
legal security. This means, for example, that property rights and contracts are not legally 
ensured.  The deterioration of civil society and the expatriation of human capital also 
diminish the future perspectives for economic recovery to a certain extent (Deininger 2003, 
583). Furthermore, the lack of public security raises the costs for economic action and also 
leads to less investment (Collier 1999, 178; Deininger 2003, 580).  
Moreover, certain capital-intensive sectors, such as infrastructure, manufacturing and 
production face the most problems. These war-vulnerable sectors are therefore the most 
heavily burdened ones when peace is consolidated (Collier 1999, 179). Not only on the 
suppliers’ side were the consequences of war fundamental, but also the demand for 
products decreased  fundamentally because savings were spent and income was not 
generated during the years of conflict making poverty widespread (ibid, 169). Decreased 
demand has a similar effect on the economy as the flight of capital: the capital stock is 
marginal, also for urgently needed investments. Thus, civil wars have a heavy impact on 
both the level of the economy and the composition of factors of production. 
Therefore, the phase after the onset of peace is often characterised and burdened by 
the problems mentioned above, but peace has mainly positive outcomes.  First, a situation 
of peace creates greater stability for economic activities so that transactions costs decrease 
through an ensured legal framework. Second, the stabilisation of the political situation 
could lead to more sustainable economic growth. However, it is not at all a guarantee that 
there will be dividends from peace because distrust between the conflict’s actors or the 
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expectation of a new conflict could be seen as reasons for the reserved development of the 
economy (Collier 1999, 182). The actors’ attitudes in the post-conflict phase is called ‘pre-
cautionary strategy’, as Deininger has emphasised (2003, 593). Once peace is settled and 
the economic actors gain trust, the likelihood that the most important sectors of production 
and infrastructure will experience rapid growth is greater (Collier 1999, 182). It is even 
more likely that these sectors will grow faster than others, such as agriculture or the service 
sector, when international financial aid supports this process. Then, as Collier and Hoeffler 
describe (2002, 2, 3-6), the phenomenon of supra-normal growth can occur: “[t]ypically, 
opportunities for recovery enable a phase when growth is supra-normal. The need to 
restore infrastructure, juxtaposed against the collapse of revenue, tend to make aid 
unusually productive” (ibid, 2).  After some years of post-conflict development, the supra-
normal growth will adapt to a pre-conflict level (ibid, 9). A critical remark is given by 
Collier and Hoeffler on how efficient external, international programmes are concerning 
the reduction of poverty, as part of comprehensive strategies to provide support within the 
transition from war to peace: as “[t]he reduction in poverty depends upon the extent of 
poverty and upon the distribution of income” (ibid, 2). It is also clear that international 
financial intervention distorts local markets; it can happen that international aid diminishes 
local returns (ibid, 2).  The social effects of international intervention in various forms 
within the process of peace-building will be discussed in section 3.2.1. Furthermore, the 
growth rates of the production sector are very high during the first years of post-conflict 
period caused by the fact that the starting level is so low (Stojanov 2003, 69); immense 
growth rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are also a result of heavy international aid. 
 Whereas production, especially industrial capacity, is likely to grow faster than other 
sectors, the will to start business of small and medium-size in the advanced post-conflict 
phase is rather reduced. The more intensive the conflict was the lower the investments and 
the lower the intensity of businesses start-ups that are crucial for broader economic growth 
(Deininger 2003, 580). Often it is noticed that there is a peak in small-scale business 
activities right after the war that, however, is not sustainable. This also shows the urgent 
need for everyday goods right after a war has ended; therefore, trade is the sector that 
might experience the peak of start-ups (ibid, 601).  
Another important outcome in war-torn societies is a persistence of corruption and a 
informal economy, which can be seen as a result of a lack of public order and legal 
framework, as well as the absence of common state executive organs such as police (Tirole 
1996; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2). Deininger sums up the lack of functioning 
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administration as, “[s]tate failure or weakness, often brought about by civil unrest, can be 
an important impediment to social and economic development” (Deininger 2003, 597, see 
also Bradshaw and Stenning 1999, 102). The existence of strong shadow economic 
activities, or  the ‘informal sector’ as it is also called, is rooted primarily in the war 
economies that emerge when a collapse of the state takes place, or if the state is 
overextended or the burden of bureaucracy is an obstacle for development (Pugh 2004, 
53). Both can be applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krastev 2003, 2); first during the war 
when opportunities for trafficking and black market enterprises opened up, and then when 
the international community imposed, in order to balance ethnic and national demands, a 
relatively complex structure of administration from municipal over cantonal and entity 
level to the national level via the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA 1995 Annex 4, Krastev 
2003, 3). Among other minor aspects, such as international trade sanctions, a missing or 
overextended state administration allows the black market and the shadow economy to 
flourish. 
On the one hand a high degree of shadow economic activity has a negative impact on 
stability and democratisation as Pugh emphasises, “[p]olitically, it is portrayed as a threat 
to transparency and accountability, and thus a threat to the promotion and sustainability of 
democratic state building” (2004, 53). The flip-side is the social function of the shadow 
economy, which serves as a coping and survival strategy for the poorer strata of society 
that suffer most from state and market failure. Hence Pugh further highlights this aspect, 
when he states that “[i]n this context, the shadow labour market acts as a survival 
mechanism, enabling people to exist at, or just above, the general poverty level” (ibid, 57). 
The phenomenon of the informal economy, which is heavily connected to social networks, 
is often divided along national and ethnic lines in the context of clientele and patrimony. 
Such a ‘mafia welfare’ structure is persistent also after the onset of peace. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, “the entrepreneurs adapted well to the post-conflict period and international 
intervention” (ibid, 55). When mafia structures substitute missing or collapsing state 
functions then it fills in the gap, but it also weakens the democratic structure through a lack 
of transparency and democratic equality. These phenomena that occur in post-conflict 
situations also lead to imperfections in a common market through its fragmentation of 
society, so that transaction costs rise and development is blocked (ibid, 57). Not only in 
post-conflict situations have informal institutions occurred, but also in post-socialist 
structures, in which the central authority is weak. 
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3.1.3 From socialist to market economy 
Parallel to the transition from conflict to peace, the former Yugoslavian countries 
also face a second, however not less essential transition, from a socialist to market 
economy (Stojanov 2003, 67; Zilić 2003, 2). Even though many aspects of the transition 
from a socialist to market economy had been overtaken by the period of conflict, certain 
economic transition aspects are still influential, particularly when it comes to the 
sustainable development of the production sector and public administration. The outcome 
of the transition period from planned to market economy in the long run should be a “[…] 
positive supply stock, raising the efficiency of resource allocation and creating a burst of 
economic growth as well as increasing the “utility” of output” (de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 
1996, 17). However, the change from socialist to market economy should not be seen as a 
one way transition, it is rather a complex and complicated change in economy, politics and 
the social field (Smith and Pickles 1998, 2). 
Already during the last years of communism the Yugoslavian economy had declined  
(Pugh 2004, 53); purchasing power fell, the unemployment rate was already up to 20%, 
and the number of people that lived below the poverty line was up to 60%.  Against the 
trends of the late 1970s and 1980s, the Yugoslavian economy became more and more 
fragmented in republic-based economies that differed fundamentally from each other 
(Aldcroft and Morewood 1996, 172). Urgently needed reforms to control hyperinflation, 
the overburdening of foreign debts and the modernisation of the production sector were 
postponed (ibid, 173). Contradictory to other socialist countries in Eastern Europe, 
Yugoslavia has had variations within its planned economy. Self-government of firms and 
the distribution of economic decisions to the republic level were some variations among 
others that had led to a relatively successful economy during the 1950s and 1960s.  As 
Gros and Steinherr describe, “[s]elf-government accelerated the growth of output and the 
technical progress beyond anything known before, while preserving fast development 
expansion” (1996, 324). After the period of success, Yugoslavia was not able to cope with 
the resulting problems from a centralised economy, such as hyperinflation, stagnation in 
productivity and reform of macroeconomic policies. These figures and concrete examples 
should function as an introduction to the more general theoretical approach to the transition 
from socialist, planned economy to the regimes of capitalism and should also explain the 
reasons for the economic shift that already occurred before the collapse of the Yugoslavian 
state. 
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In geography, the transition or transformation from a socialist to market economy, as 
Bradshaw and Stenning (1999) and Stenning (1997, 148) call the process of fundamental 
change, includes the aim to modernise, privatise and to liberalise socialist structures in 
order to adapt to western markets (Rautio 2003, 28). 
Though Bradshaw and Stenning point out four main pillars of transition, including 
liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation and internationalisation - (Bradshaw and Stenning 
1999, 100; Bradshaw 2005, 7), in this section I focus on three particular aspects: 
privatisation, modernisation and the role of state institutions within the interplay of the four 
pillars. These are essential when it comes to an economic transition and in post-conflict 
spaces such as Bosnia; it should therefore demonstrate how important the socialist legacy 
still is after the collapse of economic activity during the civil war. 
Privatisation as a key aspect of transition is generally seen as a mechanism for 
freeing productive capacities from inefficient state ownership (Donais 2002, 2). Gros and 
Steinherr state that “[p]rivate ownership is necessary to achieve separation of political and 
economic decisions and in this separation lies the scope for efficiency and stability gains” 
(1996, 182). Within the process of liberalisation, privatisation leads to a basis for recovery 
and growth. However, only a fair, democratic and transparent process of privatisation can 
provide the ground for sustainable economic growth. When the privatisation process is not 
guided by a functioning state policy, further problems and long-lasting limitations to 
growth emerge because the informal sector then tends to take responsibility for an illegal 
privatisation as mentioned above (Donais 2002, 3). Hence, an efficient central state is 
needed to undergo the process of privatisation, contrary to the relatively weak position of 
central authority in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace Accords, as Stojanov emphasises 
(2003, 70). There are two diametrically opposed policies on privatisation process within 
the process of transition: shock therapy or ‘big bang’, which means a heavy and 
comprehensive, but quick change within the context of liberalisation, or a gradual approach 
that emphasises a smoother shift in order to avoid an economic collapse in the short run 
(Gros and Steinherr 1996; Kornai 1997; Rautio 2003, 62; Bradshaw 2005, 7).  
However, a sustainable privatisation process is the basis for a market economy and 
therefore efficiency. Only competition between privately-owned enterprises leads to a 
higher degree of growth and innovation; assuming that the process is transparent and the 
legal framework is stable. It is therefore a pillar for a market economy that prices reflect 
real values and supply is ensured through competition, as Stenning underlines (1997, 149).  
If that is not the case, then an uncoordinated process that has opposite consequences takes 
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place, as Donais concludes: “[…] in an institutional vacuum privatisation can and has led 
to stagnation and de-capitalisation rather than to a better financial result and increased 
efficiency” (2002, 5). Thus, without an institutional framework the privatisation process 
leads to counterproductive consequences. The framework includes the rule of law, well 
regulated capital markets, an efficient tax system and an efficient banking system. Then, as 
a consequence of a missing institutional framework, the inflows of foreign capital will be 
missing that initially were expected to compensate for the lack of local capital (ibid, 2002, 
8). Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) can exclusively flow in when the privatisation 
process has been successful.  As Bradshaw states, “privatisation has been crucial to the 
attraction of FDI, as it has provided an opportunity for foreign companies to obtain equity 
ownership, and often control, of SOEs [State-owned enterprises]” (2005, 7). Additionally, 
some surrounding elements for the privatisation process are discussed as being important, 
such as speed or the establishment of a competitive environment (Koldko 1999, 115, in 
Donais 2002, 5). Not only the question about the conditions of privatisation is important, 
but also how and what kinds of methods will the process undergo. The question emerges 
how to find buyers for state-owned enterprises. One strategy is through vouchers, which 
have been given to the general population and can then be converted to shares of a 
privatised firm (Gros and Steinherr 1996 172). On the one hand the advantage of this 
strategy is that it is relatively quick so that financial capacities are available from 
modernisation (Donais 2002, 8; see Smith and Pickles 1998). On the other hand when the 
general population is facing income scarcity the procedure is doomed not to meet its 
expected outcomes and the likelihood for wealthy ‘mafia structures’ to gain great shares is 
high (Lock 2005).  
Applied to multiethnic societies in post-war situations the privatisation process has 
not only technical, but also political consequences.  For example, if one ethnicity 
dominates within the process, as Donais further describes the case for Bosnia where 
enterprises are privatised along ethnic or national lines (2002, 5), then an imbalance with 
deteriorating political problems occurs. Referring also to a conflict situation, the process of 
privatisation partially occurred during the war years, as Pugh describes in the Bosnian case 
(2004, 54). This kind of privatisation fails its aims in the context of transition, because the 
legal framework leads to uncertain property claims.  
The modernisation and restructuring processes of enterprises is a further important 
aspect within the transition (Bradshaw and Stenning 1999, 101). Within the process of 
liberalisation, “[t]he need to pay attention to prices and costs demands a restructuring of 
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capacity” (Stenning 1997, 149).  Industrial reorganisation also includes the restructuring of 
the management level. Not only the adoption of a new economic regime of production 
factors such as labour, capital and land, but the adoption of controlling aspects is also 
important (Rautio 2003, 26). Most transition countries had to face major decline in 
industrial production and GDP when opening their markets to international products 
(Gorzelak 1996, 9; Pickles 1998, 186). Through the planned and centralised command 
economy the emphasis of production had been on quantities rather than on qualities, so that 
product and process innovation was often neglected (Smith and Swaine 1998, 35). When 
markets are opened to international products the lack of standards become visible and the 
need for modernisation becomes essential. In various post-socialist countries a decline in 
machinery and management caused a major drop in GDP, mass unemployment and, in the 
long run, poverty and inequality (Pickles 1998, 186; Smith and Pickles 1998, 7). While 
enterprises from established free markets internationally lead the sectors, enterprises in 
transition countries are additionally burdened by the pressure of modernisation that might 
be a difficulty in a hostile business environment (Rautio 2003, 63). Additionally, the 
cutbacks in state subsidies from the former socialist period have to be compensated 
(Bradshaw 2005, 7). Bradshaw and Stenning further emphasise the role of trade within the 
transition, “[w]ith the collapse of centrally-orchestrated trade, enterprises have had to find 
new sources of supply in the local economy” (1999, 102). 
During periods when enterprises of transition countries lag behind their international 
competitors the ‘technology gap’ often grows (Meier 2001, 20). The modernisation process 
on a physical level is one side of the coin; the adoption of new working regimes by labour 
is the other. The lack of skilled labour at every level of an enterprise is often the reason for 
the collapse of production and management (Pickles 1998, 187). It is a time taking process 
to change the attitude of labour towards the capitalist working regime - profit-maximising 
behaviour, along with entrepreneurship and ownership, is often missing, but at the same 
time demanded from the new capitalist regime (ibid).  
Within the process of transition state institutions that regulate and steer the economic 
processes have a key role in macroeconomic stabilisation (Stenning 1997, 149). Therefore, 
I summarise their functions and their role in this section, but they cannot be seen as 
exhaustive. Regulatory theories give a comprehensive insight into detailed functions of the 
state (see Smith and Swain 1998, 27-32). 
Economic activities in a command system depended on the strong and 
comprehensive role of the state. Pickles (2002, 175) describes the role of the state as 
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overburdened by bureaucracy, oriented towards ideological aims rather than oriented 
towards demand, which is the principle in a free market economy. When it comes to the 
transition, then, effective state institutions become major players in steering and 
controlling the processes of liberalisation and privatisation on every level of scale (Rautio 
2003, 62-63). According to regulatory theories, the state has the function to stabilise 
“relations between production and consumption through an efficient allocation of social 
product between reinvestment, profit and consumption” (Smith and Swain 1998, 28). Tools 
such as cutbacks in subsidies, fiscal policy control and the provision of the legal 
framework are essential to fulfil the goal of transition and to reach macroeconomic 
stability (Stenning 1997, 149). 
However, in most cases state institutions have not been pillars and cornerstones of 
the transition; they are, by contrast, rather limiting factors in themselves. As Pickles says, 
“[a] weak state is unable adequately to monitor these activities and is too weak to force 
reorganisation within the enterprise” (1998, 189; see also Smith and Swain 1998, 39). State 
institutions have to be prepared for the new shift towards a market economy, but they are 
in fact, and on the contrary, not able to adopt new market mechanisms (Gros and Steinherr 
1996, 154).  Hence, state institutions play not only a particular role in the privatisation 
process as I describe above, but they are also important to ensure a legal framework, fiscal 
and monetary stabilisation and a social net so that the process of modernisation can take 
place, in other words macroeconomic stabilisation (ibid, 174). But if macroeconomic 
stability cannot be provided, not only the privatisation process is blocked, but also the 
potential for domestic and foreign investments are hindered, as Gros and Steinherr 
conclude (1996, 196). In many cases of transition countries the collapsing state institutions 
had been supported by and consulted international organisations, such as the World Bank 
and IMF (Stenning 1997, 150). Their role in local development and the intervention into 
local economic activities is given below. The collapse of the state administration and 
institutions was devastating, especially in war-torn societies, so that the transition took 
place in anarchical conditions and the implementation of reform policies was impossible 
(Bradshaw and Stenning 1999, 102). 
Referring to transition as a complex and fundamental change in economics, politics 
and social sectors, “[...]the success of transformation or transition towards market economy 
is dependent on the social, cultural, political and economic contexts of the region” 
(Bradshaw and Stenning 1999, 105). Therefore, the following section deals with social 
capital and institutions within the concepts of local development.  
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3.1.4 Institutional and social aspects of local economic development  
 
 “[…]knowledge is the most 
 powerful engine of production […]” 
 
 (Alfred Marshall 1890: The Principles of Economics, London) 
 
“The most important determinant of actions is one’s environment […]” 
 
 (Josef Stiglitz and Carla Hoff 2001, 427) 
 
 As local development is defined, it is more than growth and change, but also 
freedom, security, stability and sustainability (Meier 2001, 24; UN 2000; UNDP 2005, 17). 
Rather, it can be seen as a ‘comprehensive development’ or ‘human development’, which 
means that one has to “go beyond narrow economic objectives to larger social and political 
goals" (Basu 2001, 61). Not only labour, capital and land and infrastructure, as the classic 
tradition of economics assumes, but also institutional policies, social, cultural and human 
capital play an essential role (Pilon and DeBresson 2003, 19).  In the previous sections I 
tried to describe essential aspects of the transitions from war to peace and from a socialist 
to market economy. In both, social capital and institutions, formal and informal play an 
essential role in how the transitions are undertaken; they are therefore part of the success or 
part of the failure of economic activity at the local level. The German geographers Bathelt 
and Glückler define social capital as follows: “[s]ocial capital is thus constituted in the 
very relation between the actors involved, and is a result of ongoing social practices” 
(2005, 1555).  Besides social capital and institutions, geographic scale,  or the ‘local’, is at 
the centre of examination (Amin and Thrift 1994, Putnam 1993).   
Therefore, a relational conceptualisation is needed to explain local socio-economic 
development. Bathelt and Glückler (2003; 2005) created a concept where “[e]conomic 
action is viewed as social action which is contextual in that it is always related to other 
actors and a shared institutional environment” (2005, 1545); also, Amin and Thrift 
emphasise the human activity behind economic processes (1994, 4). Furthermore, the 
relational approach is not only a new perspective focused more on human action; it is also 
a fundamental criticism of the neoclassical tradition of local development (Meier 2001, 
21). Stiglitz and Hoff conclude the criticism as follows: “[a]nd in leaving out the 
institutions, history, and distributional considerations, neoclassical economies leave out the 
heart of development economies” (2001, 390). 
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The role of social capital, institutions and knowledge is widely discussed (Amin and 
Thrift 1994; Bathelt and Glückler 2005). Therefore, I will focus on some important 
aspects, such as knowledge and institutions, for a post-conflict situation in which social 
capital can be identified with a functioning civil society (Barnes 2001, 99). When giving an 
insight to these approaches of local development they mostly explain successful local 
development such as in ‘Third Italy’ or Silicon Valley (Putnam 1993); in the Bosnian case 
of Mostar, however, the absence of functioning institutions and missing social capital 
contribute to the stagnation or recession of local development.  
Knowledge can be seen as part of social capital and would be therefore one key 
factor that is essential for successful local development as Meier emphasises (2001, 20). 
As Meier points out, it can be used repeatedly at no additional cost (ibid, 20). If the 
employees of firms and administrations are skilled, there is a greater chance for process 
and product innovation. Also Amin and Thrift suggest, “it seems clear that the production 
and, later, distribution and exchange of knowledge is a crucial element of the global and 
the local economic system on a scale that was never the case before” (1994, 3). They 
further state that through innovation caused by the existence of knowledge a production 
factor is created (ibid). Thus, human capital has some spill-over effects also on investments 
and, in the long run, on growth and productivity (Meier 2001, 20). Moreover, knowledge 
as a resource creates the capacity of the region to enhance innovative activities (Pilon and 
DeBresson 2003, 18). Difficulties occur when a certain stage of knowledge, for example 
skilled labour, has to be kept and improved. Then, the important process of ‘continuous 
improvement’ has to be ensured through institutions of education (Meier 2001, 20). A 
regulation of knowledge through labour market policies is consequently needed as Peck 
argues (1994, 149). On the contrary, if regulation policies do not exist or miss their aims, 
the lack of skilled labour or skill formation and therefore knowledge might either be 
caused by a massive exodus of skilled workers (especially for advanced positions that 
control, steer, and decide economic activities) or it can also be caused by the absence of 
education capacities, so that the skilled labour force cannot be reproduced (ibid, 162). 
Another aspect of social capital is informal institutions. A definition is given by 
Meier when he says that “[…] social capital as the internal social and cultural coherence of 
society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people, and the institutions in 
which they are embedded” (2001, 29). It also includes trust, social networks, and co-
operation that can only have a positive outcome when the conditions of civil society are 
anchored (Collier 1999). Pilon and DeBresson illustrate the effect of social capital as 
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follows: “[l]ocal traditions, local value systems, common language and human capital 
seem to represent the sources of dynamism of the Third Italy [sic] which is characterized 
by both cooperation and competition” (2003, 19). The concept of institutions, as one value 
of social capital, explains the effects of the economic activities on the one hand, but they 
are also a product of successful local economic development, described by Bathelt and 
Glückler as relational functioning in the sense of interaction (2005, 1546), so that it also 
pre-structures social behaviour. 
As described in the transition from war to peace, institutions do not necessarily have 
positive outcomes for local economic development. When informal and illegal institutions 
such as ‘mafia-structures’ occur then they might block or even undermine the formal, 
public and legal institutions. Stigliz and Hoff suggest that, “[w]ith endogenous institutions, 
developing countries may be caught in a vicious circle in which low levels of market 
development result in high levels of information imperfections and these information 
imperfections themselves give rise to institutions – for example, informal, personalized 
networks of relationships – that impede the development of markets” (2002, 400). There 
again is interplay between weak formal state institutions and the response of informal 
personalised institutions (Krastev 2003, 1). If state institutions and conditions of civil 
society are not ensured, then the risk that informal, personalised, asymmetric institutions 
emerge is more likely. Once they exist they again weaken the needed conditions for 
democratic, sustainable development (Pilon and DeBresson 2003, 17-20).  As a reminder 
of the conflict situations, a collapse of the state can be a consequence of informal 
networks, additionally of the aspects that Deiniger points out, such as “[l]ack of human 
capital, presence of taxable and immobile wealth, infrastructure access, and to some extent 
ethnic fractionalization, emerge as the main factors contributing to higher level of civil 
strife” (2003, 580). Therefore the understanding of the positive outcome of ‘institutional 
thickness’ that Amin and Thrift (1994) and also Bathelt and Glückler (2005, 1556) 
highlight, can be questioned when it comes to conflict or post-conflict situations. They 
emphasise, however, that their understanding assumes four aspects; institutional 
persistence, commonly shared knowledge, flexibility and innovative capacity (Amin and 
Thrift 1994, 16). Yet any way it functions as an engine for decision-making processes 
(Rautio 2003, 74). When negative informal personalised institutions of paternalism occur, 
then development is hindered as Stiglitz and Hoff explain: “[m]ore generally, a 
fundamental obstacle to economic development in all states, not only dictatorships, can be 
posed by groups whose political power is threatened by progress” (2001,  425). 
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Another important aspect is the role of formalised institutions within local 
development. Here, the focus is rather on formalised institutions that can provide co-
ordination and policy services and which underline the structure of local development 
rather than on informal institutions, like conventions, common behaviour and self-imposed 
norms, as described above. In new institutional economics the role is widely discussed 
(Meier 2001, 22). A properly functioning institution, such as a city administration, uses its 
role to generate and co-ordinate development priorities, which results in a friendly 
environment for local business development. Theoretically, it is the co-ordination of 
externalities that lead to further capital accumulation (ibid, 22, 34) and an increase of local 
development (Brenner and Fornahl 2003, 4-5). Hence it is necessary to treat the formalised 
institution, in our example the city administration - “as an integral element of the economic 
system”, as Meier says (2001, 34), so that “the general principal is that government action 
can facilitate private sector coordination” (ibid, 34).  
However, the intensity of a formal institution’s intervention in local development is 
illogically discussed. The function of such institutions is the provision of a legal 
framework in which stabilisation, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation can be co-
ordinated (ibid, 23), as I highlighted above.  An over-extension of state structure might 
have also negative outcomes (ibid, 34). The question then emerges how to ‘get the 
institutions and organisations right’ to achieve those functions (ibid, 27). Institutions mean 
state institutions on every level, such as national ministries for economics and also city 
administrations that regulate development on a local level. How much they contribute to 
development and growth, assuming that they are well functioning, Stiglitz and Hoff argue 
that “[t]he ability of government to act as an agent of development may depend on the 
strength of democratic forces and on the extent to which voters are divided along class or 
ethnic lines” (2001, 400). 
These institutions can be characterised as internal formalised institutions whereas 
international organisations are external formalised institutions that also have a massive 
impact on development on each scale, especially in the context of a peace-building 
situation. Among other effects, an intervention of international organisations in post-
conflict situations that often functions as a support for the governmental institution can be 
seen as an external factor that influences the market and socio-economic development 
situation in a comparable way as internal institutions. However, international organisations 
also have the aim to reduce the risk of further conflict. Therefore, an intervention through 
international aid has a stabilising character in terms of peace-building (Collier and Hoeffler 
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2002, 2). These tools for peace-building and recovery are through aid itself, active policy 
intervention and policy support interaction (ibid, 6). The question of how much 
international aid a post-war situation can absorb is examined by Collier and Hoeffler (ibid, 
7). The functions and consequences of international intervention in the context of peace 
building will be the aim of the following section.  
When connecting the discussed aspects of social capital, such as knowledge, informal 
and formal institutions, then the effects take place on the local level, in the form of 
personal relationships, co-ordination and commonly-shared norms (Bathelt and Glückler 
2005, 1555; Rautio 2003, 75; Amin 2002). Even though the trend of globalisation could 
lead to the assumption that places are exchangeable, the local matters, as Amin and Thrift 
(1994) and Massey (1995) discuss. How much ‘geography matters’ and cultural 
differences count is highlighted by the economist Meier when he remarks that “even 
though there is a set of basic economic principles, their particular application to any one 
country will depend on the economic structure, institutions, political regime, administrative 
capacity, culture, and history of the particular country” (2001, 39). Even though he refers 
to a country, the same can be applied to the local level as Amin and Thrift underline, when 
they point out that “[…] local diversity, both within and between places remains” (1994, 
7). Closely connected to the question of location is the influence of hierarchy and power, a 
major discussion within human geography (see e.g. Paasi 2002; Massey 1999). Therefore, 
economic development is embedded in the diversity of cultural and social relations of 
locations (Amin and Thrift 1994, 16). However, the literature discusses the importance of 
the concept of ‘embeddedness’ and its consequences critically. The concept could be over-
territorialised as Hess (2004) and Glückler (2001) argue. A further detailed explanation 




3.2 Concepts of peace-building  
“Peace agreements […] do not in themselves end wars 
 or bring about lasting peace. In most cases, 
 prewar continuities and the war mentality 
 jeopardize the prospects of a consolidated peace 
 and postwar reconciliation.” 
 
 (David Francis 2000, 357) 
 
This section is addressed to the theories of peace-building, developed in political 
science and diplomacy. First, a general overview of international intervention is given, 
while the second section applies the theoretical components to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to Mostar in particular. It seems necessary to apply these approaches in order to 
understand the post-conflict processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
 
3.2.1 Peace-building and reconciliation 
Among the economic aspects and processes that have been described above, peace 
and nation-building are the second main part of the theoretical conceptualisation, which 
contributes to post-conflict development in Bosnia and Herzegovina and specifically 
Mostar. Whereas the role of international organisations concerning economic development 
has been touched upon in the previous sections, their role in the social sector, namely in the 
formation of  civil society, seen as social capital, is discussed.  
Peace-building is defined as “[…] strategies [that are] designed to promote a secure 
and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of populations are met and violent 
conflicts do not recur” (Lambourne 2004, 3). This also includes ‘practical implementation 
of reconstruction on all fronts’, which are political, social and humanitarian objectives 
(Iribarnegaray 2002, 8). This section addresses political and ethnic peace and stability in 
post-conflict situations, seen as a precondition of socio-economic development; it is 
therefore not exclusively separated from post-conflict economic development (Lambourne 
2004, 4). Peace-building is also understood as the phase that continues the phase of peace-
keeping, right after the conflict has stopped and a formal peace treaty is signed. However, a 
formal peace treaty does not necessarily mean the absence of structural violence as 
Galtung (1982) defines the absence of sources of violence that can lead  to conflict 
situations. A precondition for sustainable peace – the absence of structural violence - 
includes the process of reconciliation and co-operation between the hostile conflict actors. 
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In societies that are war-torn by civil and ethnic conflicts, an external actor or third party, 
namely the international community in the form of the UN, NATO, EU, or some other 
body, seems to be a necessary tool to stabilise the situation and to implement a basis for 
sustainable peace and development (Lambourne 2004, 2; Caplan 2004, 53). When a war is 
long-lasting and society is fractured, as is the case in Bosnia, then external support is 
needed to form the pillars for civil society, especially through the process of reconciliation 
(Lederach 2004, xvi, 17). The peace-building task of reconciliation and the establishment 
of civil society is challenging when a divided society consists of several ethnically and 
nationally divided groups where clear majorities do not exist (Schneckener 2002).  
Hence it is the function of international organisations to provide ‘negative peace’ 
through military a presence, co-ordination of humanitarian aid, reconstruction of 
infrastructure and performance of basic civilian administrative functions (Iribarnegaray 
2002, 5). These hard issues are not given here (see e.g. Zartmann and Rasmussen 1997; 
Lederach and Jenner 2002).  Instead, the focus is on aspects of civil society and 
reconciliation, understood as the “[…] building of relationships between antagonists” 
(Lederach 2004, 34), in which international actors are involved.  
In order to establish the basics of civil society, there is a need to reconcile the hostile 
actors of the war. Revealing the painful past in sensitive post-conflict situations can deepen 
the divide between the conflicting actors (Lederach 2004, 31). And yet, reconciliation is a 
necessary base for sustainable peace and further development.This process is seen as a 
tightrope by Iribarnegaray and it is “[…] an undertaking to avoid the harmful acts of the 
past and build a new relationship built on trust and respect is another step which is 
normally seen as essential to the reconciliation process” (2002, 8). It is the centrepiece of 
peace-building as Lederach argues (2004, 24). Without a civil society economic, political 
and social development seems to be impossible, as Lambourne emphasises when he states 
that “[t]here will be no peace and stable democracy in war-torn societies without truth, 
justice and reconciliation” (2004, 20). The international community, as an external force, is 
asked to create the basis for the development of civil society, but often the mechanisms fail 
to respond to the very complex situations of deeply-divided societies (Lederach 2004, 18). 
The applied mechanisms and tools are lacking in terms of the conflict situation; they are 
mostly addressed to development, humanitarian needs or the level of diplomacy (ibid, 24). 
Several factors contribute to the lack of tools, such as reconciliation assistance, which does 
not have direct financial outcomes, and the fact that development is not teleological and its 
efficiency is difficult to evaluate (Jenichen 2004, 6).  
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The task is to tackle and solve the war-caused traumas in society that are “locked in 
long-standing cycles of hostile interaction” (Lederach 2004, 23). Fear is the mechanism 
that keeps up the dynamic of division through nationalism. The core question is how to 
initiate the reconciliation process and to sustain it; it includes a handling of the painful past 
combined with positive future perspectives (ibid, 27, 31). Four main aspects play an 
important role within the reconciliation process: truth, mercy, justice and peace (ibid, 29; 
Lambourne 2004, 4). Truth about certain incidences coupled with mercy contributes in the 
same way as justice and peace, which are connected to a functioning judiciary and the 
absence of violence (Lederach 2004, 30). Therefore, “reconciliation must be proactive in 
seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their relationship and share their 
perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new 
perceptions and a new shared experience,” as Lederach  concludes (2004, 30). However, 
the question occurs of how to tackle the enormous peace-building task, when the activities 
reach from local face-to-face activities, over dialogue groups to national debates about the 
painful past (ibid, 32; Schneckener 2002). Additionally, for such direct approaches for 
reconciliation, the creation and guidance of a democratic political representative system is 
often a tool. Concretely, the fields of action are dealing with democratisation, human 
rights, and education (Jenichen 2004, 6). Here, various actors are necessary to tackle the 
problem, such as non-governmental organisations as well as multilateral agencies such as 
the UN or EU. Although they can provide comprehensive support, they cannot force 
individuals to take part in the programmes and workshops. If a forced reconciliation 
process is imposed, a counter-effect could be the result, thus questioning the effect of 
peace-building (Jenichen 2004, 5). ‘Can democracy be implemented through non-
democratic means?’ is a fundamental question that points in this direction and should be 
discussed when intervening internationally. 
It also seems necessary to involve various actors such as bilateral or multilateral 
governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but this also 
causes problems of co-ordination and co-operation. According to different self-conceptions 
and mandates, NGOs and governmental organisations tend to follow different approaches 
to the formation of civil society (Jenichen 2004, 6). If such co-operation and co-ordination 
structures are missing, the international actors loose credibility and initiatives might have 
different outcomes, in which the hostile, often radical nationalist attitudes remain 
(Lederach 2004, 33; Lambourne 2004, 19). Schwarz-Schilling, the current High 
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Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina10, criticised the lack of common strategies in 
the case of Bosnia, which partially led to catastrophic outcomes  in terms ofpolitical 
decisions (2003, 3). Under these conditions, such structures, often called ‘war 
constituencies’, remain and, consequently, undermine the sustainable and positive peace 
process. In the case when initiatives of international actors fail to build up a civil society, 
the external support that is often the only mediating institution is lost and the power 
structures of ‘war constituencies’ become stronger so that the aims of a democratic society 
are at risk. Specifically, it could mean, for example, that radical nationalists block 
important decisions caused by catalysing mutual blocking strategies (Schneckener 2002). 
These ‘pathologies’ of mutual blocking occur especially in ethically-divided societies 
(ibid). 
 Among the problems through a lack of co-ordination is a financial risk that 
particularly occurs through the difficulty of evaluating of civil society projects (Jenichen 
2004, 8). Moreover, when international organisations enter the scene, the existing balance 
of power can be weakened and the international actors themselves can lose their ability to 
enhance the democratisation process if they get entangled in the local, informal and 
ethnically-divided power structures (Gromes, Moltmann and Schoch 2004, 10-12). 
Asymmetrically-distributed financial aid from the World Bank for reconstruction in Mostar 
is just one example. Another example is international support for local firms that had been 
involved in war crimes in order to enhance local economic development, such as the case 
of  ‘Aluminij Mostar’.   The ability to enhance the democratisation processes also depends 
on the mandate of the peace-building, which might be too weak or too strong, both of 
which are seen in Bosnia as Caplan explains (2004, 54). Thus, “international assistance in 
post-conflict reconstruction should seek to support civic associations undertaking activities 
on a crosscutting basis –so that civil society does not serve to reify ethnic and factional 
identifications” (Barns 2001, 15). It is also clear that international agents act politically; 
they introduce their own concepts of peace-building and their aid might be bound to 
internationally-imposed conditions (Caplan 2004, 53). Asymmetries of power are not 
necessarily negative, as Bathelt and Glückler conclude, for the concept of social capital: 
“[p]ower asymmetries create a sort of hierarchy and dominance within a network which 
helps to settle conflicts between actors and to speed up decision-making processes” (2005, 
1553).  However, the strategies to establish sustainable peace undergo a shift towards long-
term strategies that also include balance of power relations, as Lambourne emphasises 
                                                 
10 The function of the High Representative as the representative of the international community is discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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(2004, 5). The noticeable trend of decreasing financial and strategic support after years of 
international initiatives is still a hindrance to the sustainable build-up of civil society. 
Collier and Hoeffler argue how important it is to build-up social capital when they say that 
“[…] we find that among policies the key priorities for improvement, relative to an 
otherwise similar society without a history of recent conflict, should be social policies first 
[…]” (2002, 13). 
Finally, the described approach of reconciliation and civil society within the concept 
of peace-building should not be seen as isolated from socio-economic recovery and 
restructuring in post-conflict situations. Therefore, the process of peace-building is rather a 
long-term strategy after peace has been signed, concurrent with the aims of development 
and economic co-operation (Lambourne 2004, 29). The process of civil society is 
tenacious, time-demanding and not necessarily a successful undertaking.  As Gromes, 
Moltmann and Schoch highlight: “[t]here is no ‘instant’ democratisation in ethnically-
fragmented post-war societies” (2004, IV). There is a sensitive interplay between various 
aspects of peace-building, such as the guidance of economic transitions, the formation of 
civil society, and the establishment of political stability (Lambourne 2004, 7; Leberach 
1999, 32). These interdependencies should be taken into account when applying the 
different theoretical parts to Mostar.  
 
 
3.2.2 Phases of post war development in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mostar 
In this section I combine the aspects of the transition from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy, from a socialist to a market economy, the concepts of institutional and social 
capital approaches and the process of peace-building in order to apply them to Bosnia and 
Mostar. This does not claim to fully describe or represent the analysis of my research 
question. It functions as a ‘connector’ to the above-mentioned theoretical discussion in 
order to demonstrate the intertwining of these transitions. One cannot understand the 
development of Mostar if avoiding the national process of transition and state formation, 
which is the reason to provide examples from both the national and the local levels. 
Post-conflict development in Bosnia can be divided into two phases that are 
overlapping in a sense and cannot be seen as exclusive of each other.  The first phase is 
that of 1995-2000, when security issues were the priority and the aspect of stabilisation 
demanded a comprehensive intervention by external international organisations.  During 
this period the physical reconstruction of factories, infrastructure and houses was the focus.  
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The second phase occurred in2000-2006, when international intervention shifted its focus 
to sustainable development, including aspects of capacity building, administrative and 
economic reform, the building of civil society, as well as structural transition from a 
socialist to a market economy. Certainly, the shift was gradual; however most programmes 
launched after 2000 were addressed towards reforms and capacity building. This latter 
phase can be seen as development and co-operation. This section, therefore, is addressed to 
these two phases with a special emphasis on the role of international agencies, especially 
the ‘Office of the High Representative’ (OHR). 
After the peace treaty had been signed, the international community mandated the 
OHR to monitor the ongoing processes demanded by the Dayton Peace Accords, which 
were signed in 1995 and incorporates the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a 
constitution (Caplan 2004, 55). The new-born state was designed by international agencies 
and is in its form not comparable to any other state (Bose 2002, 60), because it combines 
post-socialist and post-conflict elements. According to Donais, “[…] both a post-conflict 
and a post-socialist state, Bosnia is in many ways a sui generis case of post socialist 
transition” (2002, 1). Even though the DPA can be criticised, “peace was still peace,” as 
Cohen describes the value of peace after the devastating war (1998, 465). 
The function of the OHR was primarily to monitor the conditions of the Dayton 
Peace Accords with the assistance of the Implementation Force (IFOR) troops, who had to 
guarantee safety and stability. The fact that the peace accord were signed by three 
conflicting parties, the Croats, the Serbs and the Bosniaks, meant that they were still in 
power (Schwarz-Schilling 2003, 1); thus informal and nationalist networks or, in a 
theoretical sense, institutions were legitimate rulers even after the peace. The position of 
the OHR was therefore restricted since “[…] the functions of the High Representative were 
extremely limited initially in relation [to] both the local parties and to other international 
agents active on the ground” (Caplan 2004, 55). After two years in 1997, the mandate of 
the OHR was strengthened due in response to the increase of non-democratic institutions, 
especially in the Croatian shadow entity of Herceg-Bosna and in the Republika Srpska. 
The so-called, ‘Bonn-Powers’11 gave extraordinary authority to the OHR to rule beyond 
democratic principles in cases when the local authorities were unable to agree on reforms, 
as was the case in Mostar (ibid, 57). The High Representative used his powers to dismiss 
local officials and to impose national laws increasingly over the years. All in all, the weak 
mandate at the beginning of the peace-building process was replaced by a diametrically-
                                                 
11 The ‘Bonn-Powers’ as the extension of the OHR mandate is described in Chapter 2. 
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opposed mandate of power after 1997. The international High Representative became a 
player in national and local politics, heavily-involved and responsible for the current 
situation. While the OHR’s role was necessary for the stabilisation process, at the same 
time it should also be criticised (Bose 2002, 9; Knaus and Cox 2003).  The task of peace-
building was extraordinarily demanding because of the parallel ongoing processes 
described above. Especially in Mostar in 1995-1997, the early stages to establish peace and 
stabilisation in the ethnically-divided city was a heavy burden for the international 
community, as demonstrated by the EU’s representative Koschnick’s mission (Koschnick 
and Schneider 1996). Until 2005 the city remained governed by six ethnically-separated 
municipalities, until the reform to unify the different administrations was imposed by the 
High Representative (City of Mostar, Recommendation 2003).  During the fist two years of 
the first phase of peace-building and through the legitimisation of the former conflicting 
parties as political actors in the post-war period, the informal oligarchic networks increased 
and continued the nationalist and secessionist demands of the wartime (Bose 2002, 25).  
Czaplinski also states that, “[n]etworks that have developed in wartime tend to persist in 
the post-war environment” (2003, 2). The Croatian nationalist parallel state of Herceg 
Bosna, backed by Croatia and financed through the Hercegovaška Banka, is one such 
example (Caplan 2004, 55; Bose 2002, 28). A further outcome of these networks is that 
economic inequalities lead to hindrances to development, as Pugh illustrated in Bosnia 
(2004, 55-56). 
During the later stage, when the ‘Bonn-Powers’ were used frequently to enforce local 
decisions and reforms, the so-called ‘dependency syndrome’ occurred.  Petritsch, the 
former High Representative, states that “[l]ocal parties begin to rely opportunistically on 
the political intervention of the High Representative, especially when it comes to 
unpopular measures” (2000, 301). This dependency syndrome led to the situation in which 
ethno-nationalist goals were defended and compromises avoided (Caplan 2004, 59; Knaus 
and Cox 2003, 19). One example of this was the dismissal of several hard-core nationalist 
Croatian officials in Mostar who, in 2000, were proud to be dismissed because it 
demonstrated their nationalistic credibilities (Bose 2002, 129). A further aspect of this 
dependency syndrome is that the people themselves do not experience democratic 
practices, thus limiting progress in the construction of civil society (Caplan 2004, 59). In 
such a situation social capital is destroyed before it is built (Stiglitz and Hoff 2001, 398). 
When political democratic procedures are failing and when social capital and institutions 
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of civil society are missing, the basis for further development is uncertain (Bathelt and 
Glückler 2005, 1553 -1555). 
However, assistance within the complex post-conflict situation, such as international 
support in different forms, seemed necessary.  Caplan argues that “[…] on the other hand, 
in the absence of intervention by the High Representative, it is unlikely that the local 
parties would adopt many of the measures, necessary to enable Bosnia to make the 
transformation from a donor dependent economy to a self sustaining one” (2004, 61).  
Among the political and social factors of the first phase of peace-building, the 
financial aid to transform the war economy to a peace economy was significantly higher 
and more effective than in the second phase (2000-2006), due to the fresh wounds of the 
war and greater international attention with more than two billion Euros from EU funds 
being donated (Hall 2005, 201). The consequences of the shift from a war to a peace 
economy were therefore more visible, or at least the increasing and supra-normal economic 
development raised expectations for a better and enhanced recovery (Büschenfeld 1999, 
35-37). Bose highlights the differences between the first phase of reconstruction and the 
second phase of development when he states that “[t]he reconstruction of war damaged 
buildings and utilities, and the revival of a portion of service sector however masks the 
painful reality that the local economy remains largely a guttered wreck, characterized by 
massive unemployment as in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole” (2002, 108). 
The second phase is therefore characterised by the shift from the primary peace-
building tasks to maintenance and development tasks, such as fundamental administrative 
reforms and policies towards self-government, a self-sustainable economy and the 
consolidation of the state (Wnendt 2003, 2). Bose calls the first phase of reconstruction 
superficial rather than structural because it does not lead to a reformed and or sustainable 
economy (2002, 108). The legacy of socialist political and economic organisation is 
especially noticeable when reforming fundamental economic and administrative structures 
(Scotto 2004, 63). However, the processes also overlap with the consequences of the 
conflict itself, such as the privatisation process demonstrates (Donais 2002, 5). The 
privatisation process was in some cases undertaken during the absence of law during the 
conflict, as exemplified by the aluminium factory in Mostar (Pugh 2004, 53). Urgent 
problems of low GDP growth, unemployment and poverty are outcomes of the 
fundamental changes that are addressed within the second phase (World Bank 2002, 3-11; 
Bose 2002, 272).  
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 When international donors’ cutbacks are visible the actual situation with the national 
and local economies is revealed and often leads to a decline of economic activities and, 
therefore, frustration and passiveness (Bose 2002, 112). By contrast, long-lasting external 
financial support might lead to dependencies also at the political level (Czaplinski 2003, 
4).  Even though the security situation in Mostar improved significantly during the first 
years the structural problems and the needed reforms were not at all tackled (Bose 2002, 
131).  For example, before 1997 different car number plates made it obvious who was 
crossing the line of division. The introduction of common plates for all ethnic groups 
increased the security for people crossing the border line (ibid, 111). However, Mostar 
faces serious challenges to privatisation; in several cases former industrial enterprises have 
not been privatised due to the political environment, the obsolete legal framework and the 
poor infrastructure (Selma Karavdić, interview No. 16, 2005; Admira Čustović, interview 
No. 19, 2005). Such economic challenges maintain the soil for extreme nationalist 
positions (Czaplinski 2003, 3).  
The aim of this chapter was to provide theoretical components in order to understand 
the different and entangled processes of the local socio-economic development in Mostar. 
Not only the transition from war to peace, but also the transition from a socialist economy 
to a market economy and the importance of institutions - formal and informal - were 
discussed. Additionally, the role of the international community and the function of 
international aid were highlighted. The problems are overlapping so that cause and effect 
are not clearly visible. How these effects are interwoven indicates ‘ethnically-cleansed 
economies under transition’ as mentioned by Bose (2002, 132). It is difficult to separate 
the ongoing processes from each other. However, in my analysis inChapter 5, I try to draw 
a clearer picture of the present-day situation.  The next chapter, however, describes the 










4 Methodological Basis and Field Work 
 
In this chapter a theoretical as well as practical introduction to the methodology used 
will be given. The first section explains the reasons for choosing qualitative methods for 
my research and gives theoretical remarks on the applied methodology. While the first 
section focuses more on theoretical aspects, the second and third sections address my 
fieldwork as well as the analysis of the data. The third section’s emphasis is on the 
selection and description of the interviewees.  
 
 
4.1 Qualitative methodology – primary data collection 
The research question, “What are the hindrances to local socio-economic 
development in Mostar?” is rather broad and implicitly shows the missing scientific basis 
for more detailed questions. I was facing virgin soil when I tried to find answers, and it 
was only through an intensive literature review and field research that was gathered on 
travels and excursions over the years 2002-2005 that it became apparent that in a post-war 
situation, such as Mostar is in, different layers of social, institutional and political factors 
play an essential part in local development rather than exclusively economic aspects.  
Stiglitz and Hoff state that, “the most important determinant of actions is one’s 
environment, including the particular institutions in that environment” (2001, 427). 
 Therefore, qualitative methodology seemed to be the best tool to approach the 
research question. The choice of semi-structured interviews leads to various advantages in 
such complex and interwoven socio-economic contexts, when most of the aspects have not 
been clarified through literature research. This leads to a better understanding of the social 
context, or the local actor’s interplay (Robinson 1998, 409). The aim of qualitative 
methodology is that it should reveal the reality as the interviewees and decision-makers see 
and experience it. Furthermore, the elaboration of the subjective experiences of everyday 
life and the structure within their positions can be covered by qualitative methodology 
(Cropley 2002, 40), or as Robinson expresses it, “[…] qualitative or interpretative methods 
generally operate on the basis that the ‘natural’ order of reality is seen, conceived of and 
understood in different ways by different groups and individuals” (1998, 408). Valentine 
emphasises another advantage of semi-structured interviews as follows: “one […] strength 
of this approach is that it allows respondents to raise issues that the interviewer may not 
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have anticipated” (1997, 111).  So, with the technique of interviews I tried to cover the 
missing links between the different scenes of local development. Rather than standardized 
interview questions, semi-structured or a so-called interview guide approach gives the 
opportunity to step outside categories and fixed, pre-formulated answers, so that space for 
unexpected answers and aspects is given (Kitchen and Tate 2000, 213). This free-form of 
interviewing allowed me to go into detail about the interviewees’ position or knowledge. 
However, the risk to omit questions of interest when using free-form interviews is higher 
than using standardised interviews (ibid, 214). Another risk is that the environment in 
which the interview is taken may not be suitable, which can mean that the time, location 
and mood or either interviewer or interviewee can influence the results and the flow of the 
interview (ibid, 215-16). In some cases it seems difficult to avoid bias through questioning, 
which can lead to disposed answers that are not voluntarily given (Kitchen and Tate 2000, 
217). 
A further reason to choose qualitative methods was also that the official statistical 
data provided by the Federal Office of Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (e.g. Statistical Yearbook 2005), as well as the data from others such as the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (e.g. 2005a), was either questionable, 
opened up more questions than answers or was not representative. As Vanesa Galić12 from 
the Nansen Dialogue Centre told me, “Statistics is one thing here, reality is another thing” 
(interview, No. 20, 2005)13. Olaf Zymelka, the director of the office of the Bank for 
Reconstruction in Sarajevo (KfW) remarked, “there are no reliable statistical numbers in 
Bosnia; there is also no reliable statistical office” (interview No. 2, 2005). Others, like 
Selma Karavdić, project manager in the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), agreed with these statements (interview No. 16, 2005).  
 When using qualitative methods the epistemological base has to be mentioned. The 
development and acceptance of qualitative methodology occurred within the context of 
criticism of qualitative approaches; its underpinning epistemology is positivist (Robinson 
1998, 7-11). During the 1970s the ‘quantitative revolution’ was especially criticized 
because of its misleading stance in describing or explaining social processes. Robinson 
points out that “[…] the positivist philosophy which formed the springboard for the use of 
quantitative methods was actually unsuitable for the subject matter that was of the greatest 
importance in helping to understand the economic and social change” (1998, 8). Since then 
                                                 
12 All interviewees gave me permission to quote them as well as to mention their names.  
13 All interviews are sorted in chronological order. Therefore see Appendix 1 
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qualitative methods have gained greater use in human geography in order to explain social 
contexts and interaction. In this respect qualitative methods belong to a rather humanistic 
or, to some extent, post-modern approach. The central assumption is “…to document the 
world from the point of view of the people studied” (Hammersley 1992, 165, in Crang 
1997, 190). Here, among other aspects, the rejection of a single reality is assumed and the 
social context is seen as the space of relations as Thrift (1999, 310) emphasises. Thrift 
explains that social reality is constructed by the actors and their interactions; it does not 
exist as an objective value. This understanding therefore rejects a single and universal 
reality. Especially in war, or post-war situations the realities vary greatly as mentioned in 
Guytisolo’s book Landscapes of war – From Sarajevo to Chechnya (2000). 
   Without going deeper into the philosophical discussion about mushrooming ‘isms’ 
(see Crang 1997, 184), qualitative methodology also has its limitations.  It is neither 
representative in a quantitative manner, nor does it fulfil the means of repetition of method  
or objectivity (Valentine 1997, 111). So, once more all findings and analysis of the 
interviews are bound to place, time and subjective selection. That means that the results of 
the interviews cannot be repeated or the expressions cannot be expected to be the same if 
repetition would be undertaken. Therefore transparency should lead to inter-subjective 
reliability (Crang 1997, 188). 
 However, the overall aim of qualitative methodology is to reveal a greater 
understanding of the social actors’ interplay, as Robinson points out (1998, 410). Even 
though the qualitative approach has the above-mentioned constraints, it was obvious that 
only the tools of qualitative methodology were able to elaborate the structures of and 
hindrances to local socio-economic development through the examination of the different 
actors in Mostar. Robinson (1998, 409) sums up the aim of qualitative methodology as 
follows: “In particular, qualitative methods are best used for problems requiring depth of 
insight and understanding, especially when dealing with explanatory concepts.”  
 
 
4.2 Fieldwork in Mostar and Sarajevo 
The period of fieldwork took place from 20 November to 3 December 2005. During 
this time I conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews among experts both in 
Sarajevo and Mostar, but mainly in Mostar. I had the opportunity to conduct 23 interviews 
with local authorities as well as employees from various international organisations. In the 
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4.2.1 Description of fieldwork and analysis of the material 
Through my previous travels and contacts within the research region over the years 
2002-2005 I was able to structure the relatively short period of research time beforehand. I 
prepared the interview questions before I started the fieldwork, which meant that it was 
necessary to contact the interview partner beforehand, as well as to formulate a guideline 
for the interviews. The process was guided by an intensive research period in literature as 
well as informative conversations with members of the ‘Südosteuropagesellschaft’14. This 
helped to formulate adequate questions that I sent the interviewees when I contacted them. 
I chose the interview partners through different channels such as personal contacts, internet 
research, and acting organisations in the field. I tried to confirm the interviewees either by 
email contact or through direct phone calls. I did not know any of them from my previous 
trips, but the institutions where they are employed were familiar to me. 
Furthermore, due to the limited time of two weeks at the end of 2005, the whole 
period was divided into two parts: the first half was planned with interviews and 
appointments as previously arranged, while the second half was available for spontaneous 
contacts. These spontaneous contacts came through snowball sampling (see e.g. Valentine 
1997, 116), which meant that I asked all interview partners for further contact names. This 
known method of finding interview partners was well accepted and also convenient for me. 
No major problems occurred in finding the interviewees.  
 Sixteen interviews were conducted in Mostar itself, and seven in Sarajevo, where 
many international organisations have their headquarters. Eighteen persons were local 
employees – mainly from the ‘ex-Yugoslavian’ countries, while only 5 were foreign 
nationals. This gave me the opportunity to hear expert opinions, but it also limited the 
findings because some ‘local’ interviewees were not eager to talk about sensitive topics. 
However, the avoidance of sensitive topics was mainly overcome through ‘diplomatic’ 
answers. Whenever I got the impression that the conversation turned to a ‘hot topic’, I 
avoided pursuing it. In post-war situations, probably more than in peaceful societies, 
ethical standards have to be ensured (Cropley 2002, 84-85). Fortunately, I got the 
                                                 
14 Südosteuropagesellschaft (Association for South East Europe) represents German-speaking academics and 
people in public life who are interested and connected to South East Europe. 
 48
impression that people felt either comfortable when speaking about the war and personal 
experience or they avoided such topics.  
The fact that the interviews were conducted either in English or in German 
underlined my position as an outsider (Buttimer 1979). A translator was needed only in 
two cases. In contrast to prior concerns about the language, no major linguistic 
complications occurred. Almost all interviewees were willing to speak in either English or 
German. The fact that many of the interviewees had international experiences supported 
the foreign language use during the interviews. Among all of the interviews there was only 
one case where I was not allowed to record it; in all other cases recording was explicitly 
allowed. Unfortunately in two cases technical difficulties led to the fact that notes were 
relied upon afterwards. The duration of the interviews was from 21 mins to 1h 40 mins. On 
average an interview took about an hour (see Appendix 1 ). 
While conducting the interviews, the questions developed from the first interview to 
the latter ones. I did not follow a strict sequence of questions; in contrast I tried to adapt to 
the interviewees’ answers, so that there was no fixed guideline to the questions.  The 
conduct of the interviews was that of a conversation, rather than that of an interrogation, 
which is characteristic of semi-structured interviews (Valentine 1997, 111). Therefore, 
they were flexible and dynamic (Robinson 1998, 411). On the one hand, this method led to 
a better flow of interview, yet on the other hand the risk to skip a detailed question 
increased. Paying attention to the flow leads also to one of the advantages of qualitative 
methodology: revealing new, unformulated aspects. However, while the core questions 
concerning local socio-economic development in such fields as economics, politics and 
society were asked in different orders, I attempted to keep the original checklist of 
questions. All interviews started after I had introduced myself, then followed with rather 
general questions about local development and ended by asking for a personal estimation 
of future perspectives (see Appendix 2); Cropley 2002, 105; Kitchen and Tate 2000, 216). 
This procedure formed a framework for the interview that created a friendlier environment 
to gain the respondents’ trust (Robinson 1998, 415).  
The outcome of the interviews also depended on the individual situation  involving 
the interviewee and researcher (Cropley 2002, 63). Not only the personal appearance of 
interviewee and researcher, but also the location, time and individual preferences implicitly 
played an important role in the results and statements, without being explicitly expressed. 
Hence, the interaction between the interviewee and me was affected by identity and 
personality (Robinson 1998, 414, 416; Valentine 1997, 113). All in all, I got the 
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impression that being a student, not connected to an organization, institution or party, nor 
from one of the local national groups helped to gain trust. Thus, the ‘power relationship’, 
as Robinson calls it, did not seem to be a key factor (1998, 416). Within this ‘outsider’ 
position, advantages exceeded the disadvantages of not being involved in the society or 
being able to speak the local language15. Only by speaking perfect Bosnian or Croatian, 
knowing all linguistic differences and intricacies, would I have been able to get different 
information. Poorly-spoken local languages might have caused the contrary. In almost all 
cases the office was the chosen location of the interviews; only in two cases were 
interviews conducted in private environments. The interviewees were from all age groups, 
the youngest being around 20 and the oldest up to 60. Personal backgrounds were not 
explicitly asked, but some of them had personal war experiences, as they told me. 
Aside from any technical difficulties experienced during the interview, personal 
impressions from different sources, experience from previous travels between 2002-2005, 
knowledge from literature and previous discussions in the run-up to the thesis, and finally 
the impressions and experiences of the fieldwork itself, all influenced the findings from the 
interviews. Hence, reflexivity and the awareness of subjectivity are essential for all of the 
results (Robinson 1998, 409). 
Generally, the number and quality of the interviews were satisfying even though the 
time was limited and the selection of people was subjective. However, all participants 
showed interest in the topic and the attention to it by a student. After conducting all 
interviews, the phase of transcribing, structuring and analysing the material took place.  
Therefore, I selected six key interviews from different fields (city administration, 
journalism, business, international organisations and local parties) and transcribed them 
completely. The remaining fifteen interviews I transcribed partially in order to extract the 
important text passages, so that only the essential substance of the interview was 
transcribed (Crang 1997, 185). Even though the transcription of the data was time 
consuming, it also provided the means to relive the conversations as Robinson emphasises 
(1998, 426) and Crang describes with the term ‘re-familiarization’ (1997, 185).  However, 
“[...] the transcription process is itself part of the analytical process,” as Clayman and Gill 
summarise (2004, 593). Through this procedure a selection of text passages were 
identified, and can already be seen as part of the interpretation (Robinson 1998, 430). 
Through the impressions and the transcription a classification and categorisation into four 
fields that limit local socio-economic development was carried out: 
                                                 
15 Languages in the Bosnian post-war situation play an important role. They signal belonging to a certain 
group (Scotto 2004, 47). 
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 1. hard economic factors 
 2. internal political factors  
 3. external political factors 
 4. social factors 
While categorisation of the data is a helpful tool to structure the material, it also 
contains subjective and, therefore, selective interpretation. That means that under other 
circumstances another researcher could have marked different text passages (Crange 1997, 
189). The procedure of conducting interviews, transcribing and categorising is a triple 
selection (Clayman and Gill 2004, 593; Cropley 2002, 156). After forming the above 
mentioned categories, I marked the interviews according to the most important text 
passage, in order to compare the responses (Crang 1997, 186). It was not possible in all 
cases to categorise in an exclusive manner, so some text passages belonged to two or even 
three of the identified fields. The repetitive procedure of categorising text is a back and 
forth process, so it can be seen as an ‘analytic induction’ rather than ‘enumerative’ testing 
(ibid, 188). Some indirectly-related facts that were mentioned I highlighted additionally in 
order to include interesting aspects that I interpreted as links to the research. Finally, in the 
analysis of the dissertation I will integrate the statements into the theoretical context that 
was given in Chapter 3. I provide all quotations in English, even though some of them 
were recorded in German and translated by myself. For this translation, content and 
context were more important than a word-by-word translation. Since qualitative 
methodology addresses the understanding of people’s environment, the content rather than 
the exact word-by-word translation is important. Due to the fact that some interviewees 
made some linguistic mistakes in English and German, some editing has been made: this . 




4.2.2 Interviewees and institutions 
The choice of the interviewees and their institutional affiliation is discussed in this 
section. As mentioned above, the period of fieldwork was divided into two parts; the first 
week was organised and the second week was spontaneous. This meant that on the one 
hand basic and comprehensive fields of importance were covered while new actors and 
new perspectives could be explored. The following figure 3 shows the organisations, 
persons and representative fields from the interviews: 
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Figure 3: Interviewees, positions, fields 
Organisation Person Fields 
KfW  
(Bank for Reconstruction) 
Olaf Zymelka 
UNDP 
(United Nations Development Programme) 




(Bank for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) 
Vesna Frančić 
OSCE   
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
Richard Medić 
OSCE 
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
Katrin Hett 
OHR 
(Office of High Representative) 
Sanela Tunović 
Nansen Dialogue Centre  
(Youth and educational work) 
Vanesa Galić 
GTZ  
(German Agency for Technical Cooperation) 
Selma Karavdić-Gaab 
GTZ  
(German Agency for Technical Cooperation) 
Rubeena Esmail-Arndt 
KAS  



















City Administration   
(Business Service Centre) 
Admira Čustović 














(Business development agency) 
Mihalia Bektaš 
Redah  
(Regional development Agency Herzegovina) 
Ivan Jurij 
































Džemal Bjelic University Mostar 
(Bosniak University) 
Osman Pajić 
Student from Mostar Muhammid Velagić 
Pavarotti Centre  















RTV Mostar  










Overall, the table shows seven groups of local actors that are involved in local 
development in various ways, including international organisations, city administration, 
local development agencies, business, politics, educational institutions and the media. 
International organisations are well represented, in contrast to local firms and political 
parties who are not. An important local firm ‘Aluminij’ denied me an interview; other 
political parties did not answer the request for an interview for reasons that are not 
apparent. Therefore, the selection of interviewees is limited and has its emphasis on 
international organisations. However, the fact that most of the respondents were local 
people with Yugoslavian, if not Bosnian,16 background gave a more balanced insight. Even 
though some names of the interviewees might signal an apparent ethnic belonging, often 
the opposite was true. Hence, clear ethnic identification due to names was not possible. 
Among all interviewees, the representatives of the media were especially supportive 
because their experience and expertise go back to the beginning of the conflict in 1991, 
giving them both historical background and broad local knowledge.  
The six key interviews that were fully transcribed were those ofErich Rathfelder, 
Mirsad Behram, Olaf Zymelka, Bakir Pekučić, Damir Džeba and Admira Čustarić. These 
people have the function of ‘gatekeepers’ as Valentine emphasises (1997, 116).  As 
‘gatekeepers’ they had both expert knowledge and the position that facilitated further 
contacts. Through this kind of recruiting it was possible to have access to appropriate 
persons in relevant institutions (ibid,). Whenever the recruitment of interviewees were 
recruited through snowballing, I got the impression that trust existed due to the 
gatekeeper’s reputation. The selection of interviewees was rather connected to the 
institutions than to individuals, although personal information about their experiences was 
helpful. 
 
In this chapter I described both the theoretical base of qualitative methodology and 
the practical outcome of my research in Sarajevo and Mostar. It showed the reasons for the 
choice of qualitative methods, its advantages and its disadvantages. In the section on 
fieldwork I described the structure of the interviews and the interviewees. The following 
chapter contains the core findings of the conducted interviews, namely the analysis of 
socio-economic development in Mostar.  
 
                                                 
16 In this case, the term ‘Bosnian’ refers to the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Due to the fact that names do not necessarily give a certain ethnic or national background, the reference can 
just be in geographical terms 
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5 Analysis: the Hindrances to Socio-Economic Development in Mostar 
 
This chapter contains the core of my research that addresses. It tries to answer the 
research question, “What are the hindrances to socio-economic development in Mostar?”, 
in four steps. The interviews lead to the following four main types of hindrances: a) hard 
economic factors, b) internal political factors, c) external political factors and, d) social 
factors. The following provides the analysis of the 23 interviews supported byadditional 
literature. Even though additional material is included in the analysis the main focus is on 
the statements of the local respondents. In a subjective epistemology it is important to 
reveal the social and subjective reality; how actors, such as business people, regional 
planners and advisors evaluate the local socio-economic situation in Mostar. The aim of 
this chapter is to show how local authorities understand the processes of local development 
and where they see the main hindrances. Furthermore, the theoretical components of 
Chapter 3 will be applied and the statements of the interviewees are set into the context of 
the theoretical approaches. 
 
 
Figure 4: Local development: interconnectedness of the limiting factors  
 
In order to give an overview of the interconnection of these four fields as I perceive 
them, I provide  the above Figure 4, though Chapter 6 will go into further detail and is at 
the same time the summary of my findings. The different fields are difficult to separate 
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because there is a high degree of interconnectedness.  Each field has an essential influence 
on the others – they are highly interdependent. Local socio-economic development is 
influenced by all of them. 
At first glance the most visible damage to local development is the destroyed 
buildings and the devastated areas, but beside the hard economic factors local development 
also includes politics and society. Bose says that “[t]he reconstruction of war damaged 
buildings and utilities, and the revival of a portion of service sector however masks the 
painful reality that the local economy remains largely a guttered wreck, characterized by 
massive unemployment as in Bosnia  and Herzegovina as a whole”  and indicates that 
sustainable development includes all four fields (2002,108).  
 
 
5.1 Hard economic factors 
 
This section focuses on classical economic factors of development. Therefore, it 
contains three aspects: a) the infrastructure, b) privatisation and investment, and c) labour 
market and ‘brain drain’. 
 
 
5.1.1 Infrastructure and material reconstruction 
 
“So the major economic infrastructure and 
 facilities in Bosnia Herzegovina and in Mostar 
 especially were destroyed during the war.” 
 
(Osman Paijć –Professor of economics, interview No. 5, 2005) 
 
Infrastructure is one of the most important assumptions of local economic 
development; especially in Mostar, a heavily-damaged city, the question occurs if 
infrastructure is still missing after 10 years of reconstruction. Infrastructure is defined as 
the physical and material capacities, mainly roads, buildings, electricity, water, etc., or as 
the underlying structure of services and amenities needed to facilitate directly productive 
activity (Lee 2000, 394). Infrastructure is also the most visible aspect when speaking about 
the destruction of capacities, which was a major problem in Mostar. Mostar was, along 
with Sarajevo and Banja Luka, one of the main industrial centres in pre-war Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. Mostar had been an important location for the metal and electronic 
industries, as well as for energy generation during socialist times (Bose 2002, 133).  
 With the destruction of the industrial capacities and infrastructure during the war 
Mostar’s regional economy was missing those capacities of production; it “…was left 
without the pillars of economy”, as Osman Pajić says (interview No. 5, 2005). Especially 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were funding the 
reconstruction process during the years 1997-2003 in order to provide the basic 
infrastructure for production, transport and water supply – the most urgent issues. For 
example, the World Bank financed a project for water supply and sanitation for the city 
with US$ 12 million; the project ended in 2004 (World Bank 2004a, 38; World Bank 
2004b, 48). The first period of international reconstruction, from 1995-2000, was 
characterised by heavy investments into infrastructure and material restructuring. Vesna 
Frančić, operations officer for the World Bank in Mostar, describes the change of 
international support as follows:  
[w]e started our initiatives with financing and different reconstructing processes; you 
couldn’t do much with economic development and growth immediately after the war. 
In 1996 people didn’t have any places to live in, water and electricity were cut. All 
bridges were destroyed and all roads were exactly the same - destroyed. So this was in 
fact the first support and assistance from the bank (interview No. 4, 2005). 
 
Most of the projects on restructuring and rebuilding the physical capacities have been 
phased out over the last years because the main capacities have been reconstructed. The 
trend of international support went from reconstruction projects to administrative reform 
projects, as Frančić further emphasises; “[a]fter we finished our portfolio of the emergency 
reconstruction recovery we focused more on the reforms. …With all these reforms, you 
help them to make their economy sustainable; to be less dependent on the foreign aid…” 
(interview No. 4, 2005). Whether or not the dependency on foreign aid and the 
international community has been reduced will be discussed in section 5.3, which the 
focuses in the change of political involvement.  
Officially, the Regional Economic Development Strategy (Redah) estimates that the 
conditions of the traffic infrastructure in Mostar are above average for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in general; “the city of Mostar has at its disposal the best established and 
developed infrastructure” in the region (Redah 2004, 36). Even though its infrastructure is 
estimated as being better than in other parts of the region it is still far below European 
standards (ibid, 36). The most important road for Mostar is the M17 that connects Mostar 
with Croatia to the west and Sarajevo to the east; it is the main east-west connection for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to the fact that the volume of traffic is high and the road is 
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not large enough for intensive use, the transport costs are relatively high (ibid, 24). The 
inequality regarding traffic infrastructure between Croatia and Bosnia is immense, so much 
so that it is also seen as a limiting factor. Mehila Bektaš, from the local business 
development agency LINK agrees on the estimation of the road infrastructure in the Redah 
report; “[…] we need more roads with a higher quality,” (interview No. 10, 2005). This is 
one of the physical problems for her customers, small and medium-sized businesses, thatc 
blocks sustainable development. Also, Admira Čustarić from the Business Service Centre 
(BSC), the municipal agency for business development, says that better traffic 
infrastructure would be helpful, especially a faster highway connecting Croatia with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (interview No. 18, 2005). There is a plan for a faster trans-
national highway, the so-called C5 corridor, in the context of European transport corridors 
that should replace the M17, but foreign investments are missing (Pan Eurostar 2006, 78). 
Such a high speed connection between Croatia, Sarajevo and further to the east would 
boost the regional economy (Theiss 2005). There is potential for economic development if 
Mostar would be integrated into the European network of transport corridors.  
 Aside from the road infrastructure, Mostar has potential for air traffic due to the fact 
that the airport has been reconstructed by the international community and will connect 
Mostar to the international airports in the Balkan region (Redah 2004, 40). When focusing 
on the industrial infrastructure major difficulties appear. “[A] number of pre-war build 
premises and industrial zones with the necessary infrastructure lie unused after the war,” as 
mentioned in the Redah report (ibid, 44).  Also Osman Paijić, professor of economics at 
the Džemal Beljić University of Mostar, emphasises that “these major infrastructures, 
capacities and facilities were the basis of the economy in our country […]” (interview No. 
5, 2005).  He further mentions that the international community did not tailor their 
programmes to these “[…] pillars of the local economy […]”; they were not, as he argues, 
 […] interested to invest in the big economic infrastructure because they were in the 
ownership of the state […] they invested in small and medium-sized enterprises. What 
we need is a proper economic policy and on the other side the reconstructing of the 
economic capacities and infrastructure is really what would contribute to the 
development of our country […](interview  No. 5, 2005). 
 
Among the interviewees he was the only one who stressed the limiting influence of 
reconstruction and production capacities on local development. However, the topic of 
privatisation and modernisation seems more important. It is discussed in the next section 
(5.1.2) and it is also connected to the modernisation of production capacities.  
Even though the material damage might be the most visible hindrance, the current 
situation has improved recently and the basic “[…] infrastructure has been fixed 
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throughout the city,” as Sanela Tunović from the OHR says (interview No. 9, 2005). A 
representative from the business sector, the director of the local Tobacco Firm FDM, Bakir 
Pekušić agrees with this picture; “we have everything here […] there is not a big problem 
with infrastructure. We have a highway to Split, we have an airport” (interview No. 8, 
2005). Sanela Tunović further describes the situation positively: “[…]the new airport is 
connected, yes there is much foreign investment coming to town, yes there are many new 
jobs, the city infrastructure has been improved […] the buildings are also fixed […] but 
there is still a lot of things to be done” (interview No. 9, 2005). Even though the physical 
infrastructure does not yet meet European standards, it was not perceived as the most 
limiting factor for local economic development in general. Muhamid Velagić, student of 
economics from Mostar, summarises the infrastructure as, “[i]t might be the main physical 
problem. It is not worth talking about it. If we would have the entire infrastructure, we 
[would] have other main problems” (interview No 14, 2005). 
 
Photo 2: Recovery: traffic infrastructure financed by the international community; Mostar and former 
front line (© author) 
 
The infrastructure is to some extent a limiting factor for local socio-economic 
development but it seems that the basic traffic infrastructure has been provided. This refers 
to the theoretical approach that describes the shift from physical reconstruction to 
administrative reform. Especially in the period directly after the war reconstruction of 
infrastructure plays an important role (Deininger 2003, 583). The Bank for Reconstruction 
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KfW concludes that “[…] today, almost ten years after [the war], the direct physical 
destructions have been removed […]” (KfW 2005, 1). Once the basic infrastructure is 
provided, the essential aspects of sustainable development are public reform and the 
attraction of foreign direct investment.  Olaf Zymelka, director of the KfW describes the 
shift as “[s]lowly, one changes from development aid to economic co-operation […] that is 
also realised in the country, but very slowly” (interview No. 2, 2005). The statements of 
the representative of business, for whom infrastructure does not play such an important 
role, stand in stark contrast to the official report of the Regional Development Agency 
(Redah) in which the lack of infrastructure has priority. Surprisingly, the analysis of the 
interviews resulted in a mixed picture, where infrastructure and reconstruction were not 
mentioned to be a fundamental hindrance, but had some importance. The following section 
is addressed to privatisation and investments, which is entangled with infrastructure and 
reconstruction. This supports the theoretical approach of Collier, who emphasises the civil 
and administrative aspects, rather than the mere reconstruction of the destroyed physical 
environment (1999). However, the physical preconditions have an important impact. 
 
 
5.1.2 Privatisation process and FDI 
 
“We need money to invest, 
 that is it what we need. 
 To move something, to start something.” 
 
(Mirsad Behram, Journalist, interview No. 12, 2005) 
 
Directly connected with the reconstruction of infrastructure is the aspect of 
privatisation and the question of foreign direct investment (FDI). As described in Chapter 
3, Mostar is undergoing the postponed process of privatisation and modernisation in the 
context of transition from a socialist to market economy. The war impeded the phase of 
controlled privatisation (Pugh 2004, 53).  Mostar is also facing the problem of a lack of 
investors and un-privatised state-owned factories. The German Development Agency GTZ 
was tasked with the privatisation process in Mostar. Selma Karavdić described the function 
of the GTZ finding investors: “[…] our task was to create the connection between the 
Western European market and the local firms. We tried to make the firms as attractive as 
possible in order to find investors”. She continues that “[…] we tried everything, but it was 
not possible to sell the company – the whole story [the production of the firm] was a out of 
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date” (interview No. 16, 2005). There are two main problems with privatisation in Mostar: 
a) corruption and b) modernisation. 
Rathfelder, a journalist from Sarajevo, as well as Olaf Zymelka, the director of the 
Bank for Reconstruction KfW, emphasise the national problem of corruption; privatisation 
would be politically motivated, “18 state-owned firms out of 108 strategic companies had 
been privatised. Privatisation always takes place under corruption; the polite formula 
would be politically motivated” as Zymelka says (interview No. 2, 2005). He also remarks 
that there would be many ‘hidden agendas’ and the interest to modernise and privatise is 
very low due to the fact that socialist elites are still in control of the firms (interview No. 2, 
2005). From Zymelka’s economist point of view, “[…] nothing happened after the war, the 
business is still crusted and […] people do not want to change, because they can get bribes, 
even though the country in general is suffering. In my opinion the country hasn’t reached 
the transition period yet” (interview No. 2, 2005). In the beginning of the peace period 
privatisation was not controlled, so that until 2000, when Wolfgang Petrisch became High 
Representative, the shares of the profitable companies had been given to powerful 
members of the national parties (Rathfelder, interview No. 1, 2005). The Aluminium 
factory ‘Aluminij’ in Mostar, under the direction of the war-time mayor Brajković, is such 
an example, in which the privatisation process underwent neither a transparent nor a 
democratic procedure. Ivana Marić, from the Kondrad Adenauer Foundation for politics 
KAS, hints at the case of Aluminij: “That is still a problem with Aluminij; no one exactly 
knows how the privatisation process came. It was not clear if it underwent a transparent 
procedure. Brajković has strong ties to the HDZ” (interview No. 3, 2005). Even the HDZ 
secretary of youth, Damir Džeba, admits that, “I do not know how this famous director 
Brajković got the money to get the factory again on its feet” (interview No. 18, 2005). 
Mirsad Behram, a journalist from RTV explains the informal and uncontrolled process of 
privatisation for the aluminium factory as follows; “[t]he director of that factory, ten years 
ago, said […] it is hard to translate, his rude word in Balkan. His literal translation is: 
during the war, who took what, it belongs to him  - if you get the sense of it” (interview 
No. 12, 2005). This suggests evidence of the uncontrolled privatisation, which causes 
economic difficulties such as described theoretically in Chapter 3. When speaking about 
transparent means of privatisation the informal networks and institutions play an important 
role. As discussed in the institutional approach, the outcome of informal networks are 
neither sustainable, nor democratic and therefore a hindrance to local socio-economic 
development (Krastev 2003; Deininger 2003; Stiglitz and Hoff 2001).  
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Another example of a difficult privatisation process that derives from the problem of 
modernisation is the Tobacco Firm Mostar, FDM. It is a fully state-owned firm and, 
besides the mentioned aluminium firm, the only producing industrial site in Mostar after 
the war. Bakir Pekušić, the director of FDM, explains the unsolved problem of the 
privatisation of this firm; “…privatisation is still a problem. This firm is still not yet 
privatised. This year we tried to privatise the firm but it was not possible because it is not 
transparent. State and government are still corrupt. In Bosnia the disorientation of 
privatisation is still huge […]” (interview No. 8, 2005). Due to missing modernisation 
processes the attractiveness to invest in state owned firms is rather low. Additionally, the 
pressure of international markets and the process of global competitiveness are worsening 
the situation. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a free trade agreement with its neighbours in 
order to lower transport costs (BCR 2005, no. 575). Even though it might reduce transport 
costs, it opens the market to international products without protection for domestic 
production. The pressure of prices is immense as Pekušić notes; “[a] problem for this 
company is the competition. The foreign competitors have the better chances to sell on the 
Bosnian market […]” (interview No. 8, 2005).   
Furthermore, the legal environment to privatise state firms is imperfect. If the legal 
situation is unsolved and property rights are neither ensured nor clarified, a precondition 
for the privatisation process is rather limited. Damir Džeba from the HDZ emphasises the 
absence of legal security, “[…] so nobody is so crazy to invest a lot of money in a country 
which is not reformed and, let’s say, set up as a normal state” (interview No. 18, 2005).  
Mehila Bektaš from the local business development agency LINK agrees by saying that 
property rights are is not clear sometimes (interview No. 10, 2005). This lack of legal 
security and the image of the region is an additional barrier to FDI.  On the theoretical 
level the lack of legal security and government control of the privatisation process is 
considered to limit efficient growth (Stenning 1997, 7). In concrete terms, however, most 
of the firms did not find any investor because “[…] the firms have not been attractive 
enough,” as Selma Karavdić says (interview No. 16, 2005). Ivan Jurj, the director of the 
Regional Development Agency Redah, also sees the problem of modernisation as one of 
the most important aspects  in missing FDI (interview No. 20, 2005). Privatisation is the 
precondition for economic growth, regional development and FDI interest, as explained in 
chapter 3(Bradshaw 2005, 7). 
However, when investors can be found for the former state-owned companies, it is 
often difficult to find sustainable investments. Admira Čustorić from the BSC, the 
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municipal business agency, explains the process of privatisation from an advisory view: 
“[a]most every enterprise that was privatised went bankrupt. They [the investors] buy the 
firm and promise a lot, they take the loans of the national banks - for good conditions – and 
then they disappear. The duties [investments] are never fulfilled […]” (interview No. 19, 
2005). Not only external criminal activities, as described above, take place but also the 
atmosphere created by local politicians is rather hostile to investments, as Mirsad Behram 
says, “[s]o, meanwhile local politicians, I mean, create environment for investments, it is 
too politically unstable. The economic situation is worsening, bad, it is getting worse and 
worse every day” (interview No. 12, 2005). 
The picture in Mostar concerning privatisation represents the national one. When 
comparing the direct investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia, the former has less 
then 15% of the direct investments that Croatia receives (KfW 2005, 5). However, there is 
one sector that attracts FDI; the banking sector is almost the only example of a successful 
privatisation process. Due to the strict fiscal policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
banking sector was rapidly privatised and even Mostar benefited from it (Sanela Tunović, 
interview No. 9, 2005). Mehila Bektaš, from LINK adds,  
[w]e have very many foreign banks, we have very few local banks and they are really 
weak. The banking sector has the highest foreign investment rates in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Local politicians, they do not provide any support to foreign investors. 
And also with the legal and tax system […] (interview No. 10, 2005). 
  
The aspect of privatisation might be the most complex one when examining the 
limitations of local socio-economic development because many different reasons for the 
lagging privatisation process and the lack of investments can be mentioned. Mainly 
problems of the socialist legacy are visible, such as the lack of modernisation and the 
inefficiency of production, but these difficulties were aggravated by the war (Stenning 
1997; Donais 2002; Bradshaw 2005; Collier 1999). Informal networks, the absence of the 
state and legal framework and a bad image of the region lead to the fact that the 
privatisation process in Mostar is facing major difficulties. The image of the region also 
has an effect on the willingness to invest says Admira Čustorić: “I believe that there is not 
at all a risk of war anymore. Capital or investment is safe. Actually the investors from 
Germany, for example, should not be afraid - they can invest“ (interview No. 19, 2005). 
There is another interesting aspect in this, as the massive donations and financial aid from 
the beginning of the peace period have lead to a trend that modernisation and 
competitiveness have been neglected. Tunović, from the OHR, refers to it, “[b]asically 
there was no investment but a lot of donations and that is very difficult from my 
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perspective at least […]” (interview No. 9, 2005). She is referring to the dependency 
syndrome that Schwarz-Schilling also mentioned (2003), when international financial aid 
is the main income for the country, but does not create sustainable growth. However, 
international financial aid avoided a massive decline of production capacities in the 
beginning of the peace process. This was necessary to guarantee a minimum standard of 
living, but negatively affected the privatisation process. 
Privatisation and the transition from the socialist to market economy also have a 
human aspect. The postponed process of privatisation and the lack of FDI are linked to 
labour. The following section concentrates on the problems concerning the labour market. 
 
 
5.1.3 Labour market and brain drain 
 
“We are missing one generation. That is a vacuum“ 
 
(Bakir Pekušić, Director of FDM, interview No. 8, 2005) 
 
Another important aspect when speaking about local socio-economic development is 
the labour factor. The analysis of the interviews showed that there is a paradoxical 
situation: on the one hand Mostar faces a huge problem of unemployment and on the other 
hand skilled labour is missing. Positions in firms and in the administration could not be 
occupied properly because experienced and skilled labour could not be found. ‘Brain 
drain’ is often mentioned to be the reason why skilled labour is missing. 
The rate of unemployment is officially above 40% for the whole country (UNDP 
2004, 18). Several sources claim Mostar is at the same level (Federal Office of Statistics 
2005; KfW 2005; Redah 2005). Even though the official statistics can be questioned, the 
fact that several sources draw the same picture gives confidence, though the difficulty in 
measuring the rate of unemployment should be taken into account. Additionally, different 
definitions of unemployment lead to descrepencies. There are many people that are 
registered as being unemployed while working in family businesses, on the one hand, and 
on the other hand many people in state-owned companies are listed as employed but are 
not physically working and often live abroad. Olaf Zymelka, from the KfW, explains the 
situation: 
[…] the real rate of unemployment is up to 15 or 20 %, the rest is working in the so 
called ‘grey economy’. […] That is a whole parallel structure. However, perhaps the 
official 40% is not unrealistic because [...] we have a huge number of ghost workers 
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that are registered as being employed in state companies but they have not gone to 
work for five or six years. These state companies are overstaffed. If you would 
dismiss those ghost workers we would be up to the 40% (interview No.2, 2005). 
 
The latest numbers of the UNDP show that the problem of unemployment has been 
growing in recent years (2005, 17).  The growth of unemployment is also connected to the 
fact that the phase of reconstruction and foreign donations is ending so that less money is 
invested and the supra-natural growth is corrected (Rathfelder, interview No.1, 2005; 
Collier 1999). However, the problem of unemployment is only one side of the coin; the 
quality of labour is the other. 
The change from a socialist to market-oriented working regime was overtaken by the 
conflict during the 1990s. Skilled labour, especially engineers and technicians, and most of 
the workers with higher education and, 
[…] university diplomas went during the war to live in countries like the US or 
Western Europe and never came back after the war. This problem is really a big 
problem especially in our universities. This phenomenon happened especially during 
1991-1995 but also it also happens today. Many people are going to live somewhere 
else (Osman Pajić, interview No. 5, 2005). 
 
The emigration of skilled labour, so-called ‘brain drain’, is still a problem today. 
Knowledge cannot be generated if skilled labour is missing and, therefore, institutions for 
local development cannot be created (Amin and Thrift 1994). The consequences of missing 
skilled labour and knowledge are a lack of innovation and initiatives as the approaches of 
Amin and Thrift (1994) as well as Meier (2001) suggest. 
Those people who stayed during the war, were out of work for years and often 
could not find a place under the new regimes of the new market economy. Ivan Jurij, from 
Redah, says that 
[w]e have a lot of people in mid-age who are not skilled to be employed in high-tech 
sectors. We have to retrain them to be ready to work with the sophisticated 
techniques… A lot of people in their 40s have their experience from before the war. 
Things changed during this 15 year period (interview No. 20, 2005). 
 
Rubeena Esmail-Arndt from the GTZ refers to the unchanged thinking of the elites that are 
still in power of the state institutions when she says that “[…] many employees are the 
same as fifteen years ago […] they have not realised that the capitalist forms of working 
are different [...] they do not know what to do, if they have realised the new working 
related requirements […] and there is no opportunities to improve their skills […]” 
(interview No. 15, 2005). 
The structures within the state institutions that are still ruled by the socialist elite tend 
to resist reforms. “There are lots of employees between 40 and 50 years old that keep the 
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system running. They do not want to recruit young and qualified people. If they [the state 
employees] are not replaced by qualified people it is difficult to generate new jobs […]” 
(Katrin Hett, interview No. 7, 2005).  Muhamid Velagić from Mostar reflects on his own 
experience by giving an example of the elite-enforced hurdles that block the positions for 
qualified young people, “[b]ut if you bring in somebody who is qualified where would 
your own position be […] if you are an engineer and I [give] […] you a job, after a while 
you will advise me and take my position. Believe me there are so many people sitting in 
those positions and have absolutely no skills for them” (interview No. 14, 2005). 
What the socialist legacy is in terms of human resources becomes clear when 
drawing a picture from these statements. Entrepreneurialism and ownership are just two of 
the many aspects that reflect the change in working regime that are difficult to adopt 
(Pickles 1998, 187). Ivan Jurij, from Redah expresses that “[y]ou have to keep in mind that 
most of the human resources are out of date” (interview No. 21, 2005). Not only are labour 
skills of the socialist legacy unsatisfactory, but education standards are also low. How a 
lack of skilled labour affects the growing tourist sector is described by Mia Sarić, from the 
Toursist Board of Herzegovina: “when the tourists are coming but not to their own 
restaurant they [the unskilled owners] wonder why... When you go to the restaurants you 
can see […] [that] the waiters, they do not know how to behave or to provide proper 
service. That is a problem, that is a huge problem” (interview No. 17, 2005). This indicates 
how difficult it is to adapt to the new working environment by people by the older 
generation. 
However, unskilled labour does not only derive from the socialist employment, it is 
also the outcome of a lack of education. Mehila Bektaš from LINK illustrates the effects of 
unskilled labour by giving an example from her customers: “[w]hen our members [local 
business] are in a phase that they employ members of the family they do not care about 
skills, and then they grow to a particular level and need skilled people…then they need 
qualified people” (interview No. 10, 2005). The lack of qualified people is obvious in 
various fields. In particular public institutions, such as the city administration, is skilled 
labour missing as Katrin Hett, OSCE official responsible for reforming the city 
administration says, “all in all the personnel was not qualified enough. Even though they 
have the university degree, it does not mean that they have the skills […] so in many cases 
we had to recruit from outside” (interview No. 6, 2005). 
These examples show that the situation in Mostar, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
regarding the labour market is quite difficult. The trend of emigration is continuing after 
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the onset of peace. Many individuals, especially young people, see their future abroad. The 
fact that half of the people have lived abroad during the war - mostly as refugees - raises 
the perspective to leave the country for many (UNDP 2003, 25). Many of them have been 
educated in Germany, Austria or Italy and lived there for years. After locals came back to 
Mostar, the desire to move back to their previous residence arose when they could not find 
work.  Vanesa Galić, a student from Mostar working for the Nansen Dialogue Centre, says 
that “[t]he problem is that many well-educated people go abroad because they do not have 
the opportunity to work. Even if you have all those skills you might not have the 
opportunity to show those skills” (interview No. 20, 2005). In a nation-wide survey carried 
out by the UNDP, over 60% of people between the ages of 18 and 35 agreed that they 
would leave the country when given a chance (2004, 65). Mihila Bektaš states that “[m]ost 
people, young people, if they have the opportunity to go abroad, they decide, ok I am 
going” (interview No. 10, 2005).  Richard Medić, press officer from the OSCE office in 
Mostar, also says that “[t]he youth that the country needs is going abroad” (interview No. 
6, 2005). 
Local development is especially hindered when on the one hand unskilled labour is 
still having their positions and young people –the lost generation - (Pekušić interview No. 
8, 2005) are without any future job perspective. Another problem concerning youth is that - 
even if they have a university diploma, they do not have the experience needed for certain 
jobs, as Damir Džeba, the HDZ secretary of youth, explains: “[i]t is not enough to have 
education, you must have the experience and […] how can a student, who just has his 
Diploma or Master’s degree, how can he have five years of experience?” (interview No. 
18, 2005). Sanela Tunović from the OHR gives an example why young people leave the 
country by saying that “[…] some people think it is better to wash glasses in Germany than 
in Bosnia. […] the grass is greener on the other side […] yes, there is a lot of brain drain 
(interview No. 9, 2005). 
Tobacco-firm director Bakir Pekušić highlights the situation of well-educated people 
who have left the country from the business point of view: “I do not know why, but the 
Bosnian educated elites, who had visited higher education institutions mainly emigrated. 
We need those people, but they are happy abroad. They have houses and cars and 
everything […] and they do not want to come back because we still have a bad situation 
here […]” (interview No. 8, 2005).  Admira Čustović also agrees with this idea when 
saying that the emigrants have had a good life for years, “[…] and now, time passed by [...] 
the people found a job [abroad] [...] the kids are integrated there and that is the problem” 
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(interview No. 19, 2005). After so many years the emigrants and former refugees have lost 
their ties to their homeland on the one hand, and have a better life on the other, which 
makes it difficult to attract skilled labour. This makes it clear that the lack of skilled labour 
and the bad economic situation are corresponding factors that support each other. Detailed 
reasons of why local youth does not see their prospects in Mostar and how this is affecting 
entrepreneurship is discussed in Chapter 5.4. 
However, the picture is even more diverse. Even though on the administration and 
management level there is missing skilled labour, some, like Admira Čustrorić from the 
BSC, say that there is potential because many technicians and workers from the former 
industrial complexes are well-educated in their field: “we have good milling machine 
operators […] due to the low wages it would be a potential […] the quality of work is 
there, the workers are there. Actually the investors from Germany, for example, should not 
be afraid, they can invest” (interview No. 19, 2005). The journalist Erich Rathfelder says 
that “[…] earlier there was a factory for helicopter production and aircraft construction, 
therefore, there are highly qualified workers” (interview No. 1, 2005). Even though in 
those sectors of the labour market the potentials are better, the overall picture is rather 
problematic. 
I have created Figure 5 to show, on a theoretical level, how the labour market affects 
the local socio-economic development, which leads to the deterioration. It also summarises 
the interconnectedness of the above discussed aspects of the labour market: 
unemployment, lack of skilled labour and brain drain. It neither explains the complexity of 
the labour market overall nor the weighting of individual factors. Yet, it should 
demonstrate how the mentioned elements are interrelated.  
unemployment Brain Drain 
lack of skilled labour in the 
region
economic disadvantages 
lack of educational 
opportunities 
Figure 5: Labour market circle  
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Through the analysis of the interview material it became clear that the labour market 
has an important impact on local socio-economic development. The quality of human 
resources especially in higher positions is often inappropriate. While the elites are still in 




5.2 Internal political factors 
 
“I think as long as these nationalistic parties 
 hold the power, have the authority, I do not see that 
 any significant progress  will happen, in Mostar 
 but also  in all of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
 
(Osaman Paijć interview No. 5, 2005) 
 
The next field that that has a negative effect on socio-economic development is that 
of internal political factors. I define internal political factors as the interplay of local 
parties; therein the parties and the linkages between business and politics play a certain 
role. This section describes the main political actors, their legitimisation and the decision-
making processes on local topics. 
 
 
5.2.1 Political parties  
The political scene in Mostar is dominated mainly by two parties. Predominately, the 
HDZ represents the Croat community and the SDA represents the Muslim community 
(Scotto 2004, 106).  Both parties have their origins in the early 1990s and had been active 
during the war, as described previously. By being accepted in the DPA, they are legitimate 
political forces even though their wartime histories have not yet been reconciled. The 
parties connections to war veterans and war criminals as well as to the powerful elites from 
war times is or was tight (Schmidt 2004, 3).  Even though they have undergone a major 
shift away from radical positions to more democratic positions, the orientation and the 
electorate are ethno-national. Ivana Marić, from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) says 
that “[...] they are still nationally oriented but they open up to other ethnic groups slowly. 
This is also the case for Mostar” (interview No. 3, 2005). A UNDP survey on ethnic 
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tensions and politics, however, shows a different picture; the majority of people voted for 
the nationalist parties (2004). Still, the HDZ and SDA are the major parties that are the 
most important policy makers at the local level. Even though the nationalist parties are 
powerful, it does not explain why voters continue to vote for them. The mechanisms of 
nationalist ideology and how to attract the voters will be discussed in Chapter 5.2.2. 
In Mostar itself, nationalist parties are the main actors when it comes to local socio-
economic decision-making processes. Olaf Zymelk states that the local decision-makers 
are the City of Mostar, as well as the ruling HDZ and SDA parties (interview No. 2, 2005). 
“The political is the ethnic” he says and refers to the fact that the parties do not have their 
own economic programmes or democratic ideologies; they legitimise their position from 
an ethnic point of view (Olaf Zymelka, interview No. 2, 2005). The purpose of the parties 
is to maintain ethnic interests. Thus, the ordinary spectrum of left and right cannot be 
applied here (Bojkov 2003, 51).  Ethnic representation through the parties was and still is 
influential and powerful. Especially since the connections between politics and business 
are dose, Vesna Frančić from the World Bank says that “[…] you can maybe not even 
draw the line between the political and economic players. In so many faces they are mixed. 
And they go like merging and overlaying each other” (interview No. 3, 2005). 
When business and local politics are intertwined, the division of power is weakened 
and the risk of informal networks is high. The interconnectedness of politics and business 
often causes problems in terms of absent transparent and democratic procedures. Katrin 
Hett from the OSCE emphasises that “[…] the networking takes place where certain 
persons from politics and certain persons from firms co-operate […] this is the way how 
networks are created” (interview No. 7, 2005). 
Not only is the connection between business and politics strong and non-transparent, 
but hard-line former militias also exert a fundamental influence on society (Schmidt 2004, 
4). Certainly, to examine the informal networks is challenging and would exceed the 
research question.  However, these networks, or informal institutions, lead to non-
transparent and undemocratic procedures and decisions (UNDP 2005c, 6). Moreover, the 
‘hidden agendas’ of those businessmen who are involved in politics are supported by the 
political parties. As Muhamid Velagić states, “[…] this is all up to someone’s interest [...] 
everything is connected, the director of this, the director of that, the co-ordinator of that 
[…]. Wherever you go, to the top or to the bottom, you get to the same people” (interview 
No. 14, 2005). Mirsad Behram also agrees on the interconnectedness between politics and 
business: “[…] politicians are responsible, they are the ones who have influence within the 
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companies” (interview No. 12, 2003). He refers to the non-transparent privatisation process 
that often took place in an ethnically and politically-motivated way (Rathfelder, interview 
No. 1, 2005; Hett, interview No. 7, 2005). 
 The representation of an individual’s interests does not lead to problem-solving 
policies. Neither of the parties have a programme tailored to the local economic problems 
of Mostar. “[T]he main problem is the lack of co-ordination between the leading political 
parties, so they always are protecting their own personal, private interests or the interests of 
their parties instead of working towards improvement for all people” as Osman Paijć 
explains (interview No. 5, 2005). This suggests that local politics serve merely the self-
interest of the powerful rather than that of society (Bojkov 2003, 52). Local issues and 
programme proposals are not of interest when the political elite does not feel the need to 
represent non-ethnic parts of society (Zymelka, interview No. 2, 2005). Rather, they are 
interested in the maintenance of their power. Strong connections between local politics and 
business help them to stay in power. Individualistic and egoistic aims dominate the 
political scene so that a sustainable solution towards peace and development are difficult to 
reach (Bojkov 2003, 52).  
Even though the programmes of the parties have opened towards more democratic 
principles, legitimisation is still nationalist rather than society based.  Mehila Bektaš from 
LINK says that the “[e]conomy is not important to the politicians”, which also expresses a 
certain distrust in the ability of local politicians to solve problems.  I asked the HDZ 
general secretary of youth, Damir Džeba, if they would have a programme or strategy for 
local development - how to enhance the business – and he answered that “[b]ecause of the 
constitutional changes next year, we are only concentrating on constitutional changes” 
(interview No. 18, 2005). This shows that national or ethnic topics still dominate at the 
local level. The hierarchy of priorities therefore block necessary decisions at the local 
level. The decision making-process, however, will be discussed in Chapter 5.2.3. 
Moreover, the OCSE evaluation report on the municipal elections  in 2004 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina emphasises that “[…] ethnicity – rather than local issues – was the main 
underlying issue of the campaign” (2004, 1). These were the first elections for the unified 
city of Mostar and, therefore, the parties feared to loose power in their districts because of 
the abolishment of the former six municipalities. Rubeena Esamil-Arndt explains the 
situation in Mostar as follows; “[…] the political parties do not want that [the unification] 
because they can live well with the division” (interview No. 15, 2005).  
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When drawing conclusions about the current political scene in Mostar we can see that 
ethnic representation dominates rather than politically or economically-oriented 
programmes. The interest to stay in power, to be elected by one’s own ethnic constituency 
and the inability to start the reconciliation process are characteristic features of the local 
political scene (Bojkov 2003).  A lack of ownership and responsibility for the problems of 
the municipality are the fatal consequences.  Sanela Tunović from the OHR states that 
“ownership is really important and you sometimes have the feeling that people want to 
avoid the responsibility of making a decision” (interview No. 9, 2005). Whereas ownership 
and responsibility as elements of the civil society will be discussed in 5.4, the following 
section focuses on nationalist politics and its consequences for Mostar. 
 
 
5.2.2 Nationalist politics 
“Ethnic nationalism remains 
 the principal underlying issue 
 in politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
 
 (OSCE 2004, 4) 
 
The programmes of the HDZ and SDA as the ruling parties are still oriented towards 
ethnic and nationalist topics. Instead of through pragmatic local issues they attract voters 
by ethnic slogans and rhetoric (OSCE 2004). Fear is created by manipulated narratives 
from the wartime, so that each ethnicity is represented by its own party and each party 
represents one ethnic group. Chauvinist and exclusionary campaigns dominated the 
municipal elections in 2004. In an environment that also still IS characterised by the 
collective memory of the war, it is an easy way to attract voters with nationalistic slogans. 
The reproduction and persistence of a party’s identity is therefore easily done (Rathfelder, 
interview No. 1, 2005). Ratherfelder states that “for them [the authorities] nationalism is a 
label in order to advance their interests” (interview No. 1, 2005). 
Due to the ethno-nationalist legitimisation of the parties there is often no  pragmatic 
alternative for the voter; as Ivana Marić says, “[…] why should a Croat vote for the SDA, 
if there is already a party of the Croats […] that is a problem” (interview No. 3, 2005). 
Rubeena Esmail-Arndt describes how the nationalist rhetoric is producing fear, “I mean 
they always stoke fear that is not based on facts. The people do not have negative 
experiences […] but what happened ten years ago is raised “ (interview No. 15, 2005).  
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The mechanisms of creating fear are examined by Smith, who states that insecurity and 
elite manipulation are in close relation (2006, 8). If the political situation is insecure and 
the collective memory of a recent war is still vivid, then the political elites use the 
mechanism of fear to stay in power. The voters are receptive to this manipulation in a 
politically, economically and socially-insecure environment (ibid).  Thus, elite 
manipulation serves its self-interest rather than real ethno-nationalist demands. Muhamid 
Velagić also comments on the situation of the political elite: “[i]f you can make people 
afraid, if the people have fear you can do whatever you want. Control leads to fear and fear 
leads to nationalism” (interview No. 14, 2005). 
There is evidence of the self-interest of the politicians to stay in power at the national 
level, where nationalist parties form coalitions regardless of ethnic belonging (Bojkov 
2003, 51). At the national level ethnic identity is less strong when it comes to coalition 
building. Thus, this picture seems paradoxical, but fits into the scheme of self-interest and 
the egoistic individualism of the political elites. Katrin Het of the OSCE says that “[…] on 
the one hand the nationalist parties understand each other, indeed they form coalitions, but 
on the other hand it seems absurd when they say that they cannot work with the Serbs or 
the Croats […]” and she continues that “[…] the reason if or if not religiousness appears is 
rhetoric […] it is not so that it matters in public or in the streets” (interview No. 7, 2005). 
When the elites produce fear, their rhetoric is based on ethnicity because the people’s 
foundation of identity is ethnicity with features such as language, culture and tradition 
(Smith 2006, 13). “Everybody needs identity, but every identity is lost after what has 
happened here”, says Muhamid Velagić from Mostar (interview No.14, 2005). Often the 
elites, as in the case in Mostar, are war veterans or individuals that had been influential 
during the wartimes. Pekušić, the director of the tobacco firm, refers to the fact that the 
politicians of the wartime are still powerful and willing to co-operate: “it does not work 
with our politicians. That is a war generation […] they are made of concrete. They only 
came to power because there was no one else. The best people left” (interview No. 8, 
2005). 
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 Photo 3: Nationalist rhetoric. Mostar, western part (© author). 
 
The political leaders mostly produce fear in order to stay in power and to avoid 
prosecution for their war crimes (Smith 2006, 14). Mili Tiru, from the Pavarotti Cultural 
Centre underlines Smith’s approach of elite manipulation by saying that, “politicians […] 
are mostly talking about the past”: he further continues that “[t]he people are afraid and 
they vote for their own national parties because politicians are keeping them afraid […]The 
fear is left as the last resort, [to vote for the party] […] they vote based on fear. And then 
they vote for their own nationalities and it goes on like that” (interview No. 13, 2005). The 
situation in Mostar as an ethically-divided city is problematic because insecurity and fear 
are mutual forces that stimulate and support nationalist stances. “Because one side always 
fears the other side. If the national simpered on the other side, then we have to go for our 
nationalist,” as Richard Medić, OCSE Press officer remarks (interview No. 6, 2005).  I 
represent such a circle of ongoing nationalism in the below Figure 6. 
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 Figure 6: The persistence of nationalism and creation of instability  
 
 Each of the ruling parties in Mostar has an interest to hold onto their power. This 
trend is rooted in the fact that the parties create fear so that the environment becomes 
threatening to the other. In sum this model has two driving forces: a) that fear leads to 
manipulation and this leads to fear within a party, and b) that the fear, produced by the 
other, is creating an environment of fear (Smith 2006, 13).  Mirsad Behram, the journalist 
with Mostar’s radio and television channel RTV with personal war experience, describes 
the situation of instability for Mostar as follows: “[i]t is the same now, you have unstable 
political environment, it produces a bad economy, a bad economy produces poor people, 
poor people vulnerable to manipulation, and they vote for politicians that make again an 
unstable political situation. And it goes round and round […]” (interview No. 12, 2005). 
These mutual strategies of fear, as described by Schneckener (2002), also lead to an 
inefficient slowdown of the decision-making process; they lead to a blocking of political 
decisions. When these mechanisms of ongoing nationalist rhetoric persist, a hostile 
environment is produced. In such an environment the positive outcomes of social capital – 
regional economic growth - cannot be produced (Amin and Thrift 1994; Pilon and 
DeBresson 2003). Furthermore, the tool to control the masses is the media. If the political 
forces control the media, public opinion is formed to suit their desire. As Richard Medić 
also remarks for Mostar, “political parties more or less control the media here” (interview 
No. 6, 2005). 
Through the interconnectedness of business, politics and the media, the tools to 
create fear and the demand for nationalism are rather powerful. This also tends to be an 
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ongoing process of controlling the people as Mirsad Behram notes, “I am giving you just 
an example of an entrenched circle. On the top you have hard-liners that control the media, 
the media create the mind of the people, the people vote for those hard-liners” (interview 
No. 12, 2005). If those structures of the powerful elites that control business and the media 
through political means persist through individuals or broader support remains unclear. 
Although Rathfelder remarks that “[…] you can cut off the heads of the Hydra but it will 
still exist” (interview No. 1, 2005). Most of the interviewees emphasise that the 
nationalistic environment is created by both persons and structure (Frančić, interview No. 
4, 2005; Behram, interview No. 12, 2005). 
 However, the political situation has changed slightly during the last years, as the 
crusted party structures have become weaker. “Politically speaking I think the situation has 
changed a little bit in a good direction,” as Mirsad Behram says (interview No. 12, 2005). 
The trend of persisting nationalist policies was reversed by international intervention in the 
form of the OHR, when Croat informal power structures were removed (Rathfelder, 
interview No. 1, 2005; Schmidt 2004). When looking at voters the nationalist picture is 
different than at the party level. The strong and proactive support of voters for their 
nationalist parties has become weaker in general, although the last municipal elections in 
2004 in Mostar showed that these parties are still powerful (Federal Office of Statistics 
2004, 131): both the SDA and HDZ won a high percentage of votes. 
However, the motivation of the people has changed. About 60% do not feel 
represented at all, as a survey of the UNDP shows (2005b, 53). Damir Džeba explains that 
“[…] they are fed up of politics because lots with […] people in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
do not see the point to vote – why? So they voted […] and the international community 
made all the decisions” (interview No. 18, 2005).  This quote expresses the frustration 
about the unchanged situations and the tense relations with international organisations over 
local politics. The voters do not see any local development and therefore the political will 
to vote is weak and the turnout is lower (Bojkov 2003, 45). Džeba’s remark on the 
international community’s imposition of policies is evidence of interventional politics.   
The intervention is often seen as a consequence of blocked reforms, caused by nationalist 
stances and disinterest in local politics. A detailed insight on the policies of international 
organisations is provided in Chapter 5.3. 
Another reaction to the political situation is the drop in voter turnout as a general 
trend. Only 46 % of voters cast ballots in the municipal elections of 2004, when the newly 
unified city council was elected (OSCE 2004, 1). Mili Tiru complains about local 
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politicians: “[…] national parties have to go away from the scene. They were ruling parties 
during the war and even now […] Of course that is the biggest problem we face, political 
separations, nationalist separation should be faced. The people are the ones that suffer” 
(interview No. 13, 2005). This shows the frustration and the dissatisfaction of citizens with 
the poor performance of local political parties (UNDP 2005c, 63).  
In sum, it is a complex picture of nationalist policies. It seems that nationalist rhetoric 
often functions as a label for the self-interest of the political elites rather than the claim for 
ethnic autonomy in a co-operative way. The masses do not support these nationalist stances 
proactively, but by voting for them these politics persist. It is difficult to estimate the 
potential of exclusive nationalism in the society, but in politics these stances create 
business and lead to a hostile environment. How the decisions are blocked and what kinds 
of decisions are blocked in the new platform of the common city administration is debated 
in the following section. 
 
 
5.2.3 Decision-making procedure 
 
 “War has not been over! 
 The war has continued with other means.” 
 
(Mirsad Behram - Journalist, interview No. 12, 2005) 
 
The pace of the decision-making process of the two parties is influencing local 
economic development. The recently reunified city administration of Mostar and the city 
council are common democratic platforms  that make decisions of the city as a whole. But 
it also gives a common forum for the opposing parties the SDA and HDZ to debate 
communal issues. The more parties that are involved in the decision making process the 
slower the pace of the decisions. Even though the decisions might not be quickly made, the 
solutions that are reached by all parties, are more sustainable. As Alexander Stuhler from 
the city administration says: “democracy is no luxury – a balance of the nationalities will 
also ensure the acceptance of the decisions” (interview No. 11, 2005). Within the city 
council, the local parties have to make the decisions on local economic development. 
However, the newly-formed forum for common democratic practice is only one side 
of the coin. Often the trend is towards a slow decision-making process visibly affected by 
nationalist claims. How the nationalist parties block some decisions and act is debated 
here. As described in the previous section, nationalist issues still dominate politics, rather 
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than local issues. The question of ethnic equality is, for example, a high priority of the 
HDZ and therefore local topics are not discussed. When asked if his party had a local 
economic development strategy, Damir Džeba of the HDZ replied that “[…] we have other 
priorities. We must first set up this country as a normal country […]” (interview No. 18, 
2005). This illustrates how national topics, such as the debate on a new constitution and the 
equality of Croats, dominate local policies, rather than local topics such as infrastructure 
and business development. 
The official party platforms also do not address local topics or economic topics at all 
(SDA 2005; HDZ 2005). Even though economic and business issues could be neutral, the 
ethnic parties do not co-operate either because more fundamental problems are not solved 
or they make an ethnic or a nationalistic topic out of this.  Hence, if national politics also 
dominate at the local level, progressive programmes for the city of Mostar are neglected. 
The pace of how needed and originally non-ethnic reforms are decided is rather slow 
because of self-interest and blocking strategies that lead to disagreement. Richard Medić 
from the OSCE sees the self-interest of the nationalist parties that lead to a deceleration of 
the decision-making process: “[a] lot of these decisions are manipulated and they are just 
illusory in a sense that it suits the national parties […]” (interview No. 6, 2005). 
 The mutual fear felt by the two ethnic groups often leads to the dilemma in which no 
political party is willing to co-operate with the other. Especially when it comes to cultural 
and education issues in the context of the reunification of the city good will between the 
parties is needed as, the resistance to agree is too strong (Galić, interview No. 20, 2005). 
Mirsad Behram describes an example of the reality for culture: “[i]f there is good will, they 
would say this is for everybody [the cultural institution]. And that sign of good will would 
open hearts on the other side. It would be much easier to resolve everything” (interview 
No. 12, 2005). Alexander Stuhler, from the city administration, emphasis how much any 
decision within the city council depends on good will; “[i]f there is no will nothing 
happens” (interview No. 11, 2005). 
Additionally, the party structure in the city council supports the blocking mechanism. 
Two largely conflicting parties rule the city council so that co-operation is likely to be 
difficult. A vivid example of such mutual blocking strategies is the disagreement on the 
new status of the city. Due to the fact that the politicians were not able to agree on the new 
status – proposed and discussed in 2003 - reunification was imposed by the OHR. When 
Mili Tiru says that “[w]hatever they do [the parties], they do it because OHR said it” 
(interview No. 13, 2005), he refers to the political intransigence of  local parties that is 
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only given up when external pressure forces it. Since such a ‘log-jam’ situation concerning 
certain issues exists, the only solution might be external intervention by the international 
community  through the OHR that uses the non-democratic Bonn-Powers in order to 
impose a decision (Bojkov 2004, 58). 
The disagreements concerning various cultural and educational issues also 
consequentially leads to opposing positions when it comes to other, more technical topics 
such as infrastructure or city planning. Osman Paijć, a professor of economics, complains 
about the situation concerning technical problems that are non-ethnic but remain unsolved: 
“[…] the main problem is the lack of co-ordination between the leading political parties, so 
they are always protecting their own personal, private interests or interests of their parties 
instead of working towards improvement for all people” (interview No. 5, 2005). 
Every decision refers in some way to national questions. As Damir Džeba says, 
“[a]lways if you look to the economy, agriculture, politics, infrastructure, you have always 
in the back [ethnic] problems” (interview No. 18, 2005).  Also Vanesa Galić explains that 
the political power of the parties is far-reaching; “[i]t is true the political issue is very 
important in every segment of our life. Even when it comes to the schooling system, even 
if it comes to the economic system, or if it comes to any system – they are very powerful” 
(interview No. 20, 2005). 
However, the power of the political parties has another face, as well. As Richard 
Medić says, 
Once the political will is there, the door is open. If there is political will, things go 
very quickly here, bureaucracy is suddenly reduced  - so it can be a positive thing, but 
it depends whether you put on the right politics or the right politicians in power. So it 
[the power of the political authorities] is a double-edged sword […] (interview  No. 6, 
2005). 
 
Due to the fact that politicians political power is far-reaching, decisions can be directly 
made or at least the pace to agree on reforms can accelerate. Rubeena Esmail-Arndt also 
agrees with this: “[…] the encrustation in this country can be broken, if the leading person 
wants. If there are signals of the leaders, the others will follow straight […]” (interview 
No. 15, 2005). 
This picture fits with the elite manipulation, controlling the masses for self-interest 
and staying in power (Smith 2006). When examining recent developments, then it becomes 
clear that the blocking strategies become less evident. Since the city administration is 
reunified, there is a better chance for co-operation. Even though one could see this as a 
new area for conflict, there is improvement visible - mostly concerning practical issues - as 
Mustafa Alender from the city administration says: 
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[n]o, there was no blocking concerning practical laws and decisions [...] that went ok. 
If it comes to political or cultural questions then we sometimes argue, then we have an 
arguement between the parties and the city. But it happens with democratic means: 
dialogue […] within a democratic environment […] (interview No. 22, 2005). 
However, still today, even if the situation has improved to a certain extent, Olaf Zymelka 
says that “the war continues in people’s heads” (interview No. 2, 2005). This statement 
echos Mirsad Behram’s words on page 77 who says that the “war has not been over! The 
war has continued with other means” (interview No. 12, 2005), thus challenges the degree 
of improvement.  
Overall, local political actors have a fundamental influence on the decision-making 
process, on the ability to launch strategies and reforms for local development. If there is a 
political will to agree, then there is a way to do it as noted by Alexander Stuhler (interview 
No. 11, 2005). But if the issue does not fit into the local parties’ field of interest, then 
necessary decisions are blocked while the economic situation worsens and the people’s 
will to participate in local politics declins. As showed in Figure 5, there is a tendency to 
create a vicious circle of fear and insecurity that ensures the power of the nationalist parties 
(Smith 2006). In other words, “[b]y having an unstable political environment, it draws out 
the fact that you have a bad economy and then it goes vice versa. Bad economy makes 
people vulnerable to manipulation. And then you enter an entrenched circle from which 
there is no way out, unfortunately,” as Mirsad Behram explains (interview No. 12, 2005). 
When these political decision makers do not take responsibility for local issues then 
ordinary people suffer with the unsolved problems, as Vanesa Galić says: 
It is blocking many things in political life not only in Mostar, also in the whole of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are living just for their interest […] The problem is 
that still it is a very complicated situation in the town, we have so many other 
problems to solve and people are under pressure because of the economic situation 
and political situation (interview No. 20, 2005). 
 
These political procedures have essential outcomes for civil society in terms of 
responsibility and ownership. Especially here, the international community feels 
responsible to solve the log-jam situations by imposing reforms and decisions. The 





5.3 External political factors 
 
This section discusses the role of international organisations in Mostar. The OHR, as 
the most embedded organisation in Mostar’s local politics, plays an important role. 
Additionally, the functioning of the newly-introduced city administration as a possible 
obstacle to local socio-economic development is debated here. The entanglement of certain 
aspects, such as internal political aspects or the economic factors is obvious; hence it is 
difficult to separate the factors precisely. This section refers to the theoretical approaches 
of section 3.2.1, in which the overall function of international intervention in post-conflict 
situations is discussed. 
 
 
5.3.1 Intervention and the role of international organisations 
 
“[…]they are part of the problem, 
 and not part of the solution.” 
 
(Mirsad Behram, Journalist, interview No.12, 2005) 
 
The role of the international community in Mostar is varied. Interviewees see both 
the financial support and the ambiguous interference in local politics. Vanesa Galić 
remarks that “[p]eople are divided when it comes to them because they think that they have 
done lots of activities in a way that they wanted to have them […] so, many opinions are 
divided when it comes to that” (interview No. 20, 2005). Hence, this section focuses on the 
political role that the international organisations play. As the previous section 3.2.1 
revealed the reason for the intervention in the political decision-making process at the local 
level, the further consequences of international intervention are discussed here. Therefore, 
it is necessary to distinguish between multilateral and governmental organisations on the 
one hand, and non-governmental organisations on the other. Representatives of the former 
are the OHR, World Bank and UNDP, the latter are represented by the Nansen Dialogue 
Centre and GTZ. All play an important role in different ways in local social development. 
Concerning local socio-economic development and political decisions in Mostar, the 
OHR plays the most active role – this section will focus on their work. As already 
described in the previous chapters, it is this international organisation’s mandate to 
supervise the local political scene and to intervene if the local authorities cannot come to a 
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decision due to mutual blocking strategies (Schneckener 2002; Caplan 2004). There has 
been major criticism of the work of the state-sponsored international organisations in terms 
of on their political intervention, how they act and with which means they interfere (Kanus 
and Cox 2003). Often criticism emphasises that reforms are externally imposed by the 
OHR, but not fully followed through to a reasonable solution. Osman Pajić complains 
about the international organisations’ policies: 
even if they [the international organisations] get involved in solving different problems 
in our society, they are not involved until the end of the solution of the problem…so 
they begin to think and they start these reforms, for example in the city administration, 
where a lot of people will be redundant […]so they will lose their jobs, so [that] the 
internationals have started this process but in the end it will be the responsibility of the 
city administration to solve this problem for these people who will be out of the jobs 
[…]. I wanted to say that formally they start a lot of things but […] in real life we do 
not feel any progress. They […] make sometimes big promises but achieve little 
(interview No. 5, 2005). 
 
Pajić refers in his statement to the imposition of the reformed city administration that had 
been performed by the international team recruited by the OHR. The OHR plays an 
important role in the local socio-economic interplay in Mostar. As Sanela Tunović 
underlines, the OHR is very active in the decision-making process (interview No. 9 2005). 
The most prominent example of OHR intervention was the imposition of the new status of 
the city, that reunified the city administrations, so that almost all decisions in the newly 
reunited administration are supported or guided by the OHR.  Admira Čustović, from the 
city administration explains what Paijć means when saying that the reforms are not 
properly guided: 
For example, the OHR had employed the German – his name is Mr. Winterstein […] 
he and his team had worked out the new statute of the city. They introduced it and then 
they had left. Actually he should be here, when the statute is implemented […] they 
[the international organisations] should have taken more responsibility after the war 
[…] They had been here but interfered somehow, then they had withdrawn […]that 
does not work out […] that is not at all consequent (interview No. 19, 2005).  
 
Also, in concrete political decisions where a consensus between the local political actors 
(see 5.2) cannot be found, the interference of the OHR is rigorous. As Tunović emphasises, 
“[t]he OHR will not tolerate any obstacles and we have mechanisms to insure that there are 
no obstacles, if we come to the obstacles” (interview No. 9, 2005). Due to the fact that the 
OHR represents the international community, it has to justify its activities and is interested 
in quick and efficient solutions (Bose 2002, 275). In a sense the OHR is in a log-jam 
situation, or a so-called ‘lose-lose’ situation. On the one hand it is responsible to make 
processes work under pressure from the international community, in other words to 
interfere in local political decision-making. On the other hand the more they interfere, the 
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more they rule through non-democratic means and do not enhance local responsibility or 
ownership (Zymelka, interview No. 2, 2005). The consequences of the mandate of rigorous 
use of the Bonn-Powers have been discussed in the theoretical chapter using the concept of 
Caplan (2004) and Czaplinski (2003) (see also Knaus and Cox 2004). 
 Often the hasty results are not sustainable because the higher degree of interference 
in local political decision-making throufg non-democratic means leads a lack of 
responsibility and ownership of the local authorities (Schwarz-Schilling 2003). Zymelka 
explains the further consequences of interference: “if he [the High Representative] makes 
something, he takes the responsibility away from the Bosnians. The political elite does not 
have political responsibility at all here in the country […]” (interview No. 2, 2005). 
Furthermore Ivana Marić from the KAS states that the role of the OHR regarding political 
intervention “[…] was mainly not that good. They did something because they had to, but 
there was never a real partnership. It was always a top-down approach and they [local 
authorities] have never said something” (interview No. 3 2005). The same impression is 
shared by Damir Džeba who says that the 
international community is making moves but never takes responsibility for their 
actions. They are always making decisions and certain moves to certain directions, but 
if something goes wrong local politicians are responsible because they want to 
implement what we have in mind. So they never question themselves if the project was 
good (interview No. 18, 2005). 
 
What is seen in Mostar is also the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina; there is a strong 
criticism of the lack of accountability of the international community and of its ignorance 
of needed reforms (Scotto 2004, 86). These critical aspects at the micro-level fit to the 
overall picture that has been described in section 2.2.3.  
Some interviewees see the reason for a high degree of interference by international 
organisations as based on structural elements. Rubeena Esmail-Arndt complains that the 
results are short-sighted and that decisions are made by non-specialistswithin the 
organisations: 
their [international organisations] people come for six months, their contracts last only 
for six months, often they are either very young or really old and they do not know 
where to put them. The younger ones do not have the experience, they often use their 
mission as a spring-broad, which means they need success […] but success [in the post 
war development context] is sustainability, but this does not matter to them, it is more 
important that they make success (interview No. 15, 2005). 
 
Due to the very short contracts the background knowledge of staff of international 
organisations is limited. It seems that the short-sighted success is contradictory to the 
sustainable development of the country. Also, Rathfelder says that “[…] many 
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internationals do not understand [the background], they just know their time […] and then 
they make mistakes, because they have illusions – they often miss the human aspect” 
(interview No.1, 2005). 
Another argument is that the missing background knowledge leads to unbalanced 
decisions. Often the international organisations favour one ethnic side, because of missing 
local expertise. Existing local informal networks are underestimated, so that certain 
international policies favour one ethnic party. Katrin Hett from the OSCE explains this 
discussion: 
you get the feeling that the internationals are not very effective. They are in the 
country for quite a short time and they do not know the backgrounds, but they think 
they could do all better. On the other side you have very clever locals who exactly 
know what they do and what they want […] So it easily can happen that they play with 
the internationals and in the past it happened often. It is clear that the influence of the 
international community had suffered, so that the positive impetus had turned upside 
down (interview No. 7, 2005).  
 
The unbalanced policies of the OHR and other international organisations (e.g. World 
Bank - asymmetric financial support was discussed earlier) and their high degree of 
interference lead to a lack of responsibility and ownership on the one hand, and the 
persistence of informal structures on the other. In Mostar, as in the whole country, the 
‘dependency syndrome’ is hampering sustainable socio-economic development (Schwarz-
Schilling 2003). The imbalance causes major difficulties as Mirsad Behram explains: “[i]n 
my experience as a journalist, instead of following strict rules, […] they are juggling with 
the sides. Sometimes cheating to one side, sometimes cheating with some other side 
instead of following the strict rules proclaimed by themselves” (interview No. 12, 2005). 
It seems interesting that the perspective from within the international organisations is 
completely different than that from outside. Both interviewees from the World Bank and 
the OHR estimated the work of their institution as very successful. So Vesna Frančic says: 
We never supported, through any of our programmes, either the eastern or western part 
of the city [asymmetrically]. We never supported any of the six municipalities which 
existed in the past. So we always focused on the whole city, so that the whole city 
could benefit […] I think our approach towards central government and city authorities 
and institutions were very much welcomed in Mostar […] And it was proved as a very 
successful and appropriate approach to Mostar. I guess we contributed a lot to regain 
the trust between all groups (interview  No. 4, 2005).  
 
This estimation of international organisations’ performance is different from others 
(Esmail-Arndt, interview No. 15, 2005; Pajić, interview No. 5, 2005). When criticism has 
not been incorporated into the programmes of the international organisations, then their 
attitude towards reforms is also a limiting factor to the socio-economic development. 
However, since the position of the High Representative – as head of the OHR - changed in 
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2006, the newly-launched reforms aim to solve the problem of the ‘lose-lose’ situation. 
The new High Representative, Schwarz-Schilling, realised that the ‘dependency syndrome’ 
had to be abolished (2003). Mustafa Alendar from the new city administration proposes 
that the orientation of international support should be changed.  The thinking of the 
international organisations is still bound to the context of the DPA and not towards 
sustainable reforms and capacity building. He says “[...] that we do not need support in the 
process of reconstruction […] but we need help concerning problems of cultural issues but 
the OHR does not help us there […] we would like them to consult us in our reform 
processes” (interview No. 22, 2005). 
 
Photo 4: Comment on imbalanced financial distribution of the IMF, western Mostar (© author) 
 
Even though the role of international organisations is ambiguous, their contribution 
towards local development is also obvious. The financial support was estimated to be more 
than 2 billion Euros for the whole country (Hall 2005, 201). Their interference in local 
political decisions is often caused by local authorities, who are following their own or 
nationalist interests and are not willing to agree by consensus.  However, because the OHR 
is so heavily involved in the decision-making process, there is a trend towards opposition 
between the political parties and the OHR (ESI 2001). This weakens the actual goal of 
democratisation and hampers sustainable development. In that sense the OHR with its 
current policies can be seen as part of the problem and not part of the solution of the 
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complex local socio-economic development,as Mirsad Behram says (interview No. 12, 
2005). 
Only a reformed mandate towards more ownership and responsibility could contribute 
to sustainable socio-economic development (Scotto 2004, 86). However, all interviewees 
agreed on the necessity of the international organisations to be engaged in supporting local 
development.  Even though “many people are not satisfied with many decisions…they 
[international organisations] make many processes go faster […]” (Galić, interview No. 20, 
2005). Therefore, a complete withdrawal would have serious negative consequences 
(Behram, interview No. 12, 2005; Džeba, interview No. 18, 2005).  
 
 
5.3.2 City administration – functioning and bureaucracy 
 
 “And the city administration has a problem 
 in implementing and the people are suffering 
 and the situation is getting worse day by day” 
 
(Mili Tiru, Pavarotti Centre Mostar, interview No. 13, 2005) 
 
Besides the economic factors, political parties and the direct involvement of 
international organisations, the city administration is yet another element influencing the 
progress of local development; and is therefore part of the local governance structure. 
Since the new statute of the city of Mostar was imposed in 2005, debates about its work 
and functions arose. This section on the city administration is not explicitly connected to 
the external factors, but since it is imposed by and structured through the international 
community it is located in this section.  However, there are obviously also strong ties to 
internal political factors (5.2.3), as well as to the labour market (5.1.3). 
Due to the fact that the restructuring process of the city administration from six to 
one took longer than planned, many interviewees see this dysfunction as a barrier to local 
socio-economic development. Even members of the city administration, like the advisor to 
the mayor, Alexander Stuhler, state that the process of reform, “[…] took longer than 
expected” (interview No. 11, 2005).  The process of reunification and restructuring 
included abolishing of administrative structures and a reduction in the workforce. Due to 
resistance by released employees and the resistance by the nationalist parties, the process 
has been prolonged and positive outcomes hardly are visible. The degree of resistance by 
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nationalist parties increases when the decisions concerning the reform were imposed by the 
international organisations. 
Ivana Marić remarks that “[…] the city administration has existed since a year, but it 
does not function.  If the OHR brings the best solution, it is the worst for us because we 
have not done it ourselves - and that is the problem. Then things take a long time […]“ 
(interview No. 3, 2005). How long the process of restructuring takes is described by 
Mirsad Behram who says that, “[…] in my point of view the city administration serves for 
itself. It is only for some people to get employment within the administration and nothing 
else. They are still serving themselves. According to Ashdown’s [High Representative] 
decision they should have fired like 200 people…” (interview No. 12, 2005). He refers to 
the problematic policies of staff recruitment. There had been serious difficulties to find 
experienced and skilled personnel for the new city administration as Admira Čustović from 
the city administration reports (interview No. 19, 2005). 
This situation seems paradox when on the one hand 200 people had to be released 
and the new positions could not be filled. This paradox of the labour market is discussed in 
5.1.3. However, when it comes to the functioning of the city administration it has major 
impacts on a prolonged reconstruction. Katrin Hett of the OSCE and responsible for the 
supervision of the newly-reunited city administration explains the process: 
What still takes place is the process of restructuring. Some people have to be released 
and the departments have to be re-settled. And that takes time. We had 670 employees 
last year and we need only 400 that need to be recruited […] it does not function 
especially well yet […] because the restructuring also of the personnel has not yet been 
implemented, the people sit in their offices and say that they do not know if they will 
still have the job next year and then they do nothing […] (interview No. 7, 2005). 
 
Additionally to the process of restructuring and recruitment, there is a problem of 
bureaucracy which has a negative effect on local economic development. Vanesa Galić 
complains about the bureaucratic burden: “[w]hen you want to open a firm you have to fill 
in so many forms and so on, you have to go to many offices and you have to finish many 
administrative steps. Bureaucracy is very complicated here […]” (interview No. 20, 2005, 
see Tiru, interview No. 13, 2005). 
The reasons for limiting the bureaucratic burden are often rooted in the ethnic 
principle, which was implemented by the international community in order to balance 
ethnic demands, as Hadziahmetović carries out in his analysis (2005). The very 
complicated and complex mechanisms to balance the ethnic composition in the city 
administration also lead to delays through bureaucracy. Even though the new city 
administration tries to reduce bureaucracy, the outcomes are still not satisfying as Paijć 
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says: “[s]o, in my personal opinion, regardless of the fact that there has been a 
reunification of the city administration, there hasn’t been any significant economic 
progress or growth; not only in the economy, also in general of the social development of 
the city […]” (interview No. 5, 2005). 
Although there is fundamental criticism on the performance of the restructuring 
process, most of the interviewees agreed on the necessity of a common and reunified city 
administration. Alexander Stuhler says that “[…] a unified city needs a unified city 
administration whatever it costs!” (interview No. 11, 2005). Also Muhammid Velagić 
states that “[…] it has to work, there are no other ways, there has to be one united city 
administration. I was so happy when I heard that there will be a united city administration” 
(interview No. 14, 2005). 
When examining the limiting factors of socio-economic development in Mostar, the 
temporary inefficient performance of the city administration contributes to it to a certain 
extent. In contrast to the negative aspects such as bureaucracy, ethnic balance and the lack 
of skilled labour, the step to reunite the city administration was needed. Alexander Stuhler 
explains that an ethnic balance is needed because “[…] a completely rational institution 
could not do the job for Mostar [...] because democracy is no luxury - a balance of 
nationalities will also ensure the acceptance of the decision” (interview No. 11, 2005) in 
order to agree on sustainable decisions. Otherwise nationalist political forces would fade 
away from the official political scene and would gain more informal power. Stuhler is sure 
that “…the artificial balance will be reduced in a few years, [and] then rational arguments 
will matter” and development will improve (ibid, 2005). International supervision is 
therefore necessary to ensure the acceptance of a joint platform for the city’s matters. 
As discussed in the previous section, many decisions are made under high pressure 
from the OHR. Mustafa Alender from the city council confirms that much pressure is used 
to force certain decisions, but also that the OHR “would like to get things in their sense [...] 
what they do is command decision-making regarding their plans […] earlier the 
international community had been part of the solution, now they are part of the problem 
[…]” (interview No. 22, 2005) Even though the function and the interference are 
mentioned in this section again, it plays a fundamental role in the functioning of the city 
administration. Olaf Zymelka formulates the functioning of the city administration under 
international influence in simple words: “[t]he principle of consensus [i.e. the reunification 
of the city administration] was implemented by Mr. Ashdown [High Representative] 
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because there was no consensus on it in Mostar. There is no functioning without pressure – 
simple formula” (interview No. 2, 2005). 
Mili Tiru also agrees that there is high pressure from the OHR: “[w]hatever is 
happening in the city administration, it is initiated by the office of High Representative. 
Whatever they say to do, they do it because the OHR said it” (interview No. 13, 2005). 
Even though both positions, Zymelka and Tiru, might be a simplification, their explicitness 
shows how influential the OHR is. The illustration given by Zymelka makes clear how 
difficult it is for the city administration to act properly; “[t]hey are really in a sandwich-
position – from the bottom the society is demanding action, from the top the OHR and the 
international community is increasing the pressure” (interview No. 2, 2005). 
In addition to the previous difficulties, some interviews mentioned the problematic 
financial situation of the city that burdens the efficiency and functioning of the city 
administration in the long run (Stuhler, interview No. 11, 2005; Galić, interview No. 20, 
2005; Frančić, interview No. 4, 2005). In the near future all Bosnia and Herzegovinan 
municipalities will have to challenge changed budgets that are expected to cause trouble, 
especially when the Value Added Tax will have a fundamental impact on macro-economic 
stability (BIRN 2006, No.17). 
When examining the external forces that are responsible for the hampered local 
development, the role of the international community in the form of the OHR contributes 
more to it than the newly-reformed city administration. The role of the international 
community is ambiguous, especially during the last years when internal reforms have not 
been implemented and policies oriented towards the DPA are still actual. Mustafa Alendar 
formulates precisely this when he says that “[…] the international community thinks still in 
the sense of Dayton, but Bosnia [nowadays has changed] more European like, here […]” 
(interview 2005, no. 22).  The current policies of the OHR are therefore not anymore 
addressed to the current problems and hence create a limiting factor to local development.  
 
 
5.4 Social factors 
 
The fourth limiting field that needs to be addressed is that of social factors. Elements 
of civil society and its institutions of education are important for local socio-economic 
development. Since every economic activity is a human activity, the quality of society 
matters. A certain degree of security is needed to start economic activities; if mechanisms 
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of mutual trust are missing economic activities and initiatives are limited. Hence, 
reconciliation and the build-up of a civil society might be the most important pillars of 
development. Finally, the elements of civil society are the most important when it comes to 
questions of sustainable local development. Only when the civil society is stable, can 
sustainable development take place. Especially in Mostar the process of reconciliation, as a 
precondition of civil society, has been a problematic experience.  
 
 
5.4.1 Civil society and reconciliation 
 
“Of course it takes time, you cannot 
 expect that the people love each other.”  
 
(Damir Džeba, politician, interview No. 18, 2005) 
 
 As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the process of reconciliation is essential for 
sustainable development as Lederach developed in his approach (2004). Only when war 
crimes and atrocities between the conflict actors are reconciled and an environment of 
stability and security is ensured can the stage of absent structural violence be reached 
(Galtung 1982). Then nationalist rhetoric and propaganda as instruments of mass control 
are ineffective. In Mostar there is still a need to improve the process of reconciliation, as 
Rubeena Esmail-Arndt says: “[t]here is a need for open and frank discussions […]” 
(interview No. 15, 2005). According to Mirsad Behram, “[…] there are still cases in which 
people, who are and were responsible for atrocities are not on trial for that – for instance 
we had like concentration camps and nobody has been charged for that - which, I guess, 
burdens the process of reconciliation” (interview No. 12, 2005). 
That the wounds of war are still fresh and individual and collective memories are still 
influential is obvious. The process of reconciliation is especially difficult in post-conflict 
civil war societies where the lines of conflict divide the cities, such as Mostar (Gromes, 
Moltmann and Schoch 2004, 10-12). Erich Rathfelder, a journalist in Bosnia since 1991, 
illustrates the deeply-rooted experiences when he reports how it was during the war and 
that,  
East Mostar […] there are 5000 dead and 5000 dead are 5000 dead - you cannot 
discuss this. The war was really the hell in East Mostar. There were only connections 
through the basements. You had to be careful because of the snipers […] I was there 
with seven other journalists, four are dead – three Italians and one Dutch […] it is so 
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that every family has actually lost someone. It is not easy to do the first steps. Besides 
the nationalism there is still the collective memory […]” (interview No. 1, 2005).  
 
Even people who were absent during the war, such as Muhammid Velagić, a student from 
Mostar, feels affected by the period of conflict. Certain space images produced through the 
period of war and the personal connection to people’s experiences are heavily influential 
on thoughts and actions. He tells  of his feelings when he returned home and crossed the 
front zone: 
you are really happy to see your parents, your friends, just to drink a coffee and then 
you go through the Boulevard street [former front line] and you see all that, and you 
realise that you live in a city where hatred controls everything […] I cannot describe 
the feeling, when you feel that 50 meters away from your house there was a kind of 
Auschwitz […] that you live in a city where thousands and thousands of people died 
for nothing […] but, you really have to cross the border to get to know the other  - it 
does not work in an other way (interview No. 14, 2005).  
 
These are just two examples how vivid individual and collective memory affects people’s 
perceptions and actions. On an individual, as well as on a collective level, strong negative 
experiences distort rational behaviour, as has been discussed in the theoretical chapter 
(Jenichen 2004; Lederach 2004). That a process of reconciliation has to take place is seen 
by many interviewees (Esmail-Arndt, interview No. 15, 2005; Rathfelder, interview No. 1, 
2005). However there are strong opponents who are not interested in a reconciled past; the 
nationalist parties’ local power would be diminished if the process of reconciliation is 
successful, as discussed in 5.2.2. This makes it difficult to work on the process consistently 
(Smith 2006).  
Within the approach of reconciliation, as Lederach (2004) examines, it is essential to 
individualise the war crimes. By contrast, collective guilt would lead to an environment of 
fear that can be used by nationalist forces. Consequences of fear and instability produced 
and used by nationalist forces are discussed in 5.2.2. “Victims and committers differ: 
Victims will know the truth, what happened and are satisfied when the events are 
investigated. And the committers still try to make ideologies, how they can escape 
[accountability] in order not to face the truth […] ”, as Rathfelder analyses (interview No. 
1, 2005). 
Individualisation of the war crimes helps to reconcile and give people the sense that 
these crimes are avenged. Damir Džeba sees the process of individualisation within the 
process of reconciliation as essential for the social development of the society: 
you cannot leave it behind, because you have a lot of war crimes they must be individualised 
and if you do not have individual crimes – [where] each crime has its own name and surname 
- so you must find out who committed. Otherwise, if you do not solve the war crime cases, 
the guilt will be on all people […] (interview No. 18, 2005). 
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Common guilt that includes and is addressed to one ethnicity would prepare the ground for 
nationalist stances and instability.  When the wounds of war are still fresh, it is clear that 
the process takes time, as Gromes, Moltmann and Schoch explain (2004, iv). Furthermore, 
it cannot be expected that the first impulse comes directly from the people themselves. The 
function of international organisations and NGOs is therefore to start and enhance the 
process towards sustainable peace and development. In post-civil war contexts, such as in 
Mostar, external impulses are essential to launch the process of reconciliation as part of the 
peace-building process (Lambourne 2004, 20). Professional programmes are needed to 
discuss the past and to bring people together. However, not only well addressed 
programmes are needed; direct contact with the ‘other’ on an individual basis and joint 
activities are essential. From a very personal point of view Muhammid Velagić reports that 
it is not that important what these organisations do in detail, but they must bring the 
people together. That they drink coffee together, that is important […] that they think 
about things that cross the borders […] you would not remember the certain projects, 
but you would remember the people you met and you drank beer with […] it is 
important that the people realise that there is no enemy behind the border […]” 
(interview No. 14, 2005). 
 
For most people it is clear that a process of reconciliation has to take place actively 
and immediately. There is no alternative to develop the local economy first in order to get 
the people together when their personal economic situation has improved. That the 
concept ‘first economy then sustainable peace’ is failing was demonstrated by Tito’s way 
of dealing with the past. Muhammid Velagić summarises the past failure of a missed 
reconciliation process:“ [t]he only way is to put it [the war crimes] to the judge and make 
it an individual crime. The way is not to forget it, it is to analyse it. If there is no justice 
there is no hope, if there is no hope there is fear, if there is fear you can control [the 
people] and so on” (interview no. 14, 2005). 
Regarding the process of reconciliation, a remarkable aspect concerning the 
demography of the city can be derived from the analysis of the interviews. The willingness 
of citizens that were living in the city for decades to co-operate and work together on the 
past is much higher than between those citizens that came to the city in the context of the 
war as migrants and refugees. A Yugoslavian background, with a lived multiethnic 
experience, seems to enhance the process of reconciliation. If such a background or 
positive multiethnic experience is missing, the process is more difficult. Admira Čustarić, 
from the BSC Mostar and local that has long-lasting family roots in Mostar the says that 
the people understand each other, it does not matter if they are older or younger, if 
they are Croat or Bosniak or Serb. It very much depends if the people have lived in 
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Mostar before the war […] the others do not get along so well. The old Mostarians and 
the new ones that came later […] We think that those people have destroyed 
everything. Through the war the buildings have been destroyed and the mentality of 
the people […] Their mentality is really different from the people who have been born 
here. The people that came here do not change […]” (interview No. 19, 2005). 
 
This shows that the process of reconciliation has multiple layers: at first there has to be a 
process of reconciliation among the ethnic groups, but also between the former locals and 
new citizens.  Due to the massive demographic movements during the war, the pre-war 
social fabric of the city has entirely changed (Bose 2002, 37, 106; Scotto 2004, 103-104). 
On the one hand the differences between ‘old Mostarians’ and the new ones complicates 
the process of reconciliation with one more aspect. On the other there is potential for the 
former citizens to enhance the process of reconciliation actively by themselves because 
they might be more willing to co-operate and foster local socio-economic development.  
 Overall the process of reconciliation needs to be improved urgently. Even though 
several NGOs work on the process, which helps to accelerate the democratisation process, 
the efforts are not satisfactory (Scotto 2004, 123-199). Additionally, there is a serious 
problem of effectiveness due to the fact that reconciliation is difficult to measure and 
international organisations are reducing their support for reconciliation and 
democratisation (Esamil-Arndt, interview No. 15, 2005; Jenichen 2004, 6). Furthermore, 
many local people do not see a direct outcome from the externally-launched reconciliation 
process; this also leads to a lack of ownership and accountability resulting in passiveness. 
However, reconciliation is the assumption for a sustainable civil society and, therefore, for 
continuous democratic development. After ten years of peace building there is visible 
progress, but the process is slowing down and is still a major reason for hampered local 
development (Mirsad Behram, interview No. 12, 2005). 
 
 
5.4.2 Passiveness, education system and youth 
 
“What we miss is a civil society that questions 
 – only a civil society could change things 
 and that is the crux; they are passive” 
 
 (Katrin Hett, interview No. 7, 2005) 
 
Along with the important aspect of reconciliation, the aspect of passiveness is 
important. Both are pillars of a civil society in which socio-economic development can 
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take place. Theoretically, the concepts of social capital include civil society. These 
approaches are discussed in 3.1.3 where the importance of social capital in the context of 
local development is debated (Collier and Hoeffler 2001, 13). This section on passiveness, 
education and youth tries to answer the question why important impulses for new 
initiatives are missing, where they are rooted and who is passive in Mostar. The quality of 
civil society and the success of socio-economic development also depend on, besides the 
discussed aspects, the overall attitude of the people to start initiatives; this can be in the 
business sector or volunteer projects, in arts or in tourism initiatives. Overall, the 
assumption for successful development is connected to the activity of people. 
When we go back to the research question, ‘What are the limiting factors to local 
socio-economic development in Mostar?’, the passiveness of the people can be seen as one 
important factor. Even though it is difficult to estimate, many interviewees see passiveness 
as an important limiting factor. In that sense passiveness could be defined as the absence of 
social capital (see section 3.1.3). The fact that passiveness is an element present in society 
is described by Vanesa Galić from the Nansen Dialogue Centre: “[t]he problem is that 
people are passive – it is a consequence of war. People are tired of everything, the 
economic situation is very bad” (interview No. 20, 2005). She mentions the war as the 
main source of why people are passive. Personal experiences of the war and, subsequently, 
the insecurity felt are one important aspect of passiveness. The section on reconciliation 
refers to these processes (see section 5.4.1). 
In addition to the war experiences and an insecure environment that is created by the 
nationalist parties (see section 5.2.2), the socialist legacy plays an important role. As 
discussed in the section on the labour market (5.1.3), the socialist legacy in terms of 
working regimes and attitudes still exists. Katrin Hett emphasises the aspect of a ‘taker’ 
mentality, that the development is hampered, “because the mentality was used to take and 
not to think about it” (interview No. 7, 2005). Sanela Tunović remarks that there were, 
“[…] 50 years of socialism, it takes a while it is a few generations” to change it (interview 
No. 9, 2005). Also Olaf Zymelka says that the passiveness “is up to a taker’s mentality. 
You must not only look to 1995, you should also look to the time before. During Tito’s 
times there was a taker’s mentality - everybody was served […] Now, it is really difficult 
to change the people towards more ownership […]” (interview No. 2, 2005). Theoretically, 
human resources in the transition from socialist to market economy are conceptualised by 
Stenning and Bradshaw (1999) or Steinherr and Gros (1996) as discussed in 3.1.2.  
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 Photo 5: Build-up of civil society? (© author) 
 
Another reason for the passiveness of the people can be seen in the intervention of 
international organisations. The so called ‘dependency syndrome’, as Schwarz-Schilling 
(2003) defines it leads, for example, to the low participation of people in political 
decisions, as discussed in 5.3.1.  The low turnouts in national and municipal elections - 
launched by international organisations - are only one way how such non-interest is 
expressed.  Ivana Marić says that “[…] less and less people go for elections because we 
had at least eight elections during the last ten years. There are always elections and the 
people do not see any change. Keep in mind we had the one-party system for a long while. 
They are not used to decide on their own […]” (interview No. 3, 2005). The communist 
party system is described in section  2.1 (Donia and Fine 1994; Glenny 1999).  
A third cause of this passiveness is the missing perspective that derives from the 
stagnation of the local economy and the raised expectations from the pre-war economic 
situation.  Ivan Jurij, from the regional development agency Redah, remarks that “[i]t is 
true that people are passive because nothing is moving forward which is visible […]” 
(interview  No. 21, 2005). After the first phase of fast material recovery in which financial 
support was extraordinarily strong, the phase of stagnation and recession is absorbing 
positive future perspectives and results in passiveness and resignation (Collier and Hoeffler 
2001, 2; Büschenfeld 1999, 35-37). 
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Damir Džeba explains from where the passive attitude and the lack of perspective 
comes: 
[i]f the politicians, the internationals, [and] the state department do not have the 
answer for the country, who will have? [...] and then you have the passive role of 
young people. They cannot see the future of the country. If you cannot see the future 
of the country and you are the part of it, then there is no future for you. And that is the 
way of thinking (interview No. 18, 2005). 
 
The relatively high standard of living in Yugoslavia during pre-war times (see section 
3.1.2) and the functioning of the multiethnic society pre-determines people’s expectations 
for more prosperity. Mirsad Behram refers to this: 
Why shouldn’t I have high expectations? We had 200,000 times better life in […] 
communism than right now, so why shouldn’t I be demanding more? It is natural, 
before the war, we were in front of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Eastern Germany, Russia I mean, Soviet Union, all these 
countries, now we are fighting to survive. It is ten years ago. So why shouldn’t I be so 
demanding […] tell me one reason, why not? (interview No. 12, 2005). 
 
The expectations are based on the pre-war experience, when the multiethnic society was 
functioning. Admira Čustarić says that “we had been rich, we had been rich because we 
lived in such a multiethnic society” (interview No. 19, 2005). High living standards and the 
functioning of a culturally-rich society combined with the slow process of development are 
also seen to be responsible for the current passiveness. These four elements that contribute 
to passiveness in general; civil war, socialist legacy, dependency on international 
organisations and the high living standard of the pre-war times are directly interconnected. 
It remains open to which aspect dominates. 
When referring back to the question who is most effected by passiveness, the youth 
as the future generation is facing the especially difficult problems of no perspectives that 
were mentioned. Ivan Jurij, as well as other interviewees (Galić, interview No. 20; Medić, 
interview No. 7; or Hett No. 6, 2005), sees passiveness especially among youngsters: 
“[t]he problem with young people is that we are passive - there are no initiatives from 
young people or those initiatives are not strong enough” (Jurij interview No. 21, 2005). 
Furthermore, Rubeena Esmail-Arndt, from the GTZ unit for civil society, emphasises the 
missing perspective as a reason for the youth’s passiveness: “The problem is that there are 
no perspectives especially for the youth. The worst is actually that they are drawn into it 
[nationalism], so that it [the conflict] could happen again [...]” (interview No. 15, 2005). 
The missing perspective and the school system are often mentioned in connection 
with the problems of the passiveness of the youth. Mili Tiru explains the effects of missing 
perspectives through the lack of economic development: “[w]hat they face is a very 
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difficult situation and those who finish secondary education usually do not have financial 
assistance to go to university. The employment rate is very low and job opportunities are 
also very rare […]” (interview No. 13, 2005). Such a situation in which perspectives are 
rare and the overall economic situation does not support a more optimistic view could 
create fertile soil for nationalism to grow. 
Vesna Frančić reveals the connection between economic development and 
nationalism in a diplomatic way, by emphasising that “[…] if we create better 
opportunities in particular for young people to start with some serious work less and less 
they will have time to look at the other things. Probably yes, the richer you are the less you 
look at other issues [nationalistic parties]” (interview No. 4, 2005). Esmail-Arndt also 
reports from her experience with youth work, that youth are vulnerable to nationalistic 
views: “[...]it’s the mid-20s! I find them very hardened and I do not see them as the ones 
for the country’s future […]” (interview No. 15, 2005). 
The situation for youth to be active and to start interethnic initiatives is also 
especially difficult because of the educational situation. Due to the multiple ethnic groups, 
there are different school curricula - especially history and language is directed towards 
one’s own ethnicity – and they are often influenced by local politics. In concrete terms, this 
means that Bosnian Croat students learn Croatian history and respectively Bosniak 
students learn a different version of history though they are living in the same city. Vanesa 
Galić says that “[…] the political system is very involved in the schooling system here […] 
Schools are divided not only physically but also by curricula; we have Bosniak schools and 
Croatian schools […]” (interview No. 20, 2005).  Through the divided school curricula the 
opportunity for a multiethnic experience is missing (Medić, interview No. 6, 2005; Open 
Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, 13). Young students will not get the 
experience of getting to know each other, of diminishing their fear of the other. 
Mili Tiru also voices his concerns about a divided schooling system that is 
influenced by the nationalists: “[t]here is danger to poison the youth […] we have to talk 
about nationalism because if the young people get to be nationalists […] then it will be 
pretty difficult to change the situation ever. It is an ideal situation for such a tendency […]” 
(interview No. 13, 2005). There are several projects that try to close the gap between the 
different schooling systems but to merge educational institutions seems to be very difficult. 
For example Richard Medić, an OSCE officer, reports that 
The OSCE is planning to unify the curricula to give the Bosniak, Croat students the 
opportunity to study side by side but there is a lot of resistance to that, particularly 
from Croats who feared, I guess, the extinguishment of their language, culture – some 
kind of pre-war neo-nostalgic culture and because of that the international community, 
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so the OSCE decided that it really wasn’t worth trying to take blood out of the stones, 
so to speak […]The main thing that stops development and why it is always two steps 
forward and one step back is in my opinion fear […]” (interview No. 6, 2005). 
 
There is a certain threat that through the divided educational systems, either schools 
or universities, the nationalistic views will be fostered so that sustainable socio-economic 
development will be further hampered. How important multiethnic experiences are is 
described by Čustarić, who has grown up in a peaceful and multiethnic environment: 
The little kids have to learn to live together […] For us it was easy because we know 
how it is to live together, because we went together to school we had lots of interethnic 
marriages […] and now all of a sudden, everything is swept away and they have to 
learn again, what we still know. There is no reason to have a Croat kindergarten or a 
Bosniak kindergarten […] for example we cannot have three different kinds of history 
in school – there has to be one […]” (interview No. 19, 2005). 
 
Thus, it seems that a common experience and a supra-ethnic education are needed to 
build up a civil society where the mechanisms of trust are functioning and economic 
development can take place. Passiveness and ethnic education - especially among youth 
who are seen as the future generation that is responsible for development - are two 
important aspects that limit socio-economic development. There remains a certain threat 
that nationalism manipulates the students who are supposed to develop the city. 
A functioning civil society is the cornerstone and, at the same time, the most 
challenging element for successful post-war recovery. Therefore, the process of 
reconciliation is important  along with an active society. A functioning school system is 
one important institution that could improve civil society. If people are too passive and if 
entrepreneurship is missing, local economic development is restricted, as is the case in 
Mostar. When estimating the importance of social factors contributing to the local 




After the analysis of the four elements that are blocking the socio-economic 
development in Mostar, a summary is needed in order to illustrate the interconnectedness. 
A summary is given in the following Chapter 6, in which also the Figure 7 shows the 
connection between hard economic, internal political, external political and social factors.  
The Figure 7 is an extended version of Figure 6, that is giving an overview over the 




6 Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The final chapter of this thesis addresses three aspects. At first a short summary of 
the procedure of approaching the research question and the theoretical framework of the 
ongoing processes in local socio-economic development is provided. The second part 
draws conclusions from the previous analysis of the factors that limit socio-economic 
development in Mostar. Finally, open questions and further research is considered with an 
outlook to what additional  research could be conducted as well as the application of 
different possible methods concerning the same research question. This thesis in general 
and the analysis and summary in particular were centred around the research question: 
 “What are the hindrances to local socio-economic development in Mostar?” 
This thesis  also addressed the following sub-questions: 
1. Are hard economic factors responsible for the stage of development in Mostar? 
2. How does the local political milieu contribute to the limited development? 
3. To what extent are international organisations fostering or hampering local 
development? 
4. What is the role of civil society in the socio-economic development in Mostar?  
The function of the sub-questions was to make the complex research question more 
concrete. The general question was broken down by addressing hard economic factors, 
internal and external political processes, as well as the role of civil society.  
 
 
6.1 Approaching development in Mostar 
 
The thesis answered the research questions with a set of approaches. At first, an 
introduction to the location was provided and then theoretical components were used to 
discover the overlapping processes. A chapter on methodology lent insight to the 
qualitative methods used and it also revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the 
methodology. However, it is the analysis and the examination of four fields that is the core 
of the thesis. 
Mostar’s current socio-economic development undergoes several processes. There is 
the shift from socialism to a market economy and from war to peace. Consequently, there 
is the postponed transition from a socialist to market economy and the process of conflict 
recovery. 
 98
 Within the process of transition from a socialist to market economy not only 
privatisation and modernisation play an important role, but the quality of human resources 
as explained in the theoretical part is also important. Mostar is facing various problems 
concerning the privatisation process as well as the education of employees; both are 
important aspects in local development. Concepts of transition are explained in order to 
give insight into the complexity of processes.  
The transition from war to peace is characterised by different aspects. On the one 
hand there is the material reconstruction and the build-up of administration; on the other 
hand there is the aspect of civil society development. In a multiethnic environment that has 
experienced a civil war, security and civil society are the foundations of any kinds of 
development that are to occur. In addition, the role of the international organisations within 
the process of post-war development has been discussed broadly as one component in the 
theoretical part. When examining the role of external intervention, political and historic 
background is necessary to understand the current position of actors, such as the OHR or 
the World Bank. Especially when discussing the role of civil society and social capital, the 
role of international intervention and engagement is necessary to examine.  
In order to answer the above mentioned sub-questions, a qualitative methodology 
was used to explore the reasons for the hampered local socio-economic development in 
Mostar ten years after the conflict. The analysis of 23 locally-conducted interviews led to 
these answers.  
 
6.2 Conclusions  
 
My research has concluded that four types of factors act as hindrances to local socio-
economic development in Mostar: 1) hard economic factors, 2) internal political factors, 3) 
external political factors, and 4) social factors. These four fields were established through 
the analysis of the interviews. Even though all of the interviewees mentioned all of these 
fields as being important, the individual importance of each factor is different. 
The first field – hard economic factors - deals with the material reconstruction of the 
war-torn economy and business milieu, the process of privatisation in the context of 
transition and, finally, the quality of human resources and the demands and consequences 
of the labour market. The process of material reconstruction also includes the support and 
intervention of international aid organisations.  During the first years after the conflict, 
these material (infrastructure) improvements were more important to local development 
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than the build-up of functioning administration capacities. Some interviewees mentioned 
the missing physical infrastructure to be an aspect that is somewhat responsible for the 
hampered local development, but in general the process of material recovery is almost 
complete and therefore not the most important limiting factor. 
More important is the uncompleted and postponed process of privatisation. Many 
state-owned firms could not be privatised because of inefficiency or a lack of external 
investors. Also, non-transparent connections and informal networks are hampering the 
process of privatisation. Due to the low investment rate from domestic investors, foreign 
investment is needed for successful development. However, foreign investors are often 
difficult to find because the legal situation is unclear and the local industrial potential is 
low. Inefficient firms and a bad local image contribute to the difficulty for attracting 
foreign direct investments as well. Especially in a war-torn society that lacks domestic 
potential, foreign direct investment is needed to stimulate the local development. 
When examining the labour market then, the changes of working regimes and the 
lack of skilled labour have a negative impact on local development. There is a serious lack 
of skilled labour especially, for example, in the city administration, but also in state-owned 
firms. On the contrary, the rate of unemployed people is very high and the emigration of 
young and highly-educated, and therefore of the potential labour force, is a response to the 
situation. So there are two opposite trends that have a limiting outcome: the lack of skilled 
labour and the enormous rate of unemployment. 
The second field that plays a role in local social development in Mostar is the field of 
internal political factors, as part of the local governance structure. The focus of this field 
was problematic to study because local parties are nationalist and ethnically-defined. The 
local political scene in Mostar represents the ethnic composition of the city after the 
conflict. Each party, the HDZ or SDA, is ethnically-defined and tend to represent 
nationalist positions. Those positions can hamper the decision making process in the new 
city administration. Especially cultural or minority rights issues are often responsible for 
blocking strategies that affect other issues, which are frequently neutral. 
Often the parties cannot agree on strategies for the entire city’s development because 
too many sensitive issues are unsolved. The unsolved problems at the local level and the 
mutual blocking strategies are often the reason for international organisations, in the form 
of the OHR, to intervene in order to ensure that urgent problems are solved. There is also a 
tendency to keep up the nationalist stances of each party. Personal gain and an insecure 
environment create fertile soil for the persistence of nationalism. Nationalist policies tend 
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to address historic issues rather than address local development issues. These radical 
national stances also block the process of reconciliation, which affect the build-up of civil 
society. 
Overall, the political division along ethnic lines does not allow the occurrence of 
economically-oriented parties, which could solve the lack of development strategies. In 
general, political participation is decreasing and the people’s interest in nationalist local 
politics is decreasing. Even though the people’s interest in local politics is decreasing, the 
political parties are still very powerful with close and often informal connections to the 
business scene. 
The third field is the impact of external political factors, namely the role of 
international organisations in Mostar. They are heavily involved in local politics and can 
be seen as an independent, third political actor besides the two locally-anchored parties. 
There is a high degree of fundamental criticism of international intervention in local 
politics. The OHR’s mandate to intervene in local politics when a consensus in local 
politics cannot be reached is frequently applied and unacceptable to most politicians and 
residents. Therefore, the OHR’s deep involvement in the local governance does not support 
the process of democratisation and political participation. Its external action by 
authoritative and non-democratic means often causes dissatisfaction and mistrust among 
politicians and citizens. 
Through this high degree of intervention in local politics the people’s sense of 
responsibility and public participation is not at all fostered; on the contrary, people’s 
willingness to participate in democratic procedure is decreasing through increasing 
external interference. Such a high degree of intervention can be seen as responsible for the 
so called ‘dependency syndrome’. This occurs when local authorities rely on the OHR’s 
intervention, instead of focusing on strategies that solve the technical and political 
problems of the city. The city administration of Mostar is an especially good example of 
how rigorous international organisations use the tool of quick decision-making process 
without democratic means. Whenever it comes to ‘hot topics’, such as cultural issues, 
international organisations tend to implement the reform without the support of the local 
political actors because it would take too much time to find a consensus. In addition to the 
consequences of the high degree of intervention, the unbalanced policies that are addressed 
towards one of the ethnic groups often cause more problems than solutions. The analysis of 
the interviews leads to the conclusion that external political factors are contribute to a high 
degree to stagnating local development.  
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The fourth and most important field that could be determined is the one of social 
factors in the context of local socio-economic development. Most importantly, there is a 
serious lack of civil society in Mostar among the ethnic groups, which is needed so that 
rational rather than ethnic decisions for economic activities can be made. This lack is 
responsible for the missing mechanisms of trust and positive outcomes of social capital; 
therefore, the preconditions for economic development are missing. 
Often war experiences and feelings of fear directed towards the other ethnic group 
are still deeply rooted in the people’s actions. Distrust of the ‘others’, frustration about the 
stagnating economic development and a lack of perspectives are often mentioned to be at 
the heart of absent ideas and initiatives. Especially among youngsters, ethnic division 
through divided education systems leads to distrust and the potential for nationalism. 
Due to the lack of civil society there is also a lack of positive social capital. Positive 
social capital can be defined as interethnic and democratic. The so-called ‘Mostar-spirit’ 
that existed during Yugoslavian times was responsible for a special atmosphere in Mostar 
in which business and economic actions could take place. It is now replaced by a lack of 
perspective and a persistence of distrust against the other ethnic group. A surprising aspect 
that was revealed in this study is the fact that not only does distrust between ethnic groups 
hamper the development of economic activities, but likewise does the distrust between the 
‘old Mostarians’ and recent arrivals. During the war the demographic composition of 
Mostar was radically changed through massive refugee movements and ethnic cleansing. 
Therefore, distrust within each ethnic group between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ residents was 
created and is often mentioned to be an additional cause for the lack of a civil society. 
Without any external support reconciliation and the build-up of civil society seems to be 
doomed to fail. Furthermore, there is a certain gap between the decreasing international 
support and the urgent need for reconciliation programmes. 
Even though these four fields are responsible for the stagnation in socio-economic 
development, it seems that the aspects of civil society and the role of international 
organisations are the most important. If these aspects were to see positive development, 
then the ground would be prepared for changes in local politics. When there is a 
functioning civil society there will also be a shift towards less nationalistic stances in local 
politics. However, there is a high degree of interconnectedness among all four factors: 
economic, internal political, external political and social factors; Figure 7 shows how they 
are related. Every single field of factors contributes to local development and is 
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interconnected to the others. It seems impossible to explain a certain phenomenon of 
development by simply one single factor.  
 
 
Figure 7: Interconnected factors of local socio-economic development, detailed display  
 
Local post-conflict socio-economic development is a dense fabric of intertwined 
factors; economic, internal and external political, as well as social factors are responsible 
for the success or failure of local development. This figure also shows the detailed 
attributes that were examined in the case of Mostar in the analysis of 23 interviews and 
additional literature. Furthermore, the applied qualitative methodology is not well designed 
to weigh the different fields, but the quality and the quantity of the answers led to the 
conclusion that in a post-war situation, such as in Mostar, the aspect of civil society is the 






6.3 Further research and discussion 
 
During my fieldwork and the writing process several questions arose. There are 
questions concerning the methodology connected to the same research question and there 
are also new questions raised concerning new topics. One could either examine the same 
question through different means or follow the new questions that arose. 
Regarding methodological approaches targeting the same research question, the 
advantages and disadvantages of qualitative applied methodologies ask for further, maybe 
quantitative research. Even though it was necessary to investigate the field with qualitative 
means first in order to know which kind of factors are important, a quantitative 
methodology could clarify questions concerning the importance and priorities of the four 
fields used in this work in detail. This can be a tool to examine the research question with 
other means for a deeper and properly-based insight into the overlapping and intertwined 
processes. Consequently, such an application of quantitative methods would lead to 
statistical rather than analytical generalisations (Yin 1994).   
Regarding the newly-raised questions, there is a much broader variety possible. I 
focus on the personally-interesting issues connected to lack of social capital that are worth 
examining in detail. As described above, there is a lack of positive, or bridging, social 
capital the role of which is worth investigating for post-conflict situations in particular 
(Pickering 2006). Questions, such as: ‘How can bridging social capital be created?’ or 
‘What is the role of social capital at an individual and at a collective/ethnic level?’ are just 
two of many questions that occurred during my research. These research questions ask for 
different methods. A combined methodology, such as participant observation and 
interviews or questionnaires could be used to answer these issues.  
In addition, it would also be interesting to compare the findings of Mostar with 
similar cases in Bosnia or in other post-conflict areas in the Balkans in order to derive 
theoretical findings on local post-conflict development in general. Tuzla in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Mitrovica in Kosovo would both suita further comparison due to their 
ethnically-divided city structures and similar problems of local socio-economic 
development. For me, there has always been the question of whether these findings can be 
transferred to other cities and other countries- further research  would help to confirm this 
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 8 Appendices 
 
The appendices contain: 
 
a) Appendix 1: Detailed  list of interviews, interviews, and positions 
 
b) Appendix 2: Standardised form of an interview 
 





Appendix 1: Detailed  list of interviews, interviews, and positions 
 





Erich Rathfelder Sarajevo 20.11.05 German 1:40 min 
2 KfW (Bank for Reconstruction) 
 
Olaf Zymelka Sarajevo 21.11.05 German 0:53 min 







Sarajevo 21.11.05 English notes = 35 min2
4 World Bank 
 
 
Vesna Frančić     Sarajevo 22.11.05 English 0:44 min
5 KAS (Konrad Adenauer Foundation) 
 
Ivana Marić     Mostar 22.11.05 German 0:51 min
6 Dzemal Bjelić University Mostar 
 
Osman Pajić   Mostar 23.11.05 English transl.
Bosniak 
 0:59 min 
7 OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) 
Richard Medić     Mostar 23.11.05 English 0:45 min
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8 OSCE (Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe) 
Katrin Hett Mostar 23.11.05 English 0:59 min + notes 
=1:25 min3
9 FDM (Tobacco Firm Mostar) 
 
Bakir Pekušić     Mostar 24.11.05 German 0:54 min
10 OHR ( Office of the High 
Representative) 
 
Sanela Tunović     Mostar 24.11.05 English 0:45 min
11 LINK (Business development 
agency) 
 
Mihalia Bektaš Mostar 24.11.05 English 0.44 min 
12 City Administration, Department for 
Urban Planning  
 
Alexander Stuhler Mostar 24.11.05 English 0:21 min + notes = 
1:054 min 
13 RTV Mostar (Radio and Television 
Mostar) 
Mirsad Behram Mostar 25.11.05 English 0:55 min 
14 Pavarotti Centre (Common Cultural 
Center) 
Mili Tiru Mostar 26.11.05 English transl. 
Bosniak 
1:02 min 





Sarajevo    27.11.05 German 1:01 min





Sarajevo    28.11.05 German 1:02 min




Sarajevo    28.11.05 German 0:59 min
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18 City Administration BSC (Business 
Service Centre) 
 
Admira Čustarić     Mostar 29.11.05 German 1:10 min
19 HDZ (Croat People’s Party) 
 
Damir Džeba Mostar 29.11.05 English 1:05 min 
20 Tourism Agency Herzegovina Mia Šarić      Mostar 29.11.05 English 0:53 min
21 Redah (Regional Development 
Agency Herzegovina) 
Ivan Jurilj Mostar 30.11.05 English 0:54 min 
22 Nansen Dialogue Centre  
 
 
Vanesa Galić     Mostar 30.11.05 English 1:02 min
23 City Administration, City Council Mustafa Alendar Mostar 01.12.005 German 0:21 min  
 
Total:  01 interview failed (UNDP)            total hours ca.  21h: 30 min 
 22 interviews can be seen as successful 
09 interviews in German 
          14 interviews in English, (incl. two translated interviews) 
 16 interviews in Mostar 
 07 interviews in Sarajevo 
 
                                                 
1 Time of recorded interview, it does not cover the whole conversation 
2 It was not allowed to record, and as the interviewees were not been prepared, the interview can be seen as a failure 
3 Technical difficulties lead to an interruption of the interview, notes became necessary 
4  see footnote 3 
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Appendix 2: Standardised form of an interview 
 
1. Introduction  
a. Introduction of me and my intention 
b. general questions on the functions and tasks of the institution/ firm/ organisation 
c. Detailed sub-questions on their tasks and challanges 
 
2. General discussion about the branch of business 
a. How is the climate of the branch? 
b. Are the individual conditions representatives of the whole branch? 
c. Are local governance structures affecting your actions 
 
3. Personal questions about society and living conditions 
a. What is your personal estimation of the socio-economic situation? 
b. What is your impression of the quality of society? 
c. (What is abuot the some parts of the society?- differences in the different strata of 
society?) 
d. Do you have personal experience with socio-economic development? 
 
Attached there are two examples of structured interviews that are examples of how broad 
the questions were. Each interview differed, the types of questions differed as well as the 
order. In addition, the structure was often not followed and newly-occurring questions 
were introduced. 
 
Example 1 International Organisations 
 
Interview partner: Kfw, Worldbank, Gtz, OHR 
 
 
1. Current stage of local development 
a. How would you estimate the overall economic situation for the region of Mostar? 
b. How would you describe the state of public administration and local governance? 
c. What is the stage of forthcoming in building civil society? 
 
2. Challenges of local development 
a. What are the main challenges concerning local development, where are the main 
problems? 
b. Which factors/ variables are most important for local development? 
c. Who are the main actors in local development and how do they cooperate? 
d. Is ethno-nationalism an influencing factor in sustainable local development? 
e. If yes, how does it appear? In what kind of fields (politics, business, (civil) society)? 
f. Is there a different pace of local development for the different (ethnic) groups? 
g. What kind of role does the memory of war still play? 
 
3. Your organisation 
a. How does your organisation influence local development? 
b. What are the main challenges to your work? 
c. Which actors do cooperate most and which do not? 
d. Is there a correlation between institution and the degree of cooperation? 










Example 2  Firms 
 
Interview partner: Tobacco Firm Mostar 
 
 
1. Current economic situation  
a. How would you estimate the overall economic situation for the region of Mostar? 
b. How would you describe your own economic situation after 2000? 
c. Is there an increasing future perspective? 
 
2. Challenges of business 
d. What are the most important challenges to overcome the current problems? 
e. Are local governance and the political situation limiting factors to regional 
development? 
f. How do you value the work of the international organisations? 
g. Is there a lack of skilled labour? 
h. Do you have to face a lack of infrastructure that hinders your business?  
i. Are the material damages of war still important to you? 
j. Would you say that it is more difficult for a firm from BiH to do business than 
from somewhere else? Is there a certain image of the region? 
 
3. Your business 
k. Where do you sell the goods mainly? Who is the main purchaser? 
l. How is the personnel structure of the firm? Where do the employees come from? 
m. Did you have any problems concerning teamwork caused by ethnic tensions? 
Do you invest in the region? Where mostly? 
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